Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2016, D.J., then 15 years old, was involved in a marijuana transaction that resulted in the shooting death of J.S. The State charged D.J. with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and possession of marijuana. D.J. agreed to plead no contest in exchange for the case being designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (EJJP) rather than being tried as an adult. The court sentenced D.J. to a juvenile correctional facility until he was 22 years, 6 months old, with an adult sentence of life without parole for 25 years for the felony murder count, among other penalties, stayed as long as D.J. complied with his juvenile sentence.In October 2021, D.J. was released on conditional release but was later found in a vehicle with firearms and marijuana, and in July 2022, he was caught driving without a license and possessing marijuana. The State moved to revoke D.J.'s juvenile sentence, and the district court found that D.J. had violated the conditions of his juvenile sentence by possessing firearms and marijuana and eluding law enforcement.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that substantial competent evidence supported the revocation of D.J.'s juvenile sentence. The court also held that under K.S.A. 38-2364, the district court was required to revoke the juvenile sentence and impose the adult sentence upon finding a violation of the juvenile sentence. The court rejected D.J.'s arguments that the district court had discretion to continue the stay of the adult sentence and that the district court could modify the adult sentence under K.S.A. 22-3716.The court also dismissed D.J.'s constitutional proportionality claims, stating that case-specific challenges could not be raised for the first time on appeal and that D.J. failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) for his categorical challenge. Finally, the court declined to review D.J.'s ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to the lack of a Van Cleave hearing and insufficient factual development in the record. View "In re D.J. " on Justia Law

Luis Alvarado-Meraz was convicted of capital murder for the shooting deaths of his twin brother, Manuel, and Manuel's wife, Lucero Rodriguez. On the day of the incident, Alvarado-Meraz had arguments with Manuel and later texted friends and his mother, indicating distress and claiming he had shot Manuel. He was arrested the following day. The crime scene investigation revealed that both victims were shot multiple times, and the evidence suggested the shooter fired from a specific area in the apartment.In the Sedgwick District Court, Alvarado-Meraz raised three claims of error on appeal: violation of his right to be present during jury deliberations, prosecutorial error during closing arguments, and the denial of a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied his motion for a new trial, and a senior judge later affirmed this decision, concluding that there was no proof of a violation of his right to be present during a critical stage of the trial.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard to the district court's decision. The court found no error in the district court's handling of the jury's question, as the evidence did not conclusively show that a question was asked or answered improperly. The court also found no prosecutorial error in the closing arguments, determining that the prosecutor's statements were reasonable inferences based on the evidence presented.Regarding the jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the court concluded that the instruction was not factually appropriate. The evidence did not support a finding of legally sufficient provocation that would justify a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The court affirmed Alvarado-Meraz's conviction, finding no reversible error in the issues raised on appeal. View "State v. Alvarado-Meraz " on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury of felony murder and child abuse after his three-month-old son died from injuries consistent with abuse. The child had a history of being fussy and had been cared for by multiple people, but in the 24 hours before his death, only his parents were present. Medical experts found both recent and older injuries, including healing rib fractures and brain bleeding, suggesting prior abuse. The father admitted to shaking the baby on two occasions, describing the actions as gentle, and denied causing harm. The prosecution introduced evidence of prior injuries and alleged abuse occurring before the date of the charged offense.The Butler District Court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of prior injuries and allowed the State to present this evidence at trial under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-455. The jury was instructed that evidence of prior injuries could be considered for limited purposes, such as absence of mistake or accident, but not to support conviction for the charged offenses. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence of prior injuries was irrelevant and prejudicial, but the district court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that the admission of evidence regarding uncharged, suspected prior child abuse was erroneous. The court found that the State failed to establish that the defendant committed the prior acts or that the evidence was relevant to a material fact under K.S.A. 60-455. The State also conceded it could not prove who caused the prior injuries. The court concluded that the error was prejudicial and not harmless, as it likely affected the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Hogan " on Justia Law

