Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Bennington was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, rape, two counts of criminal use of a financial card, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy. Bennington appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court rejected most of Bennington's arguments but reversed his convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that the statements of the victim, who died before the trial, to a sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and should not have been admitted by the trial court because the statements (1) were made in the presence of a law enforcement officer who asked questions, and (2) reported past events rather than information regarding an ongoing public safety or medical emergency. View "State v. Bennington" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County amended its zoning regulations to permit small wind energy conversion systems. The regulations, however, prohibited the placement of commercial wind energy conversion systems in the county. Plaintiffs and Intervenors, landowners and owners of wind rights in the county, sued the Board, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board's action be null and void. The district court granted the Board's various dispositive motions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) the district court did not err by disposing of a Takings Clause claim as a matter of law, and because there was no taking, the court did not err in also disposing of Intervenors' related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and their claim for inverse condemnation; (2) the district court did not err in dismissing a Commerce Clause claim as a matter of law, but a claim alleging the Board's decision placed incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits was remanded for analysis under Pike v. Bruce Church; and (3) because Intervenors also made a burden-based claim under the Commerce Clause in their 42 U.S.C. 1983 contention, that specific claim was also remanded. View "Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The case involved a manufacturer of conveyor pizza ovens, Wolfe Electric, its former employee, Terry Duckworth, and the competing business Duckworth helped form, Global Cooking Systems. Wolfe Electric brought suit against Duckworth and Global Cooking for misappropriation of secrets under the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Wolfe Electric also separately alleged Duckworth breached his fiduciary duty and his employment contract while Global allegedly tortiously interfered with Duckworth's employment contract. A jury found for Wolfe Electric on all causes of action and awarded damages in a variety of categories. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple erroneous jury instructions and a verdict that failed to specify which of the innumerable acts alleged actually caused which of the particular damages awarded required reversal. Remanded. View "Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count each of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties, aggravated indecent liberties, and criminal sodomy. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the State agreed to join in Jacobs' motion for departure from Jessica's Law to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid for the off-grid aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The sentencing judge conformed to the parties' agreement on the departure motion and imposed three sentences for each conviction, all of which were ordered to run consecutive to each other. Jacobs appealed, arguing that his sentence under Jessica's Law violated the state and federal constitutions and that the sentencing judge erred by making his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument could not be ruled upon for the first time on appeal, and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to address Jacobs' second argument. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Appellant Nathan Inkelaar was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated criminal sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Appellant's alleged prior sexual abuse and determined the evidence was not unduly prejudicial; (2) the prosecutor questions during cross-examination of Appellant's brother were improper but there was no showing of deliberate misconduct, and the State met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect Appellant's substantial rights; (3) the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Appellant under Jessica's Law, as the amended complaints listed Appellant's date of birth and the court's error in failing to instruct the jury regarding Appellant's age was harmless; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of third-party guilt. View "State v. Inkelaar" on Justia Law

John Brennan sued his physician, who had a $200,000 professional liability insurance policy, for medical malpractice. The insurer was declared insolvent after Brennan filed his claim but before he recovered. The insurer's insolvency triggered the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association's (KIGA) statutory obligation to cover the insurer's obligations to the extent provided by the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association Act. KIGA, which intervened in the suit, denied liability because Brennan received medical reimbursements from his personal health insurance policy that totaled more than the insolvent insurer's policy limits. The dispositive issue was whether Brennan's due process rights were violated by a retroactive statutory amendment permitting KIGA to offset Brennan's personal health insurance benefits against its liability on the insolvent insurer's $200,000 policy. The district court declared the statute's retroactive feature unconstitutional and entered judgment against KIGA for $200,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the retroactivity provision violated due process, and (2) Brennan's rights were governed by the preamended statute. View "Brennan v. Kan. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Joshua Cash pled guilty to sex crimes covered by Jessica's Law, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643, after confessing to having had sexual contact with his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The district court (1) imposed three concurrent life sentences with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than twenty-five years, and (2) included lifetime postrelease supervision in Cash's sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the hard-twenty-five life sentence but vacated that portion of the sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision instead of lifetime parole because Cash received an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence. View "State v. Cash" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Tahah of felony murder and the underlying felony of discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm. During trial, Tahah argued for a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter. The felony-murder rule then in effect provided that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3), requiring instructions on lesser-included offenses where there is evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser-included crime did not apply when murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The district court applied the felony-murder rule and denied Tahah's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction in light of the Court's recent decision in State v. Berry, which held that section 22-3414(3) no longer makes an exception for felony murder. View "State v. Tahah" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea. View "State v. Hulett" on Justia Law

The Taranto Group contracted with two outside vendors to send out advertising via facsimile transmissions on its behalf. It was later calculated that at least 5,000 transmissions were made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). A doctor brought an action individually and as a class representative against the Taranto Group, seeking damages and injunction relief under the TCPA and tort damages for conversion. A professional corporation then sought to intervene as an additional class representative. The district court issued an order certifying the proposed class and, in an amended order, certified the order for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that class certification was appropriate in this case, holding, among other things, that the district court (1) correctly found the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that they met the statutory requirements for class certification, (2) properly determined that a class action in this case was superior to individual small claims actions, and (3) properly concluded that a class action would avoid inconsistent adjudications. View "Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc." on Justia Law