Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Williams Nunez was charged with rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with a person unable to consent due to intoxication. He admitted to the act but claimed the victim was not too intoxicated to consent. A jury convicted him, and the district court sentenced him to 155 months in prison with lifetime postrelease supervision, based on the finding that he was 18 years or older at the time of the crime.Nunez appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey were violated because his age was not determined by the jury. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, concluding that Nunez had sufficiently admitted his age through various documents and statements, and any Apprendi error was harmless.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if Nunez's rights under Apprendi were violated. The court held that for a sentencing court to rely on a defendant's admission to increase a sentence, the admission must follow a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right. Since Nunez did not waive his jury trial rights regarding his age, the court found an Apprendi violation. The court also determined that the error was not harmless because the jury was not presented with evidence of Nunez's age.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the district court's sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The court directed that Nunez be sentenced to 60 months of postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(ii), as this was the appropriate term given the lack of a jury finding on his age. View "State v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Rodney and Tonda Ross, along with Laura Field, sued Norman Terry Nelson and his corporate entities for trespass and nuisance. Nelson operated an industrial hog-farming operation and installed pipelines beneath a public road to transport treated pig waste to his farmland, which caused odors and fly infestations affecting the Rosses' property. The plaintiffs claimed Nelson did not have permission to install the pipelines and that the resulting conditions constituted a nuisance.The Phillips District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the trespass claim, ruling that Nelson needed the landowners' permission to install the pipelines, which he did not have. The court also denied Nelson's motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim, concluding that Nelson was not entitled to the statutory presumption of "good agricultural practice" under Kansas' right-to-farm statutes because his actions violated state law by trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs for both trespass and nuisance, including punitive damages.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that Nelson's installation of the pipelines exceeded the scope of the public highway easement because it was for his private and exclusive use, thus constituting a trespass. The court also agreed that Nelson was not entitled to the right-to-farm statutory protections because his agricultural activities were not "undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws," given the trespass.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that Nelson's use of the public highway easement for private pipelines was outside the easement's scope and constituted a trespass. The court also held that Nelson's agricultural activities did not conform to state law, disqualifying him from the statutory presumption of good agricultural practices and the right-to-farm protections. View "Ross v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Robert William Doelz was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless search, and the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial. Subsequently, Doelz sought compensation for his wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004, which requires proving actual innocence among other criteria.The Shawnee District Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, interpreting K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) to require a claimant to prove that their innocence resulted in the reversal of their conviction, dismissal of charges, or a not guilty verdict upon retrial. The court found that Doelz's conviction was reversed due to a Fourth Amendment violation, not because he did not commit the crime. Since there was no evidence explaining why the charges were dismissed, a material fact remained unresolved. At a bench trial, Doelz testified to his innocence, but the court granted the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Doelz failed to prove the charges were dismissed due to his innocence.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to prove actual innocence and that this innocence led to the reversal, dismissal, or acquittal. The court found that the legislative intent behind the statute was to compensate only those who are factually innocent. Since Doelz did not provide evidence that the charges were dismissed because of his innocence, he did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation. View "In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of Doelz" on Justia Law

Pettix McMillan was convicted of three counts of attempted first-degree murder after shooting his then-wife and two sons. The State sought upward durational departure sentences for the counts involving his sons, citing their vulnerability and McMillan's fiduciary responsibility. The jury found these aggravating factors, and McMillan filed a motion for a downward departure, which the sentencing judge denied. The judge imposed a total sentence of 1,068 months but did not clearly designate a primary count or specify the sentences for each count.McMillan appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals vacated his sentences, finding the total sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 1,029 months, designating count two as the primary count but did not consider McMillan's renewed departure motion. McMillan appealed again, and the Court of Appeals held the district court erred by not considering the departure motion and by imposing a new sentence on counts two and three, which it deemed legal in the original sentencing.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the original sentences were illegal due to the failure to designate a primary count and specify sentences for each count. The Court found the original sentencing judge's intentions unclear and the journal entry inconsistent. It concluded that the McMillan II panel correctly vacated all sentences and that the McMillan III panel erred in limiting the resentencing to count one. The Court also held that the district court on remand must consider McMillan's departure motion, as the mandate rule did not preclude it. The case was remanded for a third sentencing hearing with directions to consider the departure motion and comply with the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. View "State v. McMillan" on Justia Law

