Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two alternative counts of first-degree felony murder, attempt to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other criminal offenses. The district judge imposed a hard twenty life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction, a consecutive sixty-month sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, and concurrent sentences for the remaining three convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and felony murder and that the district court judge imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and felony murder; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

More than a dozen years after Appellant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of manufacture of methamphetamine, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the court failed to provide lesser included offense instructions for felony murder and because the charging document was fatally defective. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Appellant’s claims was properly raised through a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and even if the Court were to construe Appellant’s motion as a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, it was untimely. View "State v. LaMae" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested under suspicion of driving while under the influence and taken to a law enforcement center. Defendant refused to provide a breath sample for testing, so a law enforcement officer applied for and received a warrant to search Defendant’s blood. Defendant was subsequently charged with refusing to submit to testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of section 8-1025. The district court dismissed the charge against Defendant that alleged a violation of section 8-1025, finding that the statute violated Defendant’s due process rights and violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the holdings in State v. Ryce, which stated that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, are equally applicable to Defendant and resolve his case. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and transported to the county jail, where he refused to submit to a death test. The State charged Defendant with refusing to submit to testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025(a). The district court dismissed the section 8-1025 charge, concluding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 does not withstand strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests and therefore violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Ryce" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. He was taken to the county jail, where he read an implied consent advisory advising him of the consequences if he refused to consent to a breath-alcohol test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his breath test results, contending that his consent to the test was not voluntary, and therefore, the test violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. The district court concluded that Defendant’s consent to the breath test was not freely and voluntarily given. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s consent was involuntary because it was obtained by means of an inaccurate and coercive advisement and, therefore, the district court correctly suppressed Defendant’s breath-alcohol test results. View "State v. Nece" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, refusing to submit to an evidentiary test under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, and related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or suppress evidence, arguing that section 8-1025, which criminalized his refusal to submit to a breath test, was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that section 8-1025 was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and also imposed an unconstitutional condition on the privilege to drive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional. View "State v. Wycoff" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the statewide directive issued by David Harper, the Director of Property Valuation, to county appraisers requiring compliance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-1460. Under the statute, when a property owner successfully appeals a property valuation, the valuation may not be increased during the next two years unless certain conditions are met. In general, all other taxable real property is reappraised at fair market value annually. Petitioners, twenty-one boards of county commissioners, filed this original action in mandamus to challenge the constitutionality of section 79-1460 and Harper’s directive. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) the statute is unconstitutional to the extent it prevents appraisers from valuing real property at its fair market value in any tax year; and (2) the constitutionally offending provisions are severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Bd. of Johnson County Comm'rs v. Jordan" on Justia Law

After Appellant quit her job, a Kansas Department of Labor denied Appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits. The Kansas Employment Security Board of Review affirmed the examiner’s denial. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, which the Board declined to entertain. Thirty-six days after the Board mailed its decision affirming the examiner, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review. The district court judge dismissed Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction because the thirty-six days exceeded a sixteen-day finality time period provided for in the Kansas Employment Security Law and a thirty-day filing deadline under the Kansas Judicial Review Act. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s motion for Board reconsideration of its initial decision was within the sixteen-day window for finality under the version of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-709(i) in effect at the time, and Appellant’s petition for judicial review was filed well before thirty days since the Board’s final order had passed. Remanded. View "Norris v. Kan. Employment Security Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Paul Sykes was convicted of burglary and aggravated sexual battery. Prior to the expiration of his sentence, the State filed a petition seeking to have Sykes adjudicated a sexually violent predator. Although Sykes was found incompetent to assist in his own defense, the district court ultimately ruled Sykes was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The court of appeals affirmed. Sykes appealed, arguing that due process requires that a respondent be mentally competent to assist in his or her own defense in order to be civilly adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication, holding that a respondent need not be competent to be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, and therefore, Sykes did not suffer a violation of his due process rights. View "In re Care & Treatment of Sykes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder. Before sentencing, the district judge ruled that Defendant qualified for Stand-Your-Ground immunity from prosecution on the attempted second-degree murder charge. The judge vacated the second-degree murder conviction and dismissed that charge. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s immunity order and reinstated Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction, holding that the district judge had no legal basis for his unilateral decision. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction because the district judge had entered a judgment of acquittal on the charge; and (2) a district judge may sua sponte grant Stand-Your-Ground immunity to a criminal defendant after a jury has returned a guilty verdict but before sentence on the conviction has been pronounced. View "State v. Barlow" on Justia Law