Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals panel that used a harmless error analysis to save a district court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea even though the panel concluded that the court applied the wrong legal standard, holding the court of appeals erred in engaging in a harmless error analysis under the circumstances.Defendant pleaded no contest to robbery and aggravated assault. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. The panel concluded that the district court erred in using the Strickland test rather than the "lackluster advocacy" standard specified in State v. Aguilar, 231 P.3d 563 (Kan. 2010) but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the analysis of the court of appeals was incorrect. View "State v. Herring" on Justia Law

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In this driver's license suspension case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusions of the district court and the court of appeals that the implied consent advisory substantially complied with the applicable statute and that any defects in the statute that make the advisory coercive did not prejudice Defendant.Defendant's driver's license was suspended after he refused to submit to a breath test after he was arrested for driving under the influence. On appeal, Defendant argued that evidence of his test refusal should have been suppressed because of an unlawful encounter with law enforcement officers. The court of appeals affirmed without addressing whether the law enforcement encounter was unlawful. The Supreme Court applied the holding of State v. Jarvis, __ P.3d __ (this day decided), and reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendant may argue that his suspension order is invalid and should be set aside under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(o)-(q); and (2) the implied consent advisory substantially complied with the applicable statute, and any defects in the statute did not prejudice Defendant. View "Whigham v. Kansas Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that, on judicial review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(p) of a hearing officer's order suspending a driver's license, a court may consider any constitutional issue, including the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter, and that, under section 8-1020(o)-(q), a court may set aside a driver's license suspension order if the driver meets the burden of establishing that the encounter was unlawful.Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. When Defendant refused to provide a breath sample his driver's license was suspended. A district court judge set aside the suspension based on his determination that the law enforcement encounter was unlawful. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the stop was unlawful and violated Defendant's constitutional rights, and therefore, the district court did not err in setting aside the suspension of Defendant's driver's license. View "Jarvis v. Kansas Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and battery, holding that there was no reversible error on the part of the district court.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and battery. The district court imposed a hard fifty sentence for the murder conviction and a concurrent six-month sentence for the battery conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's challenges to certain jury instructions were unavailing; (2) several statements made by the prosecutor challenged by Defendant on appeal fell within the broad discretion afforded prosecutors; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and (4) there was no sentencing error. View "State v. Willis" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court summarily denying Defendant's postsentence motion to modify sentence, holding that no legal avenue existed for the relief requested by Defendant.Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Defendant to a hard forty life sentence on the murder charge and added thirteen additional months in prison for the aggravated assault charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded for resentencing on the murder charge. On remand, Defendant was again sentenced to a hard forty life time for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a pro se motion seeking to have his hard forty life sentence modified to require no mandatory term of imprisonment, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because the trial judge and not a jury made the factual findings necessary for sentence enhancement. The district judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and State v. Soto, 322 P.3d 334 (2014), did not operate retroactively to provide a remedy in this case and that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6628(c) did not apply. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case about the enforceability about a mortgage clause the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court dismissing this action, holding that any language in the mortgage agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee that would give the mortgagee the ability to take possession of the property was unenforceable in light of the Supreme Court's historical interpretation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 58-2301.The mortgage clause at issue granted to the mortgagee/lender the right to immediate and exclusive possession of the mortgaged property upon the event of the mortgagor/borrower's default. In reliance on the clause the mortgagee took possession of the property and filed a foreclosure action. The district court granted judgment in favor of the mortgagee. The mortgagor filed suit, asserting that, before the court order authorized the mortgagee's possession of the property, the mortgagee's possession was wrongful. The district court dismissed the action on the basis of the mortgage remedies provision and the mortgagor's default. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the mortgagee's reliance on the provisions of executory agreements was unsupported by Kansas law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support in state law for the mortgagee's reliance on the provisions of the executory agreements. View "Fairfax Portfolio LLC v. Carojoto LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense and that the error was reversible.At the close of the evidence, Defendant requested jury instructions on self-defense and involuntary manslaughter. The court declined to give the requested instructions, finding that the evidence failed to support either instruction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed reversible error when it refused to give his requested instructions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's testimony sufficed to make a self-defense instruction factually appropriate and that the district court's error in refusing to give the instruction was reversible. View "State v. Keyes" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that Defendant received deficient representation pretrial and at trial and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result.After Defendant's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal he filed a Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion alleging that trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant's counsel had not met the constitutional standard for effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel's decision to drop a pretrial challenge to the admissibility of Defendant's incriminating statements and counsel's failure to object to certain evidence being admitted at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Khalil-Alsalaami v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Workers Compensation Board that clear and convincing evidence showed that an employee's impairment caused by marijuana consumption did not contribute to the employee's workplace accident, holding that sufficient evidence supported the Board's finding that it was "highly probable" that the employee's impairment did not contribute to his accident.Gary Woessner died after falling fifteen feet from a jobsite catwalk for an unexplained reason. Gary's employer, Labor Max Staffing, paid workers compensation benefits for his temporary total disability and for his treatment and care, but after he died, Labor Max stopped paying not he workers compensation claim. Carmen Woessner, Gary's widow, sought benefits. An administrative law judge ruled that Gary's injuries were not compensable because Carmen failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Gary's impairment caused by marijuana use did not contribute to his accident, injury, and death. The Board concluded that Gary's injuries were compensable and awarded the benefits, finding that, even if Gary was impaired, the impairment did not contribute to his accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board, holding that the drug test results were admissible and that the conclusively presumed impairment did not contribute to Gary's accident. View "Woessner v. Labor Max Staffing" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court ordering Defendant to register as a violent offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4901 et seq., holding that the district court's notice to Defendant concerning his obligation to register did not violate Defendant's right to due process.Defendant was convicted and sentenced for aggravated burglary. The district court ordered Defendant to register as a violent offender under KORA. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's failure to notify him of his registration obligation at the time of his plea and conviction violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the notice provided to Defendant was constitutionally sound and that Defendant was not deprived of his opportunity to be heard. View "State v. Juarez" on Justia Law