Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After being convicted of kidnapping, burglary, rape, and criminal sodomy, defendant Jack Goldsmith filed a request for postconviction DNA testing. The district court ordered the testing pursuant to an agreement of the parties to test thirty-five items. The state conducted testing on only one of the items, a pair of blue sweatpants. The result of the testing was unfavorable to Goldsmith. Without granting a hearing, on unilateral request of the state, the district court dismissed the motion. Goldsmith appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the decision of the district court, holding that when a district court has issued an order for postconviction forensic DNA testing of multiple items of evidence, the state may not unilaterally discontinue testing after obtaining a single result unfavorable to the defense, nor may the district court automatically dismiss the petition. Remanded. View "Goldsmith v. State" on Justia Law

While defendant Carlos Montes-Mata was held in county jail on drug-related charges, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the pending charges because defendant had been held approximately 111 days when his motion was heard, exceeding the 90-day statutory speedy trial limit. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed. At issue was whether an I-247 form the county sheriff received from the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that informed the sheriff about the possibility of ICE formal proceedings against defendant tolled the 90-day requirement in Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3402(1). The Supreme Court concluded that the district judge properly discharged defendant from further liability for trial on the crimes charges, holding that the I-247 form did not constitute a present custodial claim on defendant and therefore did not affect the speedy trial question under the statute. View "State v. Montes-Mata" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymore Levy was convicted for rape of a child under fourteen years of age, aggravated criminal sodomy of a child under fourteen years of age, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Levy received three life imprisonment sentences, the third sentence running concurrent with the first two. On appeal, Levy argued (1) his sentence was disproportionate in violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, (2) his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated after a video interview was shown at his preliminary hearing when the child victim was not there to be cross-examined, and (3) both his trial counsel were ineffective, depriving him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding appellant's first two arguments were not properly preserved for appeal and declining to decide the third issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal. View "State v. Levy" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Gatlin was convicted by a jury of intentional aggravated battery causing disfigurement after biting off the tip of another man's thumb in a bar fight. On appeal to the court of appeals, the panel ruled that Gatlin failed to preserve the issue of failure to instruct on recklessness-based lesser included offenses. Gatlin appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to give two specific lesser included offense instructions, one for reckless aggravated battery that did cause disfigurement or great bodily harm and one for reckless aggravated battery that could have caused disfigurement or great bodily harm. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, reversed Gatlin's conviction, and remanded, holding (1) that the issue was properly preserved for appeal, and therefore, the appellate court applied an incorrect standard of review, and (2) that the district court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct on the definition of recklessness and the recklessness-based lesser included offenses sought by Gatlin and his counsel. View "State v. Gatlin" on Justia Law

Louie Martin, a convicted felon, was released on postrelease supervision after incarceration. Shortly after his release, the legislature passed an amendment that impacted Martin's previously imposed postrelease expiration date by extending it nearly eleven years. Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against the parole board, claiming that the change in his postincarceration supervision discharge date is an unlawful ex post facto law. The district court dissolved Martin's writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) because the period of parole or postrelease supervision is part of the sentence imposed, a change to that period is a change in punishment for ex post facto considerations; (2) because the amendment is retrospective and changes the term of postrelease supervision, the law violates ex post facto protections if it acts to Martin's detriment; and (3) Martin was clearly disadvantaged by the amendment. Therefore, the amendment is an impermissible ex post facto law as applied to Martin. View "Martin v. Kansas Parole Bd." on Justia Law

In 1999, Melvin Holmes was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. In 2002, a second jury convicted Holmes of the same offenses, and in 2004 the Court affirmed the convictions. In 2007, Holmes filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during his 2004 appeal. Specifically, Holmes contended appellate counsel failed to (1) raise the issue of ineffective trial counsel, (2) include a videotape and accompanying transcript used by the jury in the appellate record, and (3) file a reply brief or motion for reconsideration. The district court's denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Holmes appealed. After dismissing Holmes' first and third arguments, The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the videotape and transcript issue. The Court directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to inquire about appellate counsel's strategy in not providing the items in the record on appeal, and if the court found appellate counsel's performance was deficient, to inquire whether Holmes was prejudiced to the extent that, but for counsel's failure, Holmes' appeal would have been successful. View "Holmes v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was 4.5 miles of a railroad right-of-way that was railbanked and is now operated as a recreational trail. The appeal focused on the relationship between the Kansas Recreational Trails Act (KRTA) and the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), specifically: (1) whether the Trails Act preempts KRTA, (2) whether KRTA violates equal protection rights, and (3) whether the district court has jurisdiction to set the amount of bond required under KRTA. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that (1) a bond requirement and setting of a bond do not create a conflict with the Trails Act; (2) because KRTA does not provide a benefit to local competitors or burden local, nonpublic competitors, KRTA is not preempted because it violates the dormant Commerce Clause; (3) KRTA does not violate equal protection rights by establishing statutory requirements for interim recreational trails in railroad rights-of-way that differ from other categories of recreational trails that result from the terms of the Trails Act; and (4) the district court did have jurisdiction to set the amount of the bond and to require the appellant, Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, to pay the bond. View "Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy" on Justia Law

After pleading no contest to his criminal charges, appellant Rafael Flores was convicted of one count of first-degree felony murder and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Flores moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because felony murder with an underlying felony of attempted voluntary manslaughter is not a crime. The district court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed. The court held that (1) although attempted voluntary manslaughter is not specifically mentioned in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3436(a) as an inherently dangerous felony capable of supporting a felony-murder charge, voluntary manslaughter is listed as a felony that may be inherently dangerous in certain circumstances, and because Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3401(b) anticipates that an attempt to commit an inherently dangerous felony may support a felony-murder charge, an attempted voluntary manslaughter may support a felony-murder charge; and (2) a defendant can be charged with felony murder with the underlying charge of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter if the latter charge was so distinct from the homicide that was the subject of the felony murder charge as not to be an ingredient of the homicide. View "State v. Flores" on Justia Law

Appellant Corinthian Bricker pleaded no contest to one count each of aggravated battery, driving under the influence, and failure to present proof of insurance. Contrary to the plea bargain agreement that recommended sentencing to Labette Bootcamp Probation, the district court sentenced Bricker to prison. Bricker then filed a motion to withdraw plea, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to learn Bricker was ineligible for Labette. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the admission criteria of Labette was not sufficient to meet one prong of Strickland v. Washington test, which states that defendant must show counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's failure to advise Bricker that he could file a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea was insufficient grounds to warrant post-sentence withdrawal of the plea. View "State v. Bricker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to an oil and gas lease with Appellee Trees Oil Company (Trees), Appellant Arthur Hockett had a 1/8-royalty interest in the production from a Haskell County well that produced natural gas. Trees operated the well, and sold the gas produced to âfirst purchasers.â Before paying Trees for production, the first purchasers deduct taxes and fees imposed by the state. Trees then pays Appellant 1/8 of the net sales proceeds. In 2009, Appellant filed a complaint against Trees, seeking recovery of the amount in tax deducted from the sales proceeds from the first purchasers. Trees moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it could not be held liable for complying with state law by paying the sales taxes. The district court held that the taxes and fees were to be imposed on all owners in the venture, including royalty owners. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court found that state law does not require royalty owners pay the oil and gas taxes and fees if they do not operate the well. The fees withheld by the first purchaser are an expense attributable to the oil company as the well operator. In computing Appellantâs royalties, Trees was not permitted to deduct the amount of its fees expenses from the gross sale price under contract with the first purchaser. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in ruling in favor of Trees. The Court remanded the remanded the case for further proceedings.