Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two minor children were removed from their parents’ care after their father was incarcerated for felony convictions and their mother was unable to care for them due to drug addiction and homelessness. The children were placed in foster care after the Kansas Department for Children and Families determined that neither parent could provide adequate care. The father, while incarcerated, had limited contact with the children and did not complete most tasks in the reintegration plan, citing the constraints of his imprisonment. The children exhibited significant behavioral and emotional issues while in foster care, and potential placement with a maternal grandmother was being considered.The Leavenworth County District Court adjudicated the children as in need of care and, after 16 months without progress toward reintegration, found both parents unfit. The court based its finding regarding the father on his felony conviction and imprisonment, failure of reasonable efforts by agencies to rehabilitate the family, and failure to carry out a reasonable reintegration plan. The court concluded that the father’s unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests, given their need for permanency and the availability of a stable placement with a relative.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, focusing primarily on the father’s imprisonment as a statutory ground for unfitness and agreeing that the unfitness was unlikely to change soon. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings of unfitness and that the conduct or condition rendering the father unable to care for his children was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the children’s best interests. The judgments of both lower courts were affirmed. View "In re K.W.D." on Justia Law

In 1994, the defendant was convicted of over 60 offenses, including two counts of first-degree murder, stemming from a series of burglaries in 1993 during which two residents were killed. After being shot by a resident during a burglary, the defendant fled, leaving behind gloves and a tire iron—later linked to the murders—and was subsequently arrested. Police recovered additional items, including blood-stained shoes and jeans, some of which the defendant admitted were his, though he claimed the blood was his own. The defendant denied ownership of the gloves and tire iron, but testimony connected him to those items. No DNA testing was performed on these items at the time of trial.Years after his conviction, the defendant filed a motion under K.S.A. 21-2512 seeking postconviction DNA testing of several pieces of evidence, arguing that modern testing could yield exculpatory results. The Geary District Court appointed counsel and ordered the evidence, which had been poorly stored for decades, to be evaluated by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI). The KBI determined that the condition of the evidence—due to improper storage, possible contamination, and degradation—meant that any DNA testing would likely be inconclusive. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding there was no reasonable scientific certainty that testing would yield accurate or exculpatory results.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the district court’s decision, applying a bifurcated standard of review: factual findings were reviewed for substantial competent evidence, and legal conclusions were reviewed de novo. The court held that K.S.A. 21-2512(c) does not require DNA testing based solely on an allegation that it could produce exculpatory evidence; courts must assess whether testing could actually yield such evidence. Because the evidence was too degraded to produce meaningful results, the denial of DNA testing was affirmed. View "State v. Holt " on Justia Law

After the death of Roxine Poznich in 2020, her revocable living trust became the subject of a dispute among her five children, who were named as beneficiaries. Sarah Tharrett, one of the children, was appointed successor trustee. David Everett, another child, challenged Sarah’s role and actions as trustee, first by suing for her removal (which was dismissed), and later by objecting to the final trust accounting and distribution. While all other beneficiaries approved the final accounting, David’s objections prevented the trust from being closed. Sarah then filed a declaratory action seeking court approval to distribute the trust assets and requested attorney fees due to David’s conduct.The Bourbon District Court resolved the matter by closing the trust, releasing Sarah from her duties, ordering distribution of the remaining assets, and awarding $4,000 in attorney fees against David’s share. David appealed but accepted his distribution check. Sarah filed a notice of acquiescence, arguing that David’s acceptance of the distribution barred his appeal. The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to acquiescence, and denied Sarah’s request for appellate attorney fees, reasoning it lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee request.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that due process violations only void a judgment if they so undermine personal jurisdiction that the party is denied any meaningful opportunity to be heard, which was not the case here. The court affirmed that a trust beneficiary who accepts a distribution cannot later challenge the amount on appeal, as the benefits are inseparable from any additional claims. The court also clarified that appellate courts retain jurisdiction to award attorney fees even if the appeal is dismissed for acquiescence. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of David’s appeal and awarded Sarah $11,320 in appellate attorney fees. View "Tharrett v. Everett " on Justia Law

