Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Judith Berry brought negligence and consumer protection claims against defendants National Medical Services and Compass Vision after her urinalysis tests conducted as part of Berry's participation in the Kansas Nurses Assistance Program (KNAP) showed positive results, which meant Berry tested positive for substance abuse in violation of Berry's KNAP agreement. Berry claimed Defendants were negligent in designing, implementing, promoting, and managing their testing protocol and that Defendants knew that because she was a participant in KNAP, her nursing license would be in jeopardy if she tested positive. The district court dismissed Berry's petition with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court of appeals reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Berry was a foreseeable plaintiff, that the probability of harm was foreseeable, and that there was no public policy against imposing a duty on Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Berry was a foreseeable plaintiff and the probability of harm was foreseeable; and (2) there was no public policy to extend protection to Defendants simply because they contracted with a government agency. Remanded. View "Berry v. Nat'l Med. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty years before the current dispute arose, Cory Saylor, who worked for Westar Energy, injured his left knee on the job. More recently, Saylor underwent knee replacement surgery. On March 28, 2006, after the surgery, Saylor served a notice of intent and written claim on Westar seeking workers compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded Saylor seventy-four weeks of permanent partial disability compensation. The Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Saylor's date of injury was the date he provided notice to Westar on March 28, 2006. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board and court of appeals correctly interpreted and applied Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(d) as it was written, which resulted in the assignment of March 28, 2006 as Saylor's date of accident; (2) there was substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that Westar had knowledge of Saylor's work-related injury before the surgery and that Westar refused or neglected to provide medical treatment for that injury, and therefore, the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510j(h) was triggered, rendering Westar liable for the cost of Saylor's knee replacement surgery. View "Saylor v. Westar Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

After Mother filed a paternity action, the district court entered a temporary order granting Mother primary residential custody of Child. Father then admitted paternity and sought primary residential custody of Child. The district court concluded that it was in Child's best interests to retain primary residential custody with Mother. Father appealed, arguing (1) the district court judge applied the wrong legal standard, treating the action as though it concerned modification of a prior child custody order rather than one seeking an initial custody determination; and (2) the district judge failed to give any negative impact on Child from Mother's religious practices due consideration. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court judge applied the correct legal standard to the evidence and did not abuse his discretion for placing great weight on the length of time Child had spent with each parent and his adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (2) the district court judge properly excluded religious belief and correctly considered the ways in which current religiously motivated conduct affected Child's best interests. View "Harrison v. Tauheed" on Justia Law

Eric Neal was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, endangering a child, and criminal possession of a firearm. Neal was sentenced to total incarceration of 653 months for all convictions. Neal appealed, claiming an error in his criminal history score. The court of appeals affirmed. Later, Neal filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, contending that the district court erred in (1) aggregating three previous municipal person misdemeanor convictions into one person felony for the purpose of calculating Neal's criminal history, and (2) sentencing Neal with enhancements based upon that erroneous history. The district court dismissed Neal's motions. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Neal's motion was procedurally barred as he was improperly using it as a substitute for a second appeal. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Neal's motion was not procedurally barred because the motion to correct an illegal sentence is not subject to the general rule that a defendant must raise all available issues on direct appeal, and (2) Neal's motion raised substantial issues of fact and law. Remanded. View "State v. Neal" on Justia Law

Jamil Fulton was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Fulton received a hard twenty-five life sentence for the off-grid murder offense and a concurrent eight months' imprisonment for the criminal possession of a firearm conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the off-grid conviction, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Fulton; (2) the district court did not err in denying Fulton's motion for a new trial; and (3) Fulton was not entitled to a new trial because of his counsel's failure to request that his trial be severed from his codefendant's trial where Fulton pointed to no set of facts that would make the situation extraordinary and prejudice was not apparent as a matter of law by the appellate record. View "State v. Fulton" on Justia Law

The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) issued a show cause order alleging that Bartlett Grain Company solicited for-hire motor carriers who violated several motor carrier safety laws. Bartlett answered the show cause order, contesting the KCC's jurisdiction over it with respect to its hiring of third-party motor carriers. Upon reconsideration, the KCC found it had jurisdiction over Bartlett to proceed. On review, the district court affirmed. Bartlett appealed, and the KCC stayed the ongoing agency proceedings pending judicial review. The Supreme Court transferred the case to its court on its own motion. Before considering the merits of the jurisdictional issue, the Court first addressed the issue raised sua sponte by the Court, i.e., whether the agency's order finding it had jurisdiction over the substantive violations alleged in the show cause order was a final agency action subject to judicial review. The Court held that the action from which Bartlett appealed was a nonfinal agency action and, therefore, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bartlett Grain Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

A highway patrol trooper stopped Daniel Allen's vehicle for traffic infractions and noticed that Allen exhibited clues of intoxication. Allen agreed to a preliminary breath test (PBT) as authorized by Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012, then failed the test. Allen was arrested and later failed an evidentiary breath test. After an administrative hearing, the Department of Revenue issued an administrative order suspending Allen's driving privileges. On review, the district court reversed, holding (1) section 8-1012 was unconstitutional, both as applied in this case and on its face, and (2) there were no reasonable grounds for the trooper to administer an evidentiary breath test absent the PBT result. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding the district court erred in ruling there were no reasonable grounds to require an evidentiary breath test absent the result of the PBT. As the trooper possessed reasonable grounds for requesting the breath test even without the PBT, the Court did not address Allen's constitutional challenge to section 8-1012. Remanded. View "Allen v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property near an airport that was zoned as agricultural. Landowners filed an application with the City to classify their property as planned single-family residential and to approve a preliminary plat for a subdivision. Initially, the rezoning was approved, but after the County brought suit, Landowners initiated a new application to rezone the property and, following the directives of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3-307e, to seek the approval of the County once the City approved the rezoning and the plat. The County denied Landowners' rezoning application. On review, the district court held that the City was the zoning authority and the County took a quasi-judicial role in reviewing the City's rezoning decision. The court concluded that the County had failed to overcome the presumption that the City's decision was reasonable and upheld the City's decision to approve the rezoning. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court's ruling was erroneous because section 3-307e allows the County to reach an independent determination that a court must presume to be reasonable, and to successfully challenge the County's action under section 3-307e, a landowner must prove that the County's action was unlawful or unreasonable. Remanded. View "143rd Street Investors v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs " on Justia Law

Yvonne Ward was convicted for fourteen felonies related to four separate cocaine sales. On appeal, Ward (1) argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial that she made after witnesses for the prosecution identified two individuals sitting in the courtroom and wearing orange jail jumpsuits as people who were with Ward during one or more of the sales, and (2) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, Ward added a new issue, which the Supreme Court declined to address because it was not properly before the Court. The Supreme Court then affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, and (2) the evidence was sufficient. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

Julie Stieben was pulled over by a highway patrol trooper after the trooper watched Stieben's car cross the fog line three times. A jury found Stieben guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in the way it answered the jury's question about whether Stieben crossed the fog line when she first encountered the trooper, concluding (1) the failure of the trial court to give the jury additional information to clarify a point of fact was prejudicial and denied the defendant a fair trial, and (2) the court intruded on the province of the jury as the factfinder, interfering with Stieben's constitutional right to a trial by jury by not only answering the question, but by answering it incorrectly, possibly prejudicing Stieben's defense. View "State v. Stieben" on Justia Law