Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his Jessica's Law convictions for rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant argued (1) all three convictions must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on each of the alternative means for committing the crime on which the jury was instructed; (2) three separate statements by the prosecutor constituted misconduct; (3) his life sentence violated the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding (1) none of the complained of jury instructions included alternative means; (2) while one of the complained of statements by the prosecutor was improper, the error was not reversible; (3) Defendant's sentence did not violate the Constitution; but (4) the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

Defendant directly appealed his convictions for premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction on second-degree murder without first analyzing the propriety of giving the instruction, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court's error in failing to give an Allen-type jury instruction was not reversible; (3) the district court's denial of Defendant's new trial motion was not an abuse of discretion; (4) the district exercised its discretion in an appropriate manner in admitting certain photographs into evidence; (5) the district court did not err in finding that the evidence failed to establish a reason to believe that Defendant was mentally retarded; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors was not so great as to require reversal. View "State v. Backus" on Justia Law

Defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder and aggravated burglary were reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Upon retrial, the jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by assessing attorney fees against Defendant without adequately assessing his ability to pay or the burden such a payment would impose. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions; and (2) vacated the Board of Indigents' Defense Services attorney fees reimbursement order, holding that the district court erred by failing to ascertain Defendant's financial resources or the burden such reimbursement would cause him. Remanded. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

Appellant shot the Miguel Moya after robbing two people at gunpoint at the same house. A jury convicted Appellant of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison, with a mandatory minimum of twenty years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the felony murder conviction. Appellant raised five issues on appeal. The Supreme Court decided all issues against Appellant except his sentencing argument, holding that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to lifetime postrelease supervision rather than to a term with the possibility of parole, and accordingly, this portion of Appellant's sentence was vacated. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4904(b), sex offenders must inform their local law enforcement agency within ten days of changing their address of residence. Defendant, a registered sex offender, left his residence on June 1. He then traveled the southwest United States for approximately three weeks before settling in Nevada and registering as an offender on July 9. Defendant was convicted of one count of failing to notify the county sheriff within ten days of changing his residence - for the period of June 1-11. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that he had not yet established a new residence and therefore had no duty to register during that ten-day period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that between June 1-11, Defendant never adopted a "place of habitation," to which, whenever he was absent, he had "the intention of returning." Accordingly, during that time period, Defendant did not "change the address of his residence" to a "new address" and therefore, Defendant was not required to register under section 22-4904(b). View "State v. LeClair" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and two counts of aggravated liberties with a child. Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences, each with a mandatory forty-year prison term. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the jury was improperly instructed with inaccurate and misleading language used in an Allen-type instruction; (2) the prosecutor improperly appealed to the emotions of the jurors by asking them to protect child victims by supporting their version of the events; (3) the judge improperly responded to a jury question by informing the jury that the abuse had happened more than once; and (4) these cumulative errors prejudiced Defendant and denied him a fair trial. View "State v. Burns" on Justia Law

More than fifty years ago, in Edwards v. Edwards, the Supreme Court stated that a child support order entered during the pendency of a divorce action is interlocutory and may be modified at any time and in any manner, even to the extent of discharging accrued and unpaid installments. This appeal raised the issue of whether that holding remained valid in light of statutory changes that have occurred over that fifty-year period. After reviewing the statutory changes, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature limited a district court's authority to discharge past-due child support in a final decree of divorce; specifically, a court's authority is limited by the provision in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1610(a)(1) that limits the retroactivity of a modification to a date at least one month after the date that a motion to modify was filed. Based on this conclusion, the Court (1) reversed the district court's order entered at the final divorce hearing that discharged all unpaid child support that had accrued under the court's interlocutory child support orders; and (2) reversed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the order discharging the past-due amounts. Remanded. View "In re Marriage of Brown" on Justia Law

Kan. Stat. Ann. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) provides that where a driver's license is being suspended because an illegal blood-alcohol level has been established by a blood test, the officer shall serve notice of the suspension "by mailing the notice." This driver's license suspension case involved the question of whether the phrase "mailing the notice" requires the officer who conducted the alcohol testing to personally deliver the notice of a driver's license suspension to the custody of a mail carrier or may instead follow his or her office's standard operating procedures for outgoing mail. The Supreme Court held (1) the statute imposes the responsibility to ensure mailing on the officer but does not require the officer to personally address, stamp, and place in a mailbox an envelope containing the notice; and (2) in this case, the officer ensured mailing by following the sheriff's standard operating procedure for mailing the notice and, thus, fulfilled the statutory requirement. In so holding, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that reversed the district court, although the Court's analysis was different from that of the court of appeals. View "Byrd v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Kody Bicknell sought review of a court of appeals decision permitting Tammy Anderson to pursue punitive damages in her lawsuit against him after Bicknell rear-ended Adamson's vehicle at a train crossing. The punitive damages claim was based, in part, on Bicknell's drug use prior to the collision. Bicknell also appealed from the panel's decision permitting Adamson to submit medical bill write-offs to the jury. On the punitive damages issue, the Supreme Court (1) agreed with the panel's decision that the district court set a higher burden of proof for the punitive damages claim than statutorily necessary by requiring that Adamson provide what would amount to scientific evidence of Bicknell's impairment resulting from his consumption of drugs; (2) concluded that the panel erred in deciding the district court should have permitted Adamson to amend for punitive damages based on the evidence as the panel perceived it; and (3) remanded for rehearing on that issue and application of the proper legal standard. On the medical bill write-off question, the Court held that the court of appeals erred in reaching the merits because the issue was not preserved for appeal. View "Adamson v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and a weapons violation when he was seventeen. The district court judge sentenced Defendant to life in prison on each of the first two counts, fifteen years to life on the third count, and five years on the fourth count, with all of the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appealed his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim that his sentences were the products of judicial bias, prejudice, or corrupt motive failed on appeal; and (2) the district court judge did not err by considering the results of Defendant's psychological examination during sentencing, and the judge's consideration of statements Defendant made during the examination without having been given Miranda warnings beforehand was not error, as Miranda warnings were unnecessary in this case. View "State v. Schaeffer" on Justia Law