Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her doctor, who mistakenly removed her left ovary during a laparoscopic surgery intended to take the right ovary, and a jury awarded her $759,680 in damages. The district court reduced that amount by $425,000 because of a state law limiting non-economic damages in personal injury lawsuits and a posttrial ruling finding Plaintiff's evidence of future medical expenses insufficient. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-19a02, which operated to cap Plaintiff's jury award for non-economic damages, as applied to Plaintiff; (2) reversed the district court's decision to strike the jury's award for Plaintiff's future medical expenses and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate that award; and (3) denied the doctor's trial error claims. View "Miller v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This appeal raised the issue of whether a district court can order a child support obligor to cooperate with a child support obligee in the obligee's efforts to obtain insurance on the obligor's life if the obligor objects to the issuance of the life insurance policy. Here, despite the obligor's objection, the district court ordered the obligor to cooperate with the obligee's attempts to obtain insurance on the obligor's life at the obligee's own expense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a district court cannot issue such an order because the order would be contrary to public policy as expressed by the Kansas Legislature in Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-453(a), which provides that an insurable interest does not exist if a person whose life is insured makes a written request for the termination or nonrenewal of the policy. View "In re Marriage of Hall" on Justia Law

This appeal followed a district court's denial of a defendant's motions for new trial based on postconviction DNA testing that was allowed under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512. The postconviction DNA testing produced some results that were favorable to the defendant, some results that confirmed evidence at trial, and some results that were inconclusive because the small amount and the degradation of the DNA prevented DNA matching. Weighing the mixed results of this evidence, the district court concluded there was not a reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when the issue on appeal is whether a district court erred in ruling on a motion for new trial based on favorable postconviction DNA test results, holding that reasonable people could agree with the district court that the postconviction DNA test evidence was not so material as to make it reasonably probable there would be a different outcome if there were a new trial. View "Haddock v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an audio recording of a 911 call made by the murder victim's wife; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of seven uncharged burglaries allegedly committed by Defendant for the purposes of proving identity and plan under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455; (3) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct; (4) the sentencing court appropriately imposed a hard 50 sentence; and (5) the hard 50 sentencing scheme is constitutional. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction on several grounds. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated indecent liberties because (1) the State presented no evidence that Defendant engaged in any lewd fondling or touching of the complainant or himself, done or submitted to with the intent to arose or satisfy the sexual desires of the complainant, Defendant, or both; and (2) the State failed to present any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, that Defendant "submitted to lewd fondling or touching" as specified in the jury instruction. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

In the recent case of State v. Bogguess, the Supreme Court held that the lack of an objection during a bench trial that consisted solely of stipulated facts did not preclude appellate review of the pretrial denial of a defendant's motion to suppress. The instant case raised the question of whether the Bogguess holding applies when the bench trial is conducted by a different judge than the one who made the pretrial suppression ruling. The Court concluded that having more than one judge involved in the proceedings did not alter the two-fold rationale of the decision in Bogguess. In this case, the defendant's objection to evidence was preserved, and the court of appeals erred in concluding it was not. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Probationer was entitled to jail time credit toward a sentence for the time she spent in a residential drug abuse treatment facility when her sojourn had not been ordered as a condition of probation in the case where that prison sentence had been imposed. Probationer was statutorily required, and ordered as a condition of probation, to complete drug abuse treatment in the case involving a conviction for cocaine possession. But drug treatment was not statutorily required, or ordered as a condition of probation, in the case where her convictions concerned nondrug offenses. Probationer failed to complete her mandatory drug treatment, and the district court revoked her probation in both cases. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have awarded Probationer jail time credit toward her nondrug offense case's sentence for her time spent in drug abuse treatment. Although the treatment was ordered only as a condition of probation in Probationer's cocaine possession case, there was no statutory requirement that the time spent in such treatment be ordered in the same case in which the jail time credit was sought. Remanded. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that an action seeking reformation of an executory contract does not accrue until a party discovers a mutual mistake in the contract language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's reformation claim was barred by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-511(1) because the mutual mistake occurred when the contract was executed, which was more than five years before this case was filed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) a cause of action for reformation of a contract based on an alleged mutual mistake accrues when the mistake is made, not when the mutual mistake is discovered; and (2) the application of these rules does not depend on whether a contract is executed or executory, and the rules do not vary just because the contract relates to the title of real property. View "Law v. Law Co. Bldg. Assocs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for stabbing her long-time friend multiple times in the head with a steak knife during an altercation inside of Defendant's home. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court should have, sua sponte, given instructions on no duty to retreat, use of force in defense of a dwelling, and a lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in omitting the no duty to retreat instruction in this case, Defendant failed to establish the requisite level of prejudice; (2) the defense of dwelling instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case, and it was not clearly erroneous to fail to give that instruction; and (3) it was error not to give the lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery, but the failure to give the unrequested instruction was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error in (1) denying Defendant's motion to compel a psychological examination of the victim; (2) denying Defendant's motion for a bill of particulars; (3) failing to give a limiting instruction after admitting evidence of Defendant's prior traffic offenses; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Court also held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3511(a) does not present an alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, and therefore, this case did not involve an alternative means issue. Lastly, the district court had jurisdiction to enter the restitution portion of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Rojas-Marceleno" on Justia Law