In November 2016, D.J., then 15 years old, was involved in a marijuana transaction that resulted in the shooting death of J.S. The State charged D.J. with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and possession of marijuana. D.J. agreed to plead no contest in exchange for the case being designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (EJJP) rather than being tried as an adult. The court sentenced D.J. to a juvenile correctional facility until he was 22 years, 6 months old, with an adult sentence of life without parole for 25 years for the felony murder count, among other penalties, stayed as long as D.J. complied with his juvenile sentence.In October 2021, D.J. was released on conditional release but was later found in a vehicle with firearms and marijuana, and in July 2022, he was caught driving without a license and possessing marijuana. The State moved to revoke D.J.'s juvenile sentence, and the district court found that D.J. had violated the conditions of his juvenile sentence by possessing firearms and marijuana and eluding law enforcement.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that substantial competent evidence supported the revocation of D.J.'s juvenile sentence. The court also held that under K.S.A. 38-2364, the district court was required to revoke the juvenile sentence and impose the adult sentence upon finding a violation of the juvenile sentence. The court rejected D.J.'s arguments that the district court had discretion to continue the stay of the adult sentence and that the district court could modify the adult sentence under K.S.A. 22-3716.The court also dismissed D.J.'s constitutional proportionality claims, stating that case-specific challenges could not be raised for the first time on appeal and that D.J. failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) for his categorical challenge. Finally, the court declined to review D.J.'s ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to the lack of a Van Cleave hearing and insufficient factual development in the record. View "In re D.J. " on Justia Law

Luis Alvarado-Meraz was convicted of capital murder for the shooting deaths of his twin brother, Manuel, and Manuel's wife, Lucero Rodriguez. On the day of the incident, Alvarado-Meraz had arguments with Manuel and later texted friends and his mother, indicating distress and claiming he had shot Manuel. He was arrested the following day. The crime scene investigation revealed that both victims were shot multiple times, and the evidence suggested the shooter fired from a specific area in the apartment.In the Sedgwick District Court, Alvarado-Meraz raised three claims of error on appeal: violation of his right to be present during jury deliberations, prosecutorial error during closing arguments, and the denial of a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied his motion for a new trial, and a senior judge later affirmed this decision, concluding that there was no proof of a violation of his right to be present during a critical stage of the trial.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard to the district court's decision. The court found no error in the district court's handling of the jury's question, as the evidence did not conclusively show that a question was asked or answered improperly. The court also found no prosecutorial error in the closing arguments, determining that the prosecutor's statements were reasonable inferences based on the evidence presented.Regarding the jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the court concluded that the instruction was not factually appropriate. The evidence did not support a finding of legally sufficient provocation that would justify a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The court affirmed Alvarado-Meraz's conviction, finding no reversible error in the issues raised on appeal. View "State v. Alvarado-Meraz " on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury of felony murder and child abuse after his three-month-old son died from injuries consistent with abuse. The child had a history of being fussy and had been cared for by multiple people, but in the 24 hours before his death, only his parents were present. Medical experts found both recent and older injuries, including healing rib fractures and brain bleeding, suggesting prior abuse. The father admitted to shaking the baby on two occasions, describing the actions as gentle, and denied causing harm. The prosecution introduced evidence of prior injuries and alleged abuse occurring before the date of the charged offense.The Butler District Court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of prior injuries and allowed the State to present this evidence at trial under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455. The jury was instructed that evidence of prior injuries could be considered for limited purposes, such as absence of mistake or accident, but not to support conviction for the charged offenses. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence of prior injuries was irrelevant and prejudicial, but the district court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that the admission of evidence regarding uncharged, suspected prior child abuse was erroneous. The court found that the State failed to establish that the defendant committed the prior acts or that the evidence was relevant to a material fact under K.S.A. 60-455. The State also conceded it could not prove who caused the prior injuries. The court concluded that the error was prejudicial and not harmless, as it likely affected the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Hogan " on Justia Law