Benchmark Property Remodeling, LLC, a construction company, performed remodeling work on a building owned by Grandmothers, Inc., which was leased to the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR). The work was based on quotes finalized between KDOR and Benchmark, and a "Third Amendment to Lease" between KDOR and Grandmothers. Benchmark completed the work and invoiced Grandmothers and KDOR. KDOR paid Grandmothers, but Grandmothers only partially paid Benchmark, withholding some amounts for various reasons. Benchmark sued Grandmothers, KDOR, and others for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims.The Shawnee District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Grandmothers on several claims, concluding there was insufficient evidence of a contract between Benchmark and Grandmothers. The court also granted KDOR's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Benchmark then dismissed its remaining claims without prejudice and appealed the partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.The Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that appellate jurisdiction was proper because Benchmark did not refile its dismissed claims, making the district court's judgment final. The panel reversed the district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings for KDOR, noting significant factual issues regarding the parties' intent. The panel also reversed the district court's summary judgment for Grandmothers, finding that the evidence could support a finding of a contract between Benchmark and Grandmothers.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the district court's partial summary judgment became final with the dismissal of the remaining claims, thus granting appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the existence of a contract, making summary judgment inappropriate. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benchmark Property Remodeling v. Grandmothers, Inc." on Justia Law

Alonzo Union served as the caretaker and power of attorney for Jean Miller, an elderly woman with dementia. Union had access to Miller's finances and was responsible for her care. After Miller moved into a nursing home and accumulated an unpaid bill, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) investigated Union's financial activities. Union entered a no contest plea to mistreatment of a dependent adult. The court ordered Union to pay restitution to the nursing home for Miller's outstanding balance and to Miller for certain payments and cash withdrawals from her account.The Wyandotte District Court accepted Union's no contest plea and found him guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a 43-month underlying sentence, suspended in favor of probation, and ordered Union to pay $31,511.26 in restitution. This amount included $7,632.74 to the nursing home and $23,878.52 to Miller, covering one-half of the ATM withdrawals and Walmart purchases, among other expenses. Union appealed, arguing that the restitution order was not supported by substantial competent evidence. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's restitution order, except for the part that converted the restitution award into a civil judgment.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the portion of the restitution order directing Union to pay the nursing home $7,632.74, finding insufficient evidence that Union's crime caused the unpaid bill. However, the court affirmed the restitution order requiring Union to pay $23,878.52 to Miller. The court concluded that Union's no contest plea established that he misappropriated at least $25,000 from Miller, providing substantial competent evidence to support the restitution amount. The court held that the no contest plea and the well-pleaded facts in the charging document could be considered in determining the restitution award. View "State v. Union" on Justia Law

June R. Crow-Johnson, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in 1990, faced disciplinary proceedings for multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) and Supreme Court Rules. Crow-Johnson was appointed as trustee of a trust in 2019 and failed to perform her fiduciary duties, including failing to communicate with beneficiaries, safeguard trust property, and file necessary tax returns. Additionally, she misrepresented her actions to the court and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Crow-Johnson also neglected to file tax returns for the Topeka Bar Association (TBA) and misled them about the status of these filings.The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Crow-Johnson violated several KRPC rules, including diligence, communication, safekeeping property, candor toward the tribunal, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board recommended disbarment based on these findings.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Board's findings. The court noted Crow-Johnson's failure to appear at oral arguments and her lack of cooperation throughout the disciplinary process. The court agreed with the Board's recommendation and ordered Crow-Johnson's disbarment, effective immediately. The court also ordered her name to be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas and assessed the costs of the proceedings to her. View "In re Crow-Johnson" on Justia Law

