Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by not granting his motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content obtained from a breath test. Specifically, Defendant alleged that he had been unconstitutionally coerced into submitting to the test because officers threatened to obtain a warrant for a blood test when the officers could have lawfully obtained the warrant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kansas law permits law enforcement officers to to obtain a warrant for a blood draw after a breath test refusal, and therefore, the threat to do so was not coercive. View "City of Dodge City v. Webb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder, aggravated burglary, and attempted rape. The district court imposed the death sentence for the capital murder conviction and time in prison for the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court remanded after finding reversible error relating to Defendant’s capital sentence. After a new sentencing proceeding, the district court imposed the death sentence for the capital murder conviction and prison sentences for the remaining convictions. Defendant appealed, raising several allegations of error. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s capital murder conviction and his death sentence but reversed Defendant’s attempted rape conviction as multiplicitous, vacated his sentence for attempted rape, and remanded for resentencing on the other conviction of aggravated burglary, holding that an intervening change in the law required reversal of Defendant’s attempted rape conviction. View "State v. Kleypas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of capital murder by intentionally killing the victim during the commission of, or subsequent to, the crime of attempted rape, attempted rape, and aggravated arson. The district court imposed a sentenced of death for the murder conviction. During the pendency of this appeal, Defendant died in prison. The Supreme Court decided that only three issues should be addressed on appeal that could posthumously exonerate Defendant on one or more of his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence in the record was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for capital murder and aggravated arson; but (2) Defendant’s attempted rape conviction was multiplicitous with his conviction for capital murder. View "State v. Belt" on Justia Law

After Defendant was convicted of felony theft, a district court hearing was held to pronounce sentence on Defendant and to consider the State’s motions to revoke Defendant’s probation in four earlier cases based on his new conviction. That hearing resulted in several appellate court opinions, this decision being the fourth of them. At the hearing, Defendant was sentenced for his felony conviction, and Defendant’s probation in the prior cases was revoked. All of the sentences pronounced during the hearing were based on Defendant’s criminal history score as reflected on presentence investigation reports. Defendant appealed from the revocation of his probation in three cases, arguing that the district court imposed illegal underlying sentences premised on an erroneous criminal history score resulting from a misclassification of a prior conviction as a person felony. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated Defendant’s sentences, holding that the prior conviction at issue was misclassified as a person felony, and therefore, the resulting sentences were illegal. View "State v. Dickey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, raising several claims of error, including claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that a single error on the part of the prosecutor did not affect the outcome of the trial, and Defendant’s remaining prosecutorial misconduct claims were without merit; (2) Defendant did not meet the clear error standard for reversal based on the district judge’s early mistake in making statements to potential jurors before voir dire; (3) the district judge erred in omitting an instruction on reckless second-degree murder, but the jury would not have reached a different verdict had the instruction been given; and (4) cumulative error did not necessitate reversal. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and other crimes related to the murder of a Topeka attorney. The district judge sentenced Defendant to life in prison for the felony murder count plus 114 months on the remaining counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that a statement made by the prosecutor during closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions; and (2) there was no prosecutorial misconduct in this case. View "State v. Netherland" on Justia Law

During a fight, Defendant killed a pregnant bystander and repeatedly shot one man, resulting in the man’s paralysis. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of attempted first-degree murder and two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. The murder charges were based on Alexa’s law, which defines murder to include the killing of an “unborn child.” To prove the intent requirement of the first-degree premeditated murder counts, the State relied on the transferred intent doctrine, arguing that Defendant premeditated the murder of those with whom he had been fighting and his guilt was the same as it would have been had he hit his intended targets. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the intent element of both first-degree premeditated murder counts, and the district court did not err in providing the jury with instructions on transferred intent; (2) the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on reckless second-degree murder and reckless involuntary manslaughter was harmless; (3) the remainder of Defendant’s challenges to the instructions given in this case did not warrant a new trial; and (4) the cumulative impact of conceded and assumed instructional errors in this case did not require the reversal of Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Seba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s probationary employment was terminated by Kansas State University. Plaintiff sued the University, arguing that her employment termination was in retaliation for her potential claims under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss, determining that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies because Plaintiff was required under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA) to first present her retaliatory discharge claim to the University for determination. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were not governed by the KJRA and, therefore, jurisdiction was proper in the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s tort claim was not governed by the KJRA. Remanded. View "Platt v. Kansas State Univ." on Justia Law

Bromley Quarry operated an underground limestone mine adjacent to Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs sued Bromley Quarry, claiming trespass and conversion of 855,500 tons of limestone. Bromely Quarry admitted that it had trespassed onto the Armstrong property and removed 173,392 tons of rock during the limitations period generally applicable to trespass and conversion claims but denied liability for the remainder (the “disputed rock”). The district court granted summary judgment to Bromley Quarry on Plaintiffs’ claim relating to the disputed rock, and, following a trial, awarded Plaintiffs damages for the 173,392 tons of limestone that the court found was converted during the limitations period. To compute the award for the rock, the district court found Bromely Quarry was a good-faith trespasser. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that Bromley Quarry was not a good-faith trespasser, and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the lower courts erred by relying on an incomplete record to determine when the statute of limitations began running on Plaintiffs’ claims; and (2) Bromley Quarry did not prove it was a good-faith trespasser and therefore was liable for $1,733,920 as the enhanced value of the 173,392 tons of limestone. View "Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case both Defendant and the State urged the Supreme Court to reconsider and alter the legal tests it has applied to claims of prosecutorial misconduct since State v. Tosh. The Supreme Court overruled Tosh and adopted a modified approach that applies to what have historically been known as prosecutorial misconduct claims. Here a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree felony murder and aggravated battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his trial. The Supreme Court overruled the particularized harmlessness inquiry in the context of prosecutorial misconduct claims commanded by Tosh and adopted a simpler second step in the two-step analysis. Specifically, inside the confines of a criminal appeal, the Court will henceforth review prosecutorial behavior for “prosecutorial error.” The two steps in the analysis can now be described as error and prejudice. Further, and reversal of a conviction is not an appropriate sanction for prosecutorial misconduct. Applying the new two-step analysis to Defendant’s claim, the Supreme Court held that no reversible error occurred in Defendant’s case. View "State v. Sherman" on Justia Law