Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee injured his back before beginning work as a service technician for Employer. While working for Employer, Employee experienced a sudden, severe increase of pain in his back. Employee eventually underwent surgery and, later, quit his job after several months of physical therapy. Before undergoing surgery, Employee filed an application for a hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. The ALJ found Employee was injured during the course of his employment and entered an award for Employee. On review, the Kansas Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the ALJ and the Board, finding that Employee was precluded from compensation because his injuries were the result of the normal activities of daily living. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee was not engaged in the normal activities of day-to-day living when he reached for his tool belt or when he bent down to carry out a welding task. Accordingly, Employee's injury was covered by the Kansas workers compensation statute. View "Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Hernandez was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and residential burglary following a jury trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) a comment made by the prosecutor during his closing argument on a matter outside the evidence was in error, but the statement was little more than harmless retrospection that did not contribute to the verdict obtained; and (2) the trial court did not err in concluding there was insufficient evidence to find that Hernandez's mental faculties were so impaired by his consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the night of the murder as to render him unable to form the requisite intent. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Gregory Berry was convicted of first-degree felony murder after striking and killing another motorist during a high-speed getaway. The underlying felony for the conviction was possession of cocaine. At trial, Berry requested lesser included offense instructions for second-degree reckless murder, involuntary manslaughter, and vehicular homicide. Berry's request was denied pursuant to the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule, which requires lesser included offense instructions only when evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Berry's conviction and sentence on the felony-murder charge, holding (1) the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule must be abandoned; (2) Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3) should be applicable to felony murder, and accordingly, instructions on lesser degrees of homicide are proper in felony-murder cases when there is some evidence reasonably justifying a conviction of some lesser included crime beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) in Berry's case, and using the statutory viewpoint directed by section 22-3414(3), the evidence could reasonably justify a conviction for lesser included crimes. Remanded. View "State v. Berry" on Justia Law

Defendant Bradley Whorton pled guilty to aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Whorton filed a motion in which he argued that his lack of criminal history justified a departure from the mandatory minimum hard twenty-five life sentence prescribed in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643(a)(1). The sentencing court was unable to find substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the life sentence and denied Whorton's motion. Whorton was sentenced to a life sentence on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly considered to Wharton's absence of criminal history as a mitigating factor; (2) the district court's refusal to depart from the mandatory minimum was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) it was not arbitrary for the district court to grant a departure based on a lack of criminal history in one case but to deny departure in another case where the same mitigating factor existed. View "State v. Whorton" on Justia Law

Defendant David McDaniel pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. At the sentencing hearing, the district judge denied McDaniel's request for a nonprison sentence and imposed thirty-four months' incarceration. At a later hearing on the restitution amount, McDaniel stipulated to a restitution amount of $7,744 payable to Medicaid for the victim's medical expenses. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge's failure to require that any hearing on the amount of restitution occur before sentencing in this case did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction; (2) the setting of restitution in the second hearing was not an impermissible change in McDaniel's sentence; and (3) sentencing to the highest term in an applicable Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid box without proof of aggravating facts to a jury does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey. View "State v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, John Horton was convicted of first-degree felony murder. During the jury deliberations, Horton moved to suspend deliberations in order to give the defense time to analyze additional evidence it had received. The district court concluded that it did not have the authority to suspend the jury deliberations to allow for he introduction of additional evidence. Horton appealed, contending that the district court committed reversible error when it held that it had no jurisdiction to reopen the evidence after the jury began deliberating. The Supreme Court agreed and suspended the appeal with directions to remand, holding that a district court has broad discretion to determine whether a party may reopen its case, including the authority to suspend jury deliberations, to allow for the introduction of additional evidence. View "State v. Horton" on Justia Law

While in the passenger seat of a car registered to the car's driver, Brian Gilbert was approached by a police officer. After learning that Gilbert had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, the officer arrested Gilbert and searched the car, where he discovered drug paraphernalia and drugs. Gilbert was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Before trial, Gilbert filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the officer was not authorized to search the vehicle. The district court denied Gilbert's motion to suppress because the statute upon which Gilbert based his argument had been amended at the time of the search. The court then convicted Gilbert as charged. The court of appeals reversed Gilbert's convictions, holding (1) Gilbert had standing to contest the search, and (2) the amended version of the statute was unconstitutional. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Gilbert lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search under Rakas v. Illinois, which states that a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through introduction of evidence obtained by search of a third-person's premises has not had his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. View "State v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Randy Chavez pled guilty to one off-grid count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, under Jessica's Law, and one on-grid count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Chavez was sentenced to a twenty-five year term with lifetime parole and lifetime electronic monitoring. Chavez appealed, contending, inter alia, that the district court erred in sentencing him to a twenty-five-year term under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643(a)(1) instead of a twenty-year term under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2). The Supreme Court found that the two statutes conflicted, and pursuant to the rule that states when the provisions of two statutes are in conflict the more specific statute governs, concluded that defendants who are subject to Jessica's Law face a mandatory minimum term of not less than twenty-five years' imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole. The Court, however, held that the imposition of parole conditions, including lifetime monitoring, is the province of the parole board and lies outside the jurisdiction of the district court. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment without parole eligibility and vacated the parole condition of lifetime electronic monitoring. View "State v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Andre Bailey was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Because Bailey was seventeen years old at the time he was charged with the crimes, charges were originally filed with the juvenile court. The State filed a motion pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2347 to have the case transferred to adult court for prosecution. The trial court granted the motion and tried Bailey as an adult. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the stipulated facts provided substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to certify Bailey as an adult for prosecution. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and it was not improper for the trial court to inform two witnesses that they did not have Fifth Amendment privileges. View "State v. Bailey" on Justia Law

James Simmons was convicted of rape and misdemeanor theft following a jury trial. Simmons appealed several issues, including claims of prosecutorial misconduct during trial. The court of appeals affirmed Simmons' convictions. The Supreme Court granted review on the prosecutorial misconduct claims only. After conducting a two-step analysis, the Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) the prosecutor's discussion of the Stockholm Syndrome during voir dire constituted misconduct because the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence; (2) the prosecutor's comment about the victim's behavior in the future during closing arguments constituted misconduct because it was an improper appeal for sympathy; and (3) the two episodes of misconduct combined to constitute misconduct of sufficient magnitude to require reversal and a new trial. Remanded. View "State v. Simmons" on Justia Law