Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, criminal threat, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant’s first trial ended in a postconviction mistrial. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that his aggravated kidnapping sentence was illegal based on State v. Murdock. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Defendant’s motion, holding (1) juror misconduct occurred but the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) any errors that occurred during trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Defendant’s argument that his sentence was illegal was resolved by State v. Keel, which overruled Murdock. View "State v. Corey" on Justia Law

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and refusing a preliminary breath test. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stipulated facts were insufficient to prove that she operated or attempted to operate a vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the applicable statute, as taking actual physical control of a vehicle does not satisfy the operate or attempt to operate element of DUI; and (2) the stipulated facts presented by the parties were sufficient to prove that Defendant attempted to move the vehicle. View "State v. Darrow" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and burglary. The district court sentenced Defendant to life without the possibility of parole for twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision term, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s vehicular burglary conviction; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) the district court’s jury instruction on aiding and abetting was not in error; (5) the district court did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by authorizing the state to prosecute Defendant as an adult; and (6) the district court erred by noting within the journal entry of judgment that Defendant was subjected to lifetime postrelease supervision for all of his convictions. Remanded. View "State v. Potts" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to charges of second-degree intentional murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Later, Petitioner was placed in administrative segregation in response to threats of gang violence and possible involvement in contraband trafficking. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his continued administrative custody, lasting over 1,000 days, violated his due process rights. The district court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that, without at least a prima facie showing of unusually harsh conditions, continued incarceration in segregated custody does not infringe on a protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner’s petition for review. Noting that Petitioner was no longer placed in administrative segregation, the Court denied relief, as Petitioner’s request for relief was moot, but the Court nevertheless issued this opinion to provide guidance to courts as they countered liberty interest claims in the future. The Court then concluded that duration of segregated placement is a factor that courts must consider in determining whether an inmate has met the standards for demonstrating a liberty interest infraction. View "Jamerson v. Heimgartner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, was disciplined for violating K.A.R. 44-12-301, the regulatory prohibition on fighting. Petitioner filed a Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1501 petition against the warden of the correctional facility where Petitioner was incarcerated, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the finding by the hearing officer that Petitioner violated K.A.R. 44-12-301 was unsupported by the evidence. The district court reversed the disciplinary hearing panel’s findings, ruling that the hearing officer could not have reasonably found Petitioner guilty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Petitioner was not accorded due process when he was found to have violated K.A.R. 44-12-301, as there was a complete failure of proof of one of the elements of the offense. View "May v. Cline" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 2008 of one count of DUI. Defendant’s 2008 conviction was classified as a fourth DUI. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a mandatory fine. The court of appeals vacated the sentence and “remanded for resentencing,” concluding that the district court erred by failing to consider community service in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. Before the district court held the remand hearing, the legislature in 2011 amended the DUI lookback provisions so that, at the time of the remand hearing, Defendant would have been resentenced for a first DUI rather than a fourth DUI. In 2012, the district court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to resentence Defendant and allowed him to perform community service in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. Defendant appealed, arguing for a retroactive application of the 2011 amendment to his 2008 conviction. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Reese. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s sentence for a fourth DUI conviction, concluding that Defendant was neither sentenced nor resentenced in 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was never resentenced, and therefore, his claim to the benefit of the 2011 lookback period failed. View "State v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Water District No. 1 (WaterOne) of Johnson County filed an eminent domain petition seeking to condemn ten tracts of land. WaterOne pleaded that its interests would be “‘[s]ubject to existing easements of record.’” The district court granted the petition. D.P. and Wanda Bonham and their trust (collectively, the Bonhams) owned an easement in one of the ten condemned tracts. The Bonhams appealed the condemnation award and moved to void the district court’s order, asserting that WaterOne took their easement without complying with the Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA) as to their easement. The district court denied the Bonhams’ motion to void, concluding that WaterOne did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that WaterOne’s petition contained no statutory defects; and (2) the Bonhams failed to establish an error in the journal entry. View "Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson County v. Prairie Ctr. Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Johnson County appraised the value of Kristin Wagner’s property at $569,000. Wagner filed a protest form with the Court of Tax Appeals (COTA), which determined that the appraised value for tax year 2011 should be reduced to $553,600. Wagner appealed. While the 2011 appeal was pending, the County appraised Wagner’s property for the 2012 tax year at $537,000. Wagner challenged the 2012 appraisal. On remand, with regard to the 2011 tax appeal, COTA established the the value of Wagner’s home at $494,200. COTA then established the value of Wagner’s property for the 2012 tax year at $494,200 - the same amount as the property’s 2011 final appraised value. Wagner filed a petition for judicial review. The court of appeals affirmed COTA’s decision, ruling that COTA properly used the 2011 valuation to determine the home’s value for the 2012 tax year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA ignored evidence in the record establishing that Wagner’s home suffered a 2.94 percent decrease in value between 2011 and 2012. Remanded with directions that Wagner’s home be valued at $479,600 for the 2012 tax year. View "In re Equalization Appeal of Wagner" on Justia Law

Carol Einsel filed a petition for partition against Rodney Einsel, her ex-husband. The ownership interests at stake involved the Einsel family ranch, which consisted mostly of land and mineral interests. Carol’s claim derived from a journal entry of divorce in the parties’ earlier divorce proceedings. The judge had awarded Carol forty percent of Rodney’s remainder interest in the inheritance he received during the marriage. Before the partition court, the parties primarily argued over whether Carol’s award was an interest in a money judgment or an interest in real property. The partition court found that Carol’s interest in Rodney’s inheritance was $27,521 and granted her a judgment in this amount. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the award was an interest in real property - not a money judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals reached the correct conclusion regarding the nature of Carol’s award - an interest in real property. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Einsel" on Justia Law

Sharon Born, the cousin of John Born, held two installment promissory notes upon which the inter vivos revocable trust created by John (“the Born Trust”) assets had been pledged as security when John died. When Betty Born, John’s wife, attempted to make payments on the notes, Sharon asserted that the notes were in default because of John’s death, that the entire remaining balances were immediately due and payable under the notes’ acceleration clauses, and that Sharon’s only remedy under the security agreements was to accept all of the Born Trust’s pledged assets in full satisfaction of the note balances. Betty, in her capacity as a Born Trust trustee, brought this injunction and declaratory judgment action against Sharon, challenging Sharon’s right unilaterally to effect an acceptance-of-collateral remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for Sharon and ordered the Born Trust to turn over the collateral to Sharon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Born Trust had the right under the promissory notes to pay the accelerated balances due thereon to prevent Sharon’s acceptance of the pledged assets under the security agreement. Remanded. View "Born v. Born" on Justia Law