Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that separate damage claims against a deceased trustee for punitive and double damages under Kan. Stat. Ann. 58a-1002 and under the common law relating to a breach of trust and a breach of fiduciary duty may be recovered after the death of a trustee.A Trust and its beneficiaries brought a cause of action for a deceased Trustee’s breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty, seeking punitive damages from the Trustee’s Estate under section 58a-1002(c). On appeal from the judgment of the trial court, the Trust challenged the trial court’s rulings that prevented the jury from considering whether the Trust should receive double or punitive damages against the Trustee’s Estate. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court and court of appeals erred in concluding that Kansas law did not allow consideration of punitive and double damages because of the Trustee’s death. View "Alain Ellis Living Trust v. Harvey D. Ellis Living Trust" on Justia Law

In this case construing the full-performance exception to the statute of frauds, Kan. Stat. Ann. 33-101 et seq., the Supreme Court adopted the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 130, holding that full performance by one party alone is sufficient to remove an agreement from the statute and allows the performing party to enforce the agreement in a court of law.Three employees asked the Supreme Court to enforce their oral agreement with their former employer, arguing that they fully performed their obligation under the agreement and were owed the compensation they bargained for. The court of appeals ruled in favor of the former employer, concluding that the former employer’s duty to pay depended on the action of third parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erroneously construed the full-performance exception; and (2) because the employees completed their employment and fulfilled their end of the bargain, the full-performance exception applied and the alleged oral agreement was removed from the statute of frauds. View "Ed DeWitte Insurance Agency v. Financial Associates Midwest" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this contract dispute, holding that the district court correctly found that the contract at issue violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and was therefore unenforceable.Central Kansas Medical Center (CKMC) contracted with Dr. Stanley Hatesohl to provide family medicine services. The contract contained several postemployment covenants. Two years later, Plaintiff resigned and began practice family medicine at Great Bend Regional Hospital’s (GBRH) Central Kansas Family Practice (CKFP) clinic. CKMC sued Hatesohl for violating the postemployment covenants and GBRH and CKFP for tortiously interfering with the contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the basis of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, which forbids a corporation from hiring a physician to practice medicine that the corporation itself is not licensed to provide. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract between Hatesohl and CKMC violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. View "Central Kansas Medical Center v. Hatesohl" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court ordering Devin Wilson to pay Kenneth Risley a jury award in favor of Risley, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the assignment provision in Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-3113a(c) did not divest Risley of the right to recover his medical expenses from the tortfeasor.A jury found Wilson liable in tort for injuring Risley in an automobile accident and awarded Risley the cost of his medical expenses in addition to other compensation. Risley had previously been paid for his medical expenses under the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage of his automobile insurance policy. The jury entered judgment on the entire amount of damages as awarded by the jury. On appeal, Wilson argued that Risley had no right to sue for the medical expenses because the cause of action for those medical expenses had been statutorily assigned pursuant to section 40-3113a(c) to Risley’s PIP insurance carrier. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Risley was entitled to the full damages as awarded by the jury, including any medical expenses that were duplicative of the PIP benefits Risley received from his PIP insurance carrier. View "McCullough v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation and order to serve his underlying prison sentence, holding that the district court failed to follow the applicable statutory provisions governing probation revocation.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the intermediate sanctions to his second probation violation and that the court of appeals erred in determining that the district court had made the particularized findings required to permit it to bypass intermediate sanctions under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3716. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the record reflected a failure to set forth the reasons an intermediate sanction would have been a public safety issue or contrary to Defendant’s welfare. The Court remanded the matter for a new dispositional hearing to comply with section 22-3716. View "State v. Clapp" on Justia Law

At issue was the legal limits of a district judge’s sentencing power after probation revocation.The Supreme Court held in this appeal and in a similar case decided today, State v. Sandoval, __ P.3d __ (this day decided), that (1) after revoking a criminal defendant’s probation, a district judge may choose to sentence anew, even if some aspect of the original sentence was illegal due to a failure to match a mandatory statutory minimum; and (2) if a new sentence is pronounced from the bench after probation revocation, the original illegality no longer exists and, therefore, the new sentence is not subject to correction or challenge under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504. View "State v. Roth" on Justia Law

At issue was the legal limits of a district judge’s sentencing power after probation revocation.The Supreme Court held in this appeal and in a similar case decided today, State v. Roth, __ P.3d __, that (1) after revoking a criminal defendant’s probation, a district judge may choose to sentence anew, even if some aspect of the original sentence was illegal due to a failure to match a mandatory statutory minimum; and (2) in the alternative, a judge may require the defendant simply to serve the original sentence.The Court further held (1) if a new sentence is pronounced from the bench after probation revocation, the original illegality no longer exists and, therefore, the new sentence is not subject to correction or challenge under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504; and (2) if the judge, in the alternative, requires the defendant to serve the original sentence, any original illegality continues to exist and is subject to correction or challenge under section 22-3504. View "State v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc. subject to the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) and compelling it to provide records requested by the State through the Kiowa County Commission but reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand the case for further proceedings.The district court held that an instrumentality of the county such as Great Plains is a public agency and not exempted from KORA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination as to whether the requested documents were relevant to evaluating Great Plains’ performance of its contract terms. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the Court of Appeals decision remanding the case to the district court for further determinations was erroneous because a request under KORA is not limited to performance of contractual terms. View "State v. Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s hard twenty-five life sentence specified by Jessica’s Law under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6627, holding that the district court abused its discretion by relying on factual determinations not properly established by an evidentiary record.This was Defendant’s second appeal from a denial of his motion for downward departure from his hard twenty-five life sentence. The district court here denied the motion after concluding that the asserted mitigating circumstances did not justify departure. The court based its reasoning in part on information gathered from a probable cause affidavit filed by the State with the initial complaint and from unsworn statements made by the victim’s family at sentencing. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that the district court abused its discretion by relying on factual determinations not properly established by an evidentiary record. View "State v. Atkisson" on Justia Law

At issue was a real estate contract containing a “first right of refusal” applicable to a separate land tract.Appellant sought specific performance and title to a smaller parcel that was sold after he failed to respond to an earlier offer to sell the entire tract subject to the real estate contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. A Court of Appeals panel reversed. Defendants petitioned for review solely on the panel’s contractual compliance analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel both misread the contract and improperly inserted terms inconsistent with the plain language under consideration; but (2) the first right of refusal was fulfilled after Appellant failed to respond to the offer to sell him the full tract subject to the contract. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings where there remained an unresolved claim as to whether the parties discharged their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the offer was presented, and the answer to this question will determine whether the first right of refusal provision lapsed when Appellant failed to respond. View "Trear v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law