The case involves Dvonte Jamal Brown's direct appeal from his convictions for first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree murder, stemming from a failed drug deal. On April 8, 2020, Richard and his older brother Michael planned to steal marijuana from Brown. Richard contacted Brown, who agreed to sell him marijuana. When they met, Brown took Richard's money without handing over the marijuana, leading to a confrontation where Brown shot Michael multiple times, resulting in his death. Richard then stabbed Brown, who fled the scene while firing additional shots.The Johnson District Court initially convicted Brown of attempted second-degree murder but the jury deadlocked on the felony-murder charge. Upon retrial, Brown was convicted of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of distributing marijuana. The court sentenced Brown to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years and a concurrent 59-month term.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. Brown raised six arguments, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction issues, and the admissibility of evidence. The court found sufficient evidence to support Brown's convictions, noting that the State did not need to prove the presence of THC to establish the substance as marijuana. The court also held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in admitting a shell casing with Brown's DNA, which linked him to the crime scene. The court concluded that the cumulative error argument failed due to the absence of any errors.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Brown's convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, the jury instructions were appropriate, and the admission of the shell casing was not unduly prejudicial. View "State v. Brown " on Justia Law

John Schutt, as an agent for the J.E. Schutt & M.A. Schutt Family Trust, leased a residential property to Sherri Foster. Foster agreed to pay $1,900 per month in rent, with a late charge of $20 per day for any rent paid after the due date. Foster missed rent payments for July, August, and September 2020. Schutt filed a forcible detainer petition seeking unpaid rent and late fees. Foster countersued for money owed for construction services she performed for Schutt. The district court found Foster owed Schutt $5,700 in unpaid rent and awarded Schutt $21,240 in late fees, calculated at $20 per day for 1,062 days. After offsetting judgments, the court ruled Schutt owed Foster $544.98.Foster appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing for the first time that the late-fee provision was unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reached the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim, despite it not being raised in the district court, and concluded that the late fees were unconscionable under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The panel reversed the district court's award of late fees exceeding $2,460, the amount due for the 123 days between Foster's first missed payment and the date she vacated the property.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that appellants must brief exceptions to the preservation rule in their opening brief, as required by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5). Foster failed to comply with this requirement, as she first invoked exceptions to the preservation rule in her reply brief. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on these exceptions to reach the merits of Foster's unconscionability claim. Consequently, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated its opinion, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Schutt v. Foster " on Justia Law

Robert Cameron Grant pled guilty to two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a child after police found nude images and videos of his 16-year-old girlfriend on his cell phones. Grant was 18 years old at the time. He later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his counsel failed to inform him about the statutory "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions related to teen sexting.The Sedgwick District Court summarily denied Grant's motion without a hearing, reasoning that the Romeo and Juliet statutes did not apply because the charges involved "sexually explicit conduct," which the court interpreted to include more than mere nudity. Grant appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision. The majority concluded that the Romeo and Juliet statutes did not apply to the charges of attempted sexual exploitation of a child. Judge Schroeder dissented, arguing that the Romeo and Juliet statutes might apply and that the case involved a factual question regarding whether counsel informed Grant about these exceptions.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the lower courts erred in their analysis. The Supreme Court clarified that the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" in the Romeo and Juliet statutes is narrower than the definition in the sexual exploitation statute and does not include mere nudity. The Court also held that the district court should have considered defense counsel's performance in light of all the original charges, not just the charges to which Grant pled guilty. The Supreme Court concluded that Grant's motion raised substantial questions of fact that warranted an evidentiary hearing.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Grant's motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Grant " on Justia Law

