Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the question of what the legislature intended by providing for the creation of a permanent father and child relationship in one statute but only a presumptive relationship in another. Here, Alonzo Smith, who signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP), sought its untimely revocation. The district court concluded that the VAP was legally binding under Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2204 and established Smith as the legal father. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 23-2204 does impose a one-year limitation on a revocation action; (2) Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2208(a)(4) recognizes that a VAP creates a presumption of paternity that can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Smith successfully rebutted the presumption of paternity that statutorily arose from the VAP. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding (1) the VAP at issue in this case was valid and enforceable; (2) individuals who sign a VAP are bound by the rights and responsibilities delineated in Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2204, including the creation of a permanent father and child relationship, if the VAP is not revoked by court order within one year of the child’s birth; and (3) as applied to this case, the VAP established a permanent father and child relationship. View "State ex rel. Secretary of Department for Children and Families v. Smith" on Justia Law

A jury found Cecil Emerson was a sexually violent predator, and the district court ordered him committed. In 2001, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the appeal in 2002 after Emerson’s counsel failed to file a brief. In 2014, Emerson moved the district court to permit an out-of-time appeal of the underlying ruling that he was a sexually violent predator. The district court ruled that it would give Emerson the right to appeal based upon his previous counsel’s lack of action after the notice of appeal was filed and the appeal was dismissed. In 2015, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that Emerson was entitled to an out-of-time appeal based on principles of fundamental fairness and then rejected Emerson’s arguments. Emerson petitioned for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court lost jurisdiction to authorize the filing of the out-of-time direct appeal when the initial appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the district court could not set aside the order of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the appeal. View "In re Care & Treatment of Emerson" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Mission passed a Transportation User Fee (TUF), which is assessed on all developed real property based on a formula that estimates the number of vehicle “trips” a particular property generates. The revenue raised by the TUF is used for the maintenance and upkeep of the City’s streets. Plaintiffs challenged the TUF as an impermissible excise tax levied by the City in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-194. The district court granted summary judgment to Mission. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the TUF is an impermissible excise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mission is prohibited from levying the TUF because the City’s TUF is an excise tax that does not meet any of the exceptions in section 12-194. View "Heartland Apartment Ass'n v. City of Mission" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary and felony criminal damage to property. The district court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for twenty-six months. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred to prevent Defendant from challenging the jury instruction on the elements of burglary; (2) sufficient evidence supported the jury instruction on the elements of burglary, assuming it presented alternative means; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion permitting opinion testimony about the cost to repair a motorcycle. View "State v. Sasser" on Justia Law

Adam Pener was the trustee and personal representative of a trust and estate that owned property condemned by the Kansas Department of Transportation for a highway improvement project. The district court found the damages from the taking were $295,702. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court gave insufficient weight to the replacement value for a fence and to a comparable sale when it calculated the property’s value, and (2) the district court should have awarded him attorney fees and expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation award was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the district court did not err in denying attorney fees and expenses. View "Pener v. King" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and related charges. The court sentenced Defendant to a controlling prison term of 774 months. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition for review in part and affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated the sentence, holding (1) the information charging Defendant with aggravated kidnapping was not so defective as to warrant reversal; and (2) two prior Colorado misdemeanor convictions were improperly classified and aggregated with another misdemeanor conviction to be scored as a person felony for criminal history purposes. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2010, The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) issued a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) construction permit to Sunflower Electric Power Corporation that authorized Sunflower to build a coal-fired electric generating unit at a site where Sunflower already operates a coal-fired station. In Sierra Club I, the Supreme Court held that KDHE had failed to comply with the federal Clean Air Act and remanded the permit to KDHE. On remand, KDHE issued an addendum to the 2010 permit. Sierra Club sought judicial review of that action, arguing, inter alia, that KDHE was required to conduct an entirely new permitting process rather than simply crafting an addendum to the 2010 permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KDHE did not err in adding an addendum to the 2010 permit; and (2) Sierra Club failed to establish any other basis for invalidating Sunflower’s PSD permit. View "Sierra Club v. Mosier" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence and unlawful exhibition of speed. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his driving under the influence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion and convicted Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1565, which prohibits an unlawful “exhibition of speed or acceleration,” was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, and the good faith exception was inapplicable; and (2) alternatively, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ decision that the district court erroneously denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that reasonable suspicion did not exist to conduct the traffic stop; (2) summarily vacated the court of appeals’ determination that section 8-1565 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; and (3) reversed Defendant’s convictions and vacated his sentences and fines. View "State v. Sharp" on Justia Law

The Wabaunsee Board of County Commissioners appointed Robert Miller to serve a four-year term as Wabaunsee County Appraiser. Nearly two years into Miller’s appointment, the Board voted to terminate Miller and stop paying his salary and benefits. Miller exercised his statutory right under Kan. Stat. Ann. 19-431 to have his termination reviewed in an administrative hearing. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ordered the Board to reinstate Miller, but the district court vacated the decision. On remand, the ALJ gave deference to the Board’s decision and upheld Miller’s termination. Miller appealed, arguing that his termination was not in accordance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 19-431 because the Board did not have the authority to terminate a county appraiser. The district court affirmed the termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19-431 did not grant the Board the final authority to terminate Miller’s employment and thereby end his salary and benefits. Remanded with an order to determine the amount of back pay owed to Miller. View "Miller v. Board of Wabaunsee County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated battery. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant moved for a grant of immunity pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5231. After weighing the evidence, the district court granted Defendant immunity and dismissed the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the district court was required to view the evidence in a light favoring the State and, under the correct standard, there was probable cause to rebut Defendant’s claim of immunity and submit the case to a jury. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the decision of the district court, holding (1) because the Court announced a new rule of law enunciated herein, the Court of Appeals must be reversed; and (2) the district court correctly granted Defendant statutory immunity pursuant to section 21-5231. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law