Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that the district court did not err in admitting testimony about the videotaped interview of the child victim and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.During trial, the child victim testified as a witness. Later, Kasey Corbett, who conducted a forensic interview of the child, testified about the forensic interview she conducted of the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a forensic interview is not expert testimony, Corbett did not give expert testimony because her testimony did not include any opinion, and the purpose of a taint hearing was accomplished in this case; and (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's aggravated criminal sodomy conviction. View "State v. Howling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child and vacated the portion of district court's judgment imposing postrelease supervision on Defendant's two hard twenty-five life sentences, holding sua sponte that the postrelease supervision order was illegal.Specifically, the Court held (1) harmless prosecutorial error occurred when, in the prosecutor's closing argument, he expanded the time frame in which the crime allegedly occurred; (2) the district court did not err in admitting into evidence a video of an interview of the child victim; (3) Defendant failed to preserve his pretrial objection to the admission of prior acts of sexual misconduct; (4) the district court did not err in not ordering a psychological evaluation of the child victim; (5) cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; but (6) the postrelease supervision order was illegal. View "State v. Ballou" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of aggravated assault and criminal threat, holding that an erroneous judicial comment made in front of the jury that is not a jury instruction or legal ruling will be reviewed as "judicial comment" error under the constitutional harmless test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court judge committed judicial misconduct by commenting during voir dire about a former case in which Defendant was charged with aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State, as the party benefitting from judicial comment error, has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record; and (2) the State met its burden in this case. View "State v. Boothby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of seven sex crimes and reversed the court of appeals, which reversed two of the convictions sua sponte and remanded the case with directions to resentence Defendant for aggravated incest on those counts instead, holding that the court of appeals erred when it reversed Defendant's convictions sua sponte.The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy and rape because it believed that aggravated incest was the more specific crime for both counts. The Supreme Court held (1) aggravated incest, as now defined, is not a more specific crime than aggravated criminal sodomy or rape, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing these convictions; (2) the jury instructions listing criminal sodomy as an alternate to aggravated criminal sodomy were not erroneous; (3) the district court adequately inquired into a potential conflict Defendant had with his attorney; and (4) the jury instruction stating that the "verdict must be founded entirely upon the evidence admitted and the law as given in these instructions" was legally correct. View "State v. Toothman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court upholding the validity of a transfer-on-death deed that was signed by a benefiting party at the direction of the party seeking to make the transfer, holding that the district court did not err.The district court deemed the transfer-on-death deed to constitute an enforceable transfer of Roxie Moore's real property to Maureen Miles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court considered evidence relating to the authority by which Maureen signed the deed, notwithstanding the notary's designation of signature through power of attorney; (2) the district court's determination that Maureen signed the deed as an amanuensis was supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) the facts as found by the district court rebutted the presumption of invalidity of the deed under the clear and convincing evidence standard; and (4) Appellant failed to present even a preponderance of evidence demonstrating that Roxie lacked the capacity to make knowing and understanding conveyance. View "In re Estate of Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that his transfer was retaliatory, holding that the common-law tort of retaliation may be premised on an employer's action short of dismissal or demotion.Plaintiff, a Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) trooper, alleged that the KHP retaliated by requiring him to move across the state to keep his job after the Kansas Civil Service Board ordered the agency to reinstate him to work. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, although the lower courts disagreed as to inquiries at issue on this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding (1) common-law retaliation may be premised on the involuntary job relocation alleged in this case; (2) sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim; but (3) there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction and the sentencing judge's imposition of a registration requirement under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4901 et seq., reaffirming its holding that mandatory KORA registration is not punishment for a criminal conviction.Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant argued that he should have received jury instructions on reckless aggravated battery and that imposition of an offender registration requirement based on a deadly weapon factual finding made by the judge rather than a jury violated his rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the instructions were legally and factually appropriate; and (2) Defendant did not provide any evidence or argument to establish the punitive effects of KORA registration that is any different from that previously rejected by this Court. View "State v. Perez-Medina" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision reversing the revocation of Brenda Rosendahl's driving privileges but affirmed the district court's finding that the statutorily required $50 fee for an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension of driving privileges is unconstitutional, holding that the district court correctly found that Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(d)(2) is unconstitutional but that this judgment did not impact Rosendahl's suspension.In Creecy v. Kansas Department of Revenue, __ P.3d __ (Kan. 2019), decided on this day, the Supreme Court held that the statutorily required $50 fee for administrative hearing to challenge the suspension of driving privileges is unconstitutional. In the instant case, the Supreme Court held (1) for the reasons set forth in Creecy, the district court here did not err in finding section 8-1020(d)(2) unconstitutional; and (2) the officer not had reasonable grounds to request that Rosendahl submit to an evidentiary breath test, and therefore, the district court erred in finding that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to request a breath test. View "Rosendahl v. Kansas Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's upholding the suspension of Michael Creecy's driver's license by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) but held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(d)(2)'s monetary requirement to obtain a due process hearing, without any exception for the indigence of the licensee, renders that provision facially unconstitutional.On appeal, Creecy challenged the constitutionality of section 8-1020(d)(2), which requires a motorist whose driver's license has been confiscated by a law enforcement officer as a consequence of a driving under the influence arrest to pay a $50 fee to be granted an administrative hearing on the issue of the license deprivation. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals and the district court on the constitutionality of section 8-1020(d)(2), holding that the provision is unconstitutional and the remedy is a refund of the $50 fee; and (2) affirmed the suspension of Creecy's driver's license, holding that there was no merit of Creecy's other claims. View "Creecy v. Kansas Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that a $50 fee mandated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(d)(2) to gain administrative review of a driver's license suspension is unconstitutional and affirmed the suspension of Warren Meats' driver's license, holding that Meats was not entitled to relief in this appeal.Meats requested an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension of his driver's license. An ALJ affirmed the suspension. Meats petitioned for de novo review, arguing, inter alia, that the $50 fee required to obtain an administrative hearing was unconstitutional. The district court affirmed the driver's license suspension but ruled that section 8-1020(d)(2)'s requirement as to the fee was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court considered the constitutional argument in Creecy v. Kansas Department of Revenue, __ P.3d ___ (this day decided), and held that the $50 fee requirement in section 8-1020(d)(2) is facially unconstitutional, but because Meats did not appeal the district court's ruling that the issue was moot as to him, Meats was not entitled to relief in this appeal; and (2) there was no merit to Meats' other claims. View "Meats v. Kansas Department of Revenue" on Justia Law