Police identified the defendant as a suspect in a violent assault and rape after DNA evidence linked him to the crime. During a custodial interview, the defendant denied involvement and offered an implausible explanation for the DNA match. The victim died three days later, and the State charged the defendant with capital murder and rape. A jury convicted him on both counts, and the district court merged the rape conviction into the capital murder conviction at sentencing.Prior to trial in the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police, arguing he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to cognitive impairments. The court heard testimony from expert witnesses for both sides and ultimately found the defendant had sufficient cognitive ability to understand his rights and denied the motion to suppress. The defendant also objected to the racial composition of the jury pool, requested an implicit bias instruction, and challenged the court’s refusal to remove a juror for cause. The district court overruled these objections and denied a motion for a new trial.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, finding substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion. The court also held that the defendant failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of a distinctive group from the jury pool or substantial underrepresentation of Black jurors. The court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give an implicit bias instruction, as the requested instruction was not legally appropriate. Finally, the court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of a for-cause juror challenge because the juror was removed by peremptory strike. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. McNeal " on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that A.K., a three-year-old child, was in need of care. Both parents entered no contest statements, and the court found A.K. to be a child in need of care. The father later died, leaving the mother as the sole subject of the termination proceedings. The State filed a motion to terminate the mother's parental rights, and during a pretrial conference, the mother did not appear, but her attorney did. The court set a date for a "proffer trial" under K.S.A. 38-2248(f). At the proffer trial, the mother was absent, and her attorney objected to proceeding by proffer, leading the court to set a full trial date. The mother did not appear at the trial, and her substitute counsel did not object to proceeding by proffer. The court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence.The Johnson District Court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence. The mother appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to proceed by proffer because she had instructed her counsel to object. She also argued that K.S.A. 38-2248(f) violated procedural due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the mother's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court misapplied K.S.A. 38-2248(f) by terminating the mother's parental rights based on a proffer alone. The court clarified that while K.S.A. 38-2248(f) permits a proffer against an absent party who has not instructed their counsel to object, it does not allow the district court to make a finding of unfitness or terminate parental rights based solely on the proffer. The court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re A.K. " on Justia Law

Three individuals, including the defendant, set out to purchase marijuana from a seller and his associate. En route, two of them decided to rob the seller instead. At the seller’s apartment, the defendant held several people at gunpoint while his accomplice searched for drugs. During a struggle, the defendant shot the seller in the face. The defendant denied involvement, claiming an alibi corroborated by his wife. Physical evidence, including DNA and video footage, as well as eyewitness testimony, linked the defendant to the scene. The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm.The Johnson District Court presided over the trial, where the defendant raised several issues: prosecutorial error due to the prosecutor’s use of “we know” statements during closing argument, the prejudicial display of graphic photographs, limitations on witness questioning, acceptance of a stipulation regarding prior convictions without a jury trial waiver, and alleged speedy trial violations due to COVID-19 delays. The district court admitted the stipulation, allowed the display of photographs, and sustained objections to certain defense questions. The defendant was sentenced to a hard 25 years for felony murder plus additional consecutive and concurrent terms.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the prosecutor’s “we know” statements regarding contested facts constituted error, but found the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the evidence. The court ruled that the length of time admitted evidence is displayed is within the trial judge’s discretion and found no abuse of discretion here. It determined that the defense failed to preserve the issue regarding excluded witness testimony. The court found constitutional error in accepting the stipulation without a jury trial waiver but held it was harmless. COVID-19-related delays were weighed neutrally in the speedy trial analysis, and no violation was found. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Cherry " on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to the premeditated murders of his mother and stepfather. In December 2021, he forced entry into their home, using a stolen firearm to shoot his mother six times and his stepfather four times. The defendant did not contest his responsibility for the crimes. Prior to sentencing, he presented evidence of severe mental illness, a troubled upbringing, and his acceptance of responsibility, seeking more lenient sentences based on these mitigating factors.The Bourbon District Court considered the defendant’s request for concurrent “hard 25” sentences, supported by expert testimony regarding his mental health and background. However, the court found that, while there were mitigating circumstances, they did not rise to the level of “substantial and compelling reasons” required to depart from the statutory “hard 50” sentence for premeditated first-degree murder. The court imposed two consecutive hard 50 sentences, emphasizing the brutal and premeditated nature of the crimes and the impact on the victims’ family. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in both the length and the consecutive nature of the sentences.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed both sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court acted within its lawful discretion in declining to depart from the hard 50 sentences and in ordering the sentences to run consecutively. The court found that the mitigating evidence did not compel a lesser sentence given the facts of the case, and that the decision to impose consecutive sentences was reasonable in light of the gravity of the offenses. The defendant’s sentences were affirmed. View "State v. Mitchell " on Justia Law