Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of abuse of a child, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, aiding and abetting aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and promoting obscenity to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting Defendant’s female cousin’s testimony about past sexual abuse as propensity evidence; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence at trial as to each element of the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child; and (3) the district court erred in finding a witness was unavailable to testify at trial and admitting her preliminary hearing testimony, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Page" on Justia Law

Larry Solomon was the chief judge of the Thirtieth Judicial District of Kansas. Judge Solomon was appointed to serve as judge judge in 1991 and has been reappointed continuously through the present. Under Kan. Stat. Ann. 20-329, as amended by section 11 of H.B. 2338, Judge Solomon’s current term will end on January 1, 2016, and under Supreme Court Rule 107(a) his current term will end on December 31, 2015. On February 18, 2015, Judge Solomon filed a petition seeking a declaration that section 11 of H.B. 2338 is an unconstitutional encroachment on the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court to administer the judiciary of the state and that if section 11 were declared unconstitutional, the remainder of the bill could not be saved. The district court granted Judge Solomon’s motion for summary judgment and struck all of H.B. 2338 because of a nonseverability clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 11 of H.B. 2338 is unconstitutional, and Rule 107 remains in full effect. View "Solomon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant’s lawyer subsequently filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial judge denied. Defendant also filed a pro se motion, which the district judge construed as a motion for new trial. In his motion, Defendant argued, in relevant part, that his lawyer had failed to put on evidence in Defendant’s defense. Characterizing Defendant’s arguments as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district judge concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the court of appeals said that Defendant could challenge his trial counsel’s effectiveness through a later motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. Defendant subsequently filed a section 60-1507 motion, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective in several respects. After an evidentiary hearing, the district judge denied Defendant relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) conflict existed between Defendant and his lawyer at the hearing on the motion for new trial; and (2) Defendant’s remaining allegations were without merit. View "Fuller v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of domestic battery, which was treated as a person felony based on Defendant’s criminal history. The district court imposed the minimum ninety-day confinement required by statute, followed by twenty-four months of probation. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a district court may impose up to sixty months of probation on persons convicted of felony domestic battery in accordance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6608(c)(6). Defendant appealed, arguing that he could only be sentenced to twelve months of probation pursuant to the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a statutory limit, the duration of the probation term for felony domestic battery is a probation condition within the district court’s discretion; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve twenty-four months of probation. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

In 2000, at the age of eighteen, Defendant was convicted as an adult of murder. In 2012, Defendant filed a second petition for collateral relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process because he was convicted while mentally incompetent. Although Defendant’s motion was entitled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,” the district court deemed the motion a collateral challenge under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 and assigned it both a civil case number and a criminal case number. In the civil case, the court summarily denied the motion, determining that the pleading was both untimely and successive. In the criminal case, the court dismissed the motion, concluding that it was without merit. Defendant filed two notices of appeal, one to the Court of Appeals from the civil decision and one to the Supreme Court from the criminal caption. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that his conviction amounted to a denial of due process because, at the time of trial, he was a juvenile who suffered from a mental defect that rendered him incompetent. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that because Defendant's claim was procedural, not jurisdictional, Defendant could not prevail in his claim that his sentence was illegal. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder. The district court imposed the mandated sentence of lifetime imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err when it failed to order sua sponte a competency evaluation; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to inquire further into Defendant’s reasons for filing motions requesting the appointment of new counsel; and (3) Defendant’s claim that the district court judge allegedly misspoke during his reading of the instructions to the jury was without merit. View "State v. Marshall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to a hard fifty sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the sentencing scheme under which Defendant was sentenced has been declared to be unconstitutional, and therefore, Defendant must be resentenced; (2) this was not a multiple acts case requiring a unanimity instruction; (3) the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were in error, but the error was harmless; (5) Defendant was not convicted in violation of the corpus delicti rule; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (7) the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a search of Defendant’s outbuilding; and (8) Defendant was not denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. View "State v. Sprague" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy involving his three-year-old twin daughters. The bulk of the evidence at trial against Defendant was Defendant’s admissions to others, including law enforcement, that he had committed the offenses. Defendant received four life sentences. The court of appeals affirmed all four convictions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions for aggravated indecent liberties with a child and the consecutive life sentences imposed for them, holding, inter alia, that Defendant’s confessions concerning one victim were sufficiently truthworthy to establish the corpus delicti; but (2) reversed both aggravated criminal sodomy convictions, holding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on alternative means of committing that crime without supporting evidence for each means presented to the jury, and the court of appeals erred in applying the invited error doctrine to preserve those convictions. View "State v. Dern" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in a compensable workplace accident. Prior to his injury, Appellant was receiving social security retirement benefits and earning additional employment income without a reduction in his social security because he had reached full retirement age. Based on Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501(h), the offset statute, an administrative law judge determined that Employer could use Appellant’s social security benefit to offset its workers compensation obligation. The Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s offset, holding that section 44-501(h) does not apply when the claimant has reached full retirement age and was already receiving social security retirement benefits at the time of injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Dickens v. Pizza Co., Inc. and its progeny, which limited the statutory offset under section 44-501(h) and permitted already-retired claimants working to supplement their social security at the time of injury, improperly give effect to a perceived legislative purpose underlying section 44-501 that is contrary to the statutory text’s clearly expressed meaning; and (2) section 44-501(h) unambiguously provides that any workers compensation payments are subject to the offset when the injured worker is simultaneously receiving social security retirement benefits. View "Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc." on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint charging Defendant with one count of felony theft by deception. Both parties submitted instructions to the trial court setting out the elements of theft by unauthorized control. The jury found Defendant guilty of felony theft. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the conviction was the result of error invited by both parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties never raised on appeal the discrepancy between the charge and the instruction, and therefore, the case must be analyzed on the terms that the parties argued it, as a matter of whether the evidence sufficed to sustain a conviction for theft by deception; and (2) considered from a sufficiency of the evidence perspective, the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of theft by deception. View "State v. Laborde" on Justia Law