Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Defendant’s backpack but that the evidence was nonetheless admissible because it would have been discovered through a valid inventory search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unconstitutional search occurred and that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered through a valid inventory search of Defendant’s backpack. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a pro se Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence, alleging that appointed counsel had a conflict of interest and provided deficient representation. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant was barred by res juicata from relitigating his claims and that his newly asserted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred as a matter of law when it determined that Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was not litigated on direct appeal; but (2) the court of appeals correctly held that Defendant’s claim failed on the merits because he could not demonstrate any prejudice. View "Bogguess v. State" on Justia Law

Mahnaz Consolver hired attorney Bradley Pistotnik to represent her in her personal injury lawsuit. Consolver terminated Pistotnik without cause just before settlement. Thereafter, Consolver hired Stephen Brave, who settled the case for $360,000. The district court concluded that Pistotnik was entitled to a fee in the amount of nearly $87,000 and expenses of approximately $10,000. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district court “stepped outside the legal principles guiding quantum meruit to premise the fee award to Pistotnik on the contingency percentage in the parties’ contract." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the reasonable value of Pistotnik’s services by considering, in part, the terms of the contingency fee agreement between Pistotnik and Consolver. View "Consolver v. Hotze" on Justia Law

A.D.T., a juvenile, pled guilty to first-degree premeditated murder, completed the incarceration portion of his juvenile sentence and was placed on conditional release. A.D.T. subsequently violated his conditional release by twice testing positive for drugs. The district court revoked his juvenile sentence and imposed his adult sentence of life imprisonment. A.D.T. appealed, arguing that manifest injustice was caused to his constitutional rights. The State counted that the district court strictly complied with the provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2364(b) governing the revocation of A.D.T.’s juvenile sentence and the invocation of his adult sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was not manifestly unjust for the district court to impose A.D.T.’s adult sentence for the positive urinalysis tests where (1) although A.D.T. did not receive the recommended substance abuse treatment while in the juvenile correctional facility, that circumstance cannot trump the plain language of section 38-2364(b); and (2) A.D.T. had fair notice and warning that, if he failed another drug test, he was facing a hard twenty-five life sentence as an adult. View "In re A.D.T." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for felony murder and a term of fifteen years to life for aggravated robbery. The district court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to each other and to sentences imposed in separate cases in Saline County and Geary county. This appeal concerned the Saline County District Court’s summary dismissal of Defendant’s fourth motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing judge’s pronouncement of consecutive sentence was not ambiguous; and (2) Defendant failed to show that his consecutive sentencing illegally failed to conform to statutory provisions. View "State v. Swafford" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to a hard forty life sentence. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence claiming that his sentence was illegal because was based on an incorrect criminal history score and that his due process rights were violated when his sentence was imposed based on that error. After a hearing, the district court concluded that Appellant’s criminal history did contain an error but that resentencing was unnecessary because an illegal sentence was not created by this error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hard forty sentencing determination in Appellant’s case did not turn on his criminal history classification and conformed to the then-controlling statutory provision; and (2) Appellant’s due process claim was not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Kingsley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sale of cocaine and was sentenced under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). In calculating Defendant’s criminal history score, the sentencing court classified as a person crime a 1990 felony adjudication for burglary. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the classification of the felony adjudication for burglary was error under State v. Dickey, 350 P.3d 1054 (Kan. 2015) (Dickey I), which held that pre-KSGA convictions and juvenile adjudications of burglary under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3715 must be classified as nonperson felonies. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s sentence based on Dickey I, holding that the sentencing court improperly classified Defendant’s 1990 burglary adjudication as a person felony, resulting in an incorrect criminal history score and an illegal sentence. The court remanded for resentencing with directions to reclassify the 1990 burglary adjudication as a nonperson felony. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a 1993 aggravated robbery and sentenced under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). The sentencing court, in calculating Defendant’s criminal history score, classified as person felonies three residential burglary offenses that Defendant committed in the late 1980s. Defendant filed a motion to correct his aggravated robbery sentence, arguing that the offenses were misclassified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to have the offenses classified as nonperson offenses under State v. Murdock, 323 P.3d 846 (Kan. 2014); (2) Defendant was not entitled to have the offense classified as nonperson offenses under State v. Dickey, 350 P.3d 1054 (Kan. 2015); (3) the KSGA’s person/nonperson classification of pre-KSGA offenses does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s prohibition on nonjury factual findings that increase a defendant’s sentence; and (4) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion without a hearing. View "State v. Collier" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to capital murder and attempted murder. The district court concluded there was a sufficient factual basis to support findings of guilt on the two charges and accepted Appellant’s no contest plea. Before he was sentenced, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant failed to establish good cause for withdrawing his no contest plea. On appeal, Appellant argued that he met the good-cause burden by showing he was misinformed about how his no contest plea might affect his ability to pursue double jeopardy arguments on appeal, and therefore, his plea was not knowingly entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea. View "State v. Reu-El" on Justia Law

More than thirteen years after he was sentenced to life for second-degree murder, Appellant filed a pro se motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504 to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, Appellant claimed that his sentence was illegal because the district court failed to include a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to first-degree murder. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the district court should have construed his pro se pleading as being a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 22-3504(1) was the wrong vehicle to challenge the alleged instruction error, and a section 60-1507 motion was untimely; and (2) further, Appellant’s failure to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter erected a considerable obstacle to obtaining relief. View "State v. Ditges" on Justia Law