The case involves Dvonte Jamal Brown's direct appeal from his convictions for first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree murder, stemming from a failed drug deal. On April 8, 2020, Richard and his older brother Michael planned to steal marijuana from Brown. Richard contacted Brown, who agreed to sell him marijuana. When they met, Brown took Richard's money without handing over the marijuana, leading to a confrontation where Brown shot Michael multiple times, resulting in his death. Richard then stabbed Brown, who fled the scene while firing additional shots.The Johnson District Court initially convicted Brown of attempted second-degree murder but the jury deadlocked on the felony-murder charge. Upon retrial, Brown was convicted of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of distributing marijuana. The court sentenced Brown to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years and a concurrent 59-month term.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. Brown raised six arguments, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction issues, and the admissibility of evidence. The court found sufficient evidence to support Brown's convictions, noting that the State did not need to prove the presence of THC to establish the substance as marijuana. The court also held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in admitting a shell casing with Brown's DNA, which linked him to the crime scene. The court concluded that the cumulative error argument failed due to the absence of any errors.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Brown's convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, the jury instructions were appropriate, and the admission of the shell casing was not unduly prejudicial. View "State v. Brown " on Justia Law

John Schutt, as an agent for the J.E. Schutt & M.A. Schutt Family Trust, leased a residential property to Sherri Foster. Foster agreed to pay $1,900 per month in rent, with a late charge of $20 per day for any rent paid after the due date. Foster missed rent payments for July, August, and September 2020. Schutt filed a forcible detainer petition seeking unpaid rent and late fees. Foster countersued for money owed for construction services she performed for Schutt. The district court found Foster owed Schutt $5,700 in unpaid rent and awarded Schutt $21,240 in late fees, calculated at $20 per day for 1,062 days. After offsetting judgments, the court ruled Schutt owed Foster $544.98.Foster appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing for the first time that the late-fee provision was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reached the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim, despite it not being raised in the district court, and concluded that the late fees were unconscionable under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The panel reversed the district court's award of late fees exceeding $2,460, the amount due for the 123 days between Foster's first missed payment and the date she vacated the property.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that appellants must brief exceptions to the preservation rule in their opening brief, as required by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5). Foster failed to comply with this requirement, as she first invoked exceptions to the preservation rule in her reply brief. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on these exceptions to reach the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated its opinion, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Schutt v. Foster " on Justia Law

Robert Cameron Grant pled guilty to two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a child after police found nude images and videos of his 16-year-old girlfriend on his cell phones. Grant was 18 years old at the time. He later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his counsel failed to inform him about the statutory "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions related to teen sexting.The Sedgwick District Court summarily denied Grant's motion without a hearing, reasoning that the Romeo and Juliet statutes did not apply because the charges involved "sexually explicit conduct," which the court interpreted to include more than mere nudity. Grant appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision. The majority concluded that the Romeo and Juliet statutes did not apply to the charges of attempted sexual exploitation of a child. Judge Schroeder dissented, arguing that the Romeo and Juliet statutes might apply and that the case involved a factual question regarding whether counsel informed Grant about these exceptions.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the lower courts erred in their analysis. The Supreme Court clarified that the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" in the Romeo and Juliet statutes is narrower than the definition in the sexual exploitation statute and does not include mere nudity. The Court also held that the district court should have considered defense counsel's performance in light of all the original charges, not just the charges to which Grant pled guilty. The Supreme Court concluded that Grant's motion raised substantial questions of fact that warranted an evidentiary hearing.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Grant's motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Grant " on Justia Law

Police identified the defendant as a suspect in a violent assault and rape after DNA evidence linked him to the crime. During a custodial interview, the defendant denied involvement and offered an implausible explanation for the DNA match. The victim died three days later, and the State charged the defendant with capital murder and rape. A jury convicted him on both counts, and the district court merged the rape conviction into the capital murder conviction at sentencing.Prior to trial in the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police, arguing he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to cognitive impairments. The court heard testimony from expert witnesses for both sides and ultimately found the defendant had sufficient cognitive ability to understand his rights and denied the motion to suppress. The defendant also objected to the racial composition of the jury pool, requested an implicit bias instruction, and challenged the court’s refusal to remove a juror for cause. The district court overruled these objections and denied a motion for a new trial.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, finding substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion. The court also held that the defendant failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of a distinctive group from the jury pool or substantial underrepresentation of Black jurors. The court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give an implicit bias instruction, as the requested instruction was not legally appropriate. Finally, the court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of a for-cause juror challenge because the juror was removed by peremptory strike. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. McNeal " on Justia Law