Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this contract dispute, holding that the district court correctly found that the contract at issue violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and was therefore unenforceable.Central Kansas Medical Center (CKMC) contracted with Dr. Stanley Hatesohl to provide family medicine services. The contract contained several postemployment covenants. Two years later, Plaintiff resigned and began practice family medicine at Great Bend Regional Hospital’s (GBRH) Central Kansas Family Practice (CKFP) clinic. CKMC sued Hatesohl for violating the postemployment covenants and GBRH and CKFP for tortiously interfering with the contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the basis of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, which forbids a corporation from hiring a physician to practice medicine that the corporation itself is not licensed to provide. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract between Hatesohl and CKMC violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. View "Central Kansas Medical Center v. Hatesohl" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court ordering Devin Wilson to pay Kenneth Risley a jury award in favor of Risley, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the assignment provision in Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-3113a(c) did not divest Risley of the right to recover his medical expenses from the tortfeasor.A jury found Wilson liable in tort for injuring Risley in an automobile accident and awarded Risley the cost of his medical expenses in addition to other compensation. Risley had previously been paid for his medical expenses under the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage of his automobile insurance policy. The jury entered judgment on the entire amount of damages as awarded by the jury. On appeal, Wilson argued that Risley had no right to sue for the medical expenses because the cause of action for those medical expenses had been statutorily assigned pursuant to section 40-3113a(c) to Risley’s PIP insurance carrier. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Risley was entitled to the full damages as awarded by the jury, including any medical expenses that were duplicative of the PIP benefits Risley received from his PIP insurance carrier. View "McCullough v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation and order to serve his underlying prison sentence, holding that the district court failed to follow the applicable statutory provisions governing probation revocation.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the intermediate sanctions to his second probation violation and that the court of appeals erred in determining that the district court had made the particularized findings required to permit it to bypass intermediate sanctions under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3716. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the record reflected a failure to set forth the reasons an intermediate sanction would have been a public safety issue or contrary to Defendant’s welfare. The Court remanded the matter for a new dispositional hearing to comply with section 22-3716. View "State v. Clapp" on Justia Law

At issue was the legal limits of a district judge’s sentencing power after probation revocation.The Supreme Court held in this appeal and in a similar case decided today, State v. Sandoval, __ P.3d __ (this day decided), that (1) after revoking a criminal defendant’s probation, a district judge may choose to sentence anew, even if some aspect of the original sentence was illegal due to a failure to match a mandatory statutory minimum; and (2) if a new sentence is pronounced from the bench after probation revocation, the original illegality no longer exists and, therefore, the new sentence is not subject to correction or challenge under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504. View "State v. Roth" on Justia Law

At issue was the legal limits of a district judge’s sentencing power after probation revocation.The Supreme Court held in this appeal and in a similar case decided today, State v. Roth, __ P.3d __, that (1) after revoking a criminal defendant’s probation, a district judge may choose to sentence anew, even if some aspect of the original sentence was illegal due to a failure to match a mandatory statutory minimum; and (2) in the alternative, a judge may require the defendant simply to serve the original sentence.The Court further held (1) if a new sentence is pronounced from the bench after probation revocation, the original illegality no longer exists and, therefore, the new sentence is not subject to correction or challenge under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504; and (2) if the judge, in the alternative, requires the defendant to serve the original sentence, any original illegality continues to exist and is subject to correction or challenge under section 22-3504. View "State v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc. subject to the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) and compelling it to provide records requested by the State through the Kiowa County Commission but reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand the case for further proceedings.The district court held that an instrumentality of the county such as Great Plains is a public agency and not exempted from KORA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination as to whether the requested documents were relevant to evaluating Great Plains’ performance of its contract terms. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the Court of Appeals decision remanding the case to the district court for further determinations was erroneous because a request under KORA is not limited to performance of contractual terms. View "State v. Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s hard twenty-five life sentence specified by Jessica’s Law under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6627, holding that the district court abused its discretion by relying on factual determinations not properly established by an evidentiary record.This was Defendant’s second appeal from a denial of his motion for downward departure from his hard twenty-five life sentence. The district court here denied the motion after concluding that the asserted mitigating circumstances did not justify departure. The court based its reasoning in part on information gathered from a probable cause affidavit filed by the State with the initial complaint and from unsworn statements made by the victim’s family at sentencing. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that the district court abused its discretion by relying on factual determinations not properly established by an evidentiary record. View "State v. Atkisson" on Justia Law

At issue was a real estate contract containing a “first right of refusal” applicable to a separate land tract.Appellant sought specific performance and title to a smaller parcel that was sold after he failed to respond to an earlier offer to sell the entire tract subject to the real estate contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. A Court of Appeals panel reversed. Defendants petitioned for review solely on the panel’s contractual compliance analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel both misread the contract and improperly inserted terms inconsistent with the plain language under consideration; but (2) the first right of refusal was fulfilled after Appellant failed to respond to the offer to sell him the full tract subject to the contract. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings where there remained an unresolved claim as to whether the parties discharged their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the offer was presented, and the answer to this question will determine whether the first right of refusal provision lapsed when Appellant failed to respond. View "Trear v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court entering judgment upon a jury verdict rendered in favor of Defendant, a doctor, on Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below requiring reversal.Plaintiff filed this action against an emergency room (ER) doctor after his wife died in a hospital room following a visit to the ER. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant negligently provided emergency medical care, resulting in his wife’s death. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. A Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) instructed the jury on a physician’s right to elect treatment; (2) defined “negligence” and “fault” using a comparative fault pattern instruction; and (3) granted a motion in limine prohibiting Plaintiff and his expert witnesses from using derivatives of the word “safe.” View "Biglow v. Eidenberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant’s request for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five life sentence under Jessica’s Law and, in so holding, clarified the process for district court consideration of motions to depart under Jessica’s Law.Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under fourteen, a conviction that carried a hard twenty-five life sentence under Jessica’s Law. At sentencing, Defendant requested a downward departure to 29.5 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and imposed the hard twenty-five life sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the record was ambiguous as to whether the district court weighed evidence about an uncharged prior molestation against Defendant’s evidence in mitigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record did not establish that the district court abused its discretion by improperly weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and (2) district courts considering a departure motion need not affirmatively state they are not weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. View "State v. Powell" on Justia Law