Grover D. James was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm for a 2015 incident where he fatally shot Leon McClennon at a birthday party in Wichita. Surveillance footage showed James entering a store basement with McClennon and others, and later walking past McClennon's collapsed body. James admitted to firing two shots but claimed he did not intend to hit anyone. Witnesses testified that the shooting was deliberate, and the jury found James guilty, sentencing him to a hard 50 life sentence for murder and a concurrent 21-month sentence for firearm possession.James filed multiple petitions for relief in the Sedgwick District Court, including claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that an affidavit from a witness, Rance Kindred, recanting his statements to police warranted a new trial. The district court denied these petitions, finding that the evidence could have been produced at trial and was unlikely to change the outcome. James also claimed ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, arguing that his attorneys failed to protect his speedy trial rights and did not adequately challenge continuances. The district court denied these claims without an evidentiary hearing.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that James did not meet the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence could not have been produced at trial or that it would likely result in a different outcome. The court also found no merit in James' ineffective assistance claims, noting that his speedy trial rights were not violated and that his appellate counsel's performance was not deficient. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James' motions and affirmed the denial of relief. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

Matthew Douglas Hutto pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and received two consecutive hard 25 life sentences. After sentencing, Hutto filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas, which the district court denied. Hutto appealed the denial, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Before the deadline to file a motion for rehearing or modification of the Supreme Court's decision, Hutto was subpoenaed to testify against his accomplice, Richard Daniel Showalter. Hutto invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The district court ruled that Hutto no longer had the privilege and found him in contempt, imposing a six-month jail sanction.Hutto appealed the contempt finding, arguing that he retained his Fifth Amendment privilege because he had not exhausted all methods of attacking his convictions and sentences, including a potential motion for rehearing or modification and a possible habeas corpus motion. The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected Hutto's argument, holding that defendants lose their privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing when they plead guilty and do not move to withdraw their plea before sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of contempt.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the proper standard to determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a witness from being compelled to testify is whether the testimony sought exposes the witness to a legitimate risk of incrimination, not a hypothetical or speculative one. The court overruled previous decisions that terminated the privilege at sentencing for guilty pleas. The court concluded that Hutto faced a legitimate risk of incrimination if forced to testify because he still had a legally viable opportunity to challenge the court's decision by filing a motion for rehearing or modification. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order finding Hutto in contempt and vacated the six-month jail sanction. View "State v. Showalter" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers arrested the appellant, Crista Hinostroza, and transported her to the Lyon County jail, where a small handgun was discovered concealed in her bra. Hinostroza was charged with trafficking contraband into a correctional facility, possession of a weapon by a felon, interference with a law enforcement officer, and battery on a law enforcement officer. At trial, the State presented evidence including bodycam videos, photographs of the jail, and testimony from officers and the jail captain. Hinostroza testified that she did not disclose the gun to the officers because she was uncomfortable with male officers touching her and believed the female staff at the jail would find it during their search.The Lyon District Court convicted Hinostroza of criminal possession of a firearm, trafficking contraband in a correctional facility, and interference with a law enforcement officer. She was acquitted of battery on a law enforcement officer. Hinostroza appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of intent and voluntariness, lack of individualized notice of contraband rules, and improper jury instructions. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that an arrestee who consciously acts to conceal and carry contraband into a correctional facility acts voluntarily. It found that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supported the conclusion that Hinostroza intentionally introduced the gun into the jail. The court also held that the jail provided adequate notice of what constituted contraband through posted signs and Hinostroza's prior knowledge of the jail's rules. Finally, the court rejected the argument that the jury should have been instructed on the requirement of individualized notice, finding no legal basis for such an instruction. View "State v. Hinostroza" on Justia Law