Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant appealed, arguing that an audio recording of a nontestifying informant’s statements were improperly admitted into evidence because the informant’s statements were testimonial and thus violated Defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and Crawford v. Washington. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, under the circumstances, the informant’s statements were not testimonial in nature. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the informant’s statements qualified as testimonial, but the error in admitting the informant’s testimonial evidence was harmless. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder. The crimes were committed in October 1994. In June 1995, the district court sentenced Defendant to a hard twenty-five life imprisonment for first-degree murder and a consecutive 134 months’ imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder. Approximately twenty years later, Defendant filed two motions to correct an illegal sentence. The district court denied the motions. Defendant filed a pro se motion for reconsideration arguing that his sentence was illegal because the hard twenty-five sentence authorized by statute did not come into effect until July 1995. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hard twenty-five sentencing statute applies to certain crimes committed on or after July 1, 1994 and therefore applied to the crimes Defendant committed in October 1994. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

In 1988, Appellant pled guilty to three counts of forgery. Later that year, Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to three life sentences for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2014, Appellant filed a pro se motion entitled “motion to set aside a void judgment” that included eight arguments for why his convictions should not have been sustained. The district court summarily denied Appellant’s motion because it was untimely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that Appellant’s claims were not properly raised through a motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Cotton" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of, among other crimes, battery against a law enforcement officer. The conviction arose from Defendant's act of spitting on Brian Johnson, a detective for the Riley County Police Department. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for felony battery against a law enforcement officer as charged under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5413(c)(3)(D), concluding that the State failed to prove that Johnson was a correctional officer or employee. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated the felony conviction and sentence for battery against a law enforcement officer, holding that because Johnson was not a correctional employee at the time of the spitting incident, Defendant was convicted of a crime for which the State failed to charge or prove all of the elements. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the firefighter’s rule should be extended to law enforcement officers. Officer Juan Apodaca and Officer Jonathan Dulaney suffered serious injuries after attempting to help Matthew Willmore, who had fallen asleep at the wheel. The officers filed a petition alleging that Willmore’s negligence caused them to suffer personal injuries and related damages. They also asserted a claim of negligent entrustment against Willmore’s father. The Willmores filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the firefighter’s rule barred the officer’s claims. Thereafter, Officer Dulaney dismissed his claims against the Willmores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Willmores, concluding (1) the firefighter’s rule “should be and is extended to law enforcement officers”; and (2) the firefighter’s rule barred Officer Apodaca from recovering in this action because he was acting within the scope of his duties as a law enforcement officer at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the firefighter’s rule, first enunciated in Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., is extended to law enforcement officers; and (2) the district judge correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims because of application of the firefighter’s rule. View "Apodaca v. Willmore" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the district court judge lacked jurisdiction to impose multiple, consecutive convictions and sentences for felony murder and aggravated kidnapping. The district court judge summarily denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judge made insufficient findings of fact to allow for meaningful review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court adequately addressed Defendant’s challenge and reached the correct conclusion. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and terroristic threat. The jury unanimously determined that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for forty years should be imposed for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. Defendant later filed a second amended motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the instructions that had been provided to the jury did not clearly specify the standard of proof for finding mitigating circumstances. The district court denied the motion, concluding that even if there were error, it was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. View "State v. Allison" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the question of what the legislature intended by providing for the creation of a permanent father and child relationship in one statute but only a presumptive relationship in another. Here, Alonzo Smith, who signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP), sought its untimely revocation. The district court concluded that the VAP was legally binding under Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2204 and established Smith as the legal father. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 23-2204 does impose a one-year limitation on a revocation action; (2) Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2208(a)(4) recognizes that a VAP creates a presumption of paternity that can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Smith successfully rebutted the presumption of paternity that statutorily arose from the VAP. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding (1) the VAP at issue in this case was valid and enforceable; (2) individuals who sign a VAP are bound by the rights and responsibilities delineated in Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2204, including the creation of a permanent father and child relationship, if the VAP is not revoked by court order within one year of the child’s birth; and (3) as applied to this case, the VAP established a permanent father and child relationship. View "State ex rel. Secretary of Department for Children and Families v. Smith" on Justia Law

A jury found Cecil Emerson was a sexually violent predator, and the district court ordered him committed. In 2001, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the appeal in 2002 after Emerson’s counsel failed to file a brief. In 2014, Emerson moved the district court to permit an out-of-time appeal of the underlying ruling that he was a sexually violent predator. The district court ruled that it would give Emerson the right to appeal based upon his previous counsel’s lack of action after the notice of appeal was filed and the appeal was dismissed. In 2015, Emerson filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that Emerson was entitled to an out-of-time appeal based on principles of fundamental fairness and then rejected Emerson’s arguments. Emerson petitioned for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court lost jurisdiction to authorize the filing of the out-of-time direct appeal when the initial appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the district court could not set aside the order of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the appeal. View "In re Care & Treatment of Emerson" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Mission passed a Transportation User Fee (TUF), which is assessed on all developed real property based on a formula that estimates the number of vehicle “trips” a particular property generates. The revenue raised by the TUF is used for the maintenance and upkeep of the City’s streets. Plaintiffs challenged the TUF as an impermissible excise tax levied by the City in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-194. The district court granted summary judgment to Mission. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the TUF is an impermissible excise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mission is prohibited from levying the TUF because the City’s TUF is an excise tax that does not meet any of the exceptions in section 12-194. View "Heartland Apartment Ass'n v. City of Mission" on Justia Law