Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea. View "State v. Hulett" on Justia Law

The Taranto Group contracted with two outside vendors to send out advertising via facsimile transmissions on its behalf. It was later calculated that at least 5,000 transmissions were made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). A doctor brought an action individually and as a class representative against the Taranto Group, seeking damages and injunction relief under the TCPA and tort damages for conversion. A professional corporation then sought to intervene as an additional class representative. The district court issued an order certifying the proposed class and, in an amended order, certified the order for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that class certification was appropriate in this case, holding, among other things, that the district court (1) correctly found the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that they met the statutory requirements for class certification, (2) properly determined that a class action in this case was superior to individual small claims actions, and (3) properly concluded that a class action would avoid inconsistent adjudications. View "Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Anthony Stapleton committed suicide while he was incarcerated in the Shawnee County Adult Detention Center. Plaintiffs, including the administratrix of Stapleton's estate, filed suit against Defendants, Shawnee County, a detention center guard, and an assistant shift supervisor at the detention center, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care, and (2) even if Defendants breached their duty of care, they were immune from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the guard and shift supervisor were not entitled to summary judgment, and (2) Defendants were not entitled to KTCA immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as (i) the guard and supervisor owed a duty of reasonable care to Stapleton and breached that duty, and (ii) the County was alleged to be vicariously liable for the guard's and supervisor's negligence; and (2) the discretionary function under KTCA was not applicable to immunize Defendants from liability for negligence in this lawsuit. View "Thomas v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Tully of one count of rape. The court of appeals affirmed Tully's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Tully's rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona and Doyle v. Ohio were violated by the State's improper comments on Tully's postarrest silence; (2) the district court gave an improper jury instruction on the element of force; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing a State's expert witness to offer an opinion beyond her qualifications, which also invaded the province of the jury; and (4) the cumulative errors denied Tully a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Tully" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Barnes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. Barnes was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole with a consecutive fourteen months for the aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench despite Barnes' difficulty in choosing between jury and bench trial; (2) the district judge did not err in accepting Barnes' knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of two children. Mother's husband, Stepfather, petitioned to adopt the children without the consent of their biological Father. The district court determined that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted Stepfather's adoption. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination that Father had failed to assume his parental duties for the two consecutive years immediately preceding the adoption petition. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding (1) a natural parent's unfitness will not obviate the need for his or her consent to a stepparent adoption unless the district court finds that the unfitness has prevented the natural parent from assuming the duties of a parent for two consecutive years immediately preceding the filing of the adoption for petition, and (2) the evidence was sufficient in this case to establish that Father had failed to assume the parental duty of providing for his children's needs in the two years preceding the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of J.M.D." on Justia Law

Lafayette Cosby was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder after a second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, (1) The district court properly excluded evidence of a question Cosby asked police because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) the district judge correctly decided not to include a lesser included offense on voluntary manslaughter in the jury instructions; (3) the evidence of premeditation in this case was plainly sufficient to support Cosby's conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in reversible conduct or improperly shift the burden of proof on the element of premeditation to the defense with a certain comment to the jury because the prosecutor's challenged comment was within the wide latitude allowed the State in discussing the evidence. View "State v. Cosby" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Phouthavy Chanthaseng was convicted for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Chanthaseng argued that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and commenting on the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing the delayed and piecemeal "process of disclosure" of the abuse victim and by using personal experiences of venire panel members as substitute for evidence of disclosure pattern relevant to reliability; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing the abuse victim's credibility because the prosecutor's comments, when viewed in context, where accompanied by a discussion of the evidence presented at trial and merely asked the jury to draw permissible inferences from that evidence; and (3) the prosecutor's "process of disclosure" misconduct did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of Chanthaseng's conviction. View "State v. Chanthaseng" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an order granting summary judgment to the Board of County Commissioners regarding its challenge to the annexation of certain land by Park City. The district court then granted Park City an extension of time to file a postjudgment motion. Twenty days after the district court's order, Park City filed a motion for postjudgment relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-259(f). The district court denied the motion as untimely, observing that a motion under section 60-259(f) must be filed within ten days after entry of judgment, and Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-206(b) specifically prohibits a district court from extending this time period. After the thirty-day time limitation for filing notice of appeal had expired, Park City appealed the summary judgment ruling. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's decision in part, concluding that the unique circumstances doctrine, which permits an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over a late appeal if the appellant reasonably relied on some judicial action, did not save the untimely appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine could not be used to extend a statutory deadline that was jurisdictional. View "Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Park City" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff sued Defendant, a doctor, alleging negligence. Attorney Scott Mann represented Plaintiff, and an attorney from Bretz Law Offices allegedly agreed to assist as co-counsel. The district court judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify the Bretz firm and Mann from continued representation of Plaintiff because an associate at Defendant's attorney's firm had left there and gone to work for the Bretz firm. In 2009, Mann entered his appearance for Plaintiff in district court. The district judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify Mann. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district judge abused his discretion in extending the 2004 imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm to Mann because (a) there was no substantial competent evidence to support the legal conclusion that Mann must also be subject to imputed disqualification, and (b) the district judge failed to conduct an appropriate legal analysis of whether Mann was part of the Bretz firm; (2) the district judge's imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm in 2004 exerted no preclusive effect in the 2009 dispute over Mann's status; and (3) Mann was not subject to disqualification in 2009 because he was not likely to be a necessary witness on causation. View "Venters v. Sellers" on Justia Law