Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to conduct separate trials for him and his codefendant; (2) the court did not err when it denied Appellant's request for a psychological evaluation of S.W., the complaining witness; (3) the court properly limited cross-examination of S.W.; (4) the district court did not err in failing to strike a juror for cause; (5) the court did not err by admitting into evidence three of S.W.'s drawings; (6) the jury was not instructed on alternative means of committing aggravated criminal sodomy; (7) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of the crimes for which he was convicted; (8) the prosecutor's comments during his closing argument did not improperly prejudice the jury against Appellant as to deny him a fair trial; and (9) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion requesting a departure sentence. View "State v. Stafford" on Justia Law

An officer arrested Appellant, suspecting Appellant was intoxicated. After performing two field sobriety tests, Appellant refused to take the evidentiary breath test the officer requested. The Kansas Department of Revenue suspended Appellant's driving privileges for one year under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1014(a)(1), which provides that privileges can be suspended for refusing to take a breath test the arresting officer is authorized to request. The district court affirmed Appellant's suspension, concluding that a reasonable officer could have believed it was more than a possibility that Appellant operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Appellant's driving privileges, holding (1) the officer's statutory authority to request Appellant to take the breath test depends upon a valid arrest; (2) the arrest was invalid in this case because the officer had no probable cause to support it; and (3) Appellant's refusal to take a breath test the officer had no statutory authority to request could not be the basis for suspending his driving privileges under section 8-1014(a)(1). View "Sloop v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested for driving on a suspended license. Upon the arresting officer's request, Appellant refused to take a breath test. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently suspended Appellant's driving privileges for one year under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1014(a). The district court affirmed the administrative suspension, relying upon State v. Counseller in its decision. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated Appellant's driving privileges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer's authority to request Appellant to take the breath test depended upon an arrest for an alcohol-related driving offense, rather than simply an arrest for any offense involving operation of a motor vehicle; (2) Appellant's refusal to take a breath test the officer had no statutory authority to request could not be the basis for suspending his driving privileges under section 8-1014(a); and (3) therefore, Counseller was reversed, and Appellant's driving privileges reinstated. View "Shrader v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and failure to stop at a stop sign. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and all statements he made after the evidence was seized, arguing that evidence was derived from an unlawful search of his pockets following a traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and a judge found Defendant guilty of both counts. The court of appeals found Defendant had failed to preserve the suppression issue for appellate review, and even if the issue had been preserved, there was ample basis for denying the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was not consensual under the circumstances and violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. View "State v. Spagnola" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to felony murder and kidnapping. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence in part and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision; (2) the district court did not err in requiring Defendant to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, as nothing in the record suggested Defendant's victim was under eighteen years of age; (3) the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the propriety of Defendant's sixty-one-month sentence for kidnapping because the sentence was considered a presumptive sentence; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant's sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder for the death of his five-month-old son. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court judge (1) did not clearly err by failing to instruct sua sponte on reckless second-degree murder and reckless involuntary manslaughter, as the instructions would not have been factually appropriate at trial; (2) did not clearly err by giving a jury instruction on child abuse; (3) did not err by admitting gruesome autopsy photographs, as the photographs were probative and not unduly prejudicial; and (4) did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a plea of no contest to manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. The sentencing judge found that because Appellant was not manufacturing the drug solely for his personal use, but was distributing it to others, he was required to register pursuant to the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA). The district court based its decision on the statutory scheme then in effect requiring offenders to register and defining an offender of anyone convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance, unless the court made a finding that the manufacturing was for "such person's personal use." The court decided it should read the word "solely" into the personal use exemption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the the portion of the sentence requiring Appellant to register as a drug offender, holding that the district court improperly added language to the statute that the legislature elected to omit. View "State v. Mishmash" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the only child of Susan Shore. Susan and her children were beneficiaries of the Shore Family Trust. After Susan died, Plaintiff sued Defendant, the trustee of the trust, alleging (1) Defendant sold the farmland that formed the principal of the of the trust and distributed the proceeds to himself for his personal use, and (2) Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant's actions until within two years before filing suit. Plaintiff's complaint claimed breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and constructive fraud. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the applicable statues of limitations and repose barred all of Plaintiff's claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that three of four of Plaintiff's causes of action were time barred, but his claim based on constructive fraud survived. Remanded. View "Hemphill v. Shore" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for aggravated criminal sodomy, furnishing alcohol to a minor for an illicit purpose, and endangering a child. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for review in part to clarify whether a nurse's testimony about hospital laboratory results was testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained no findings as to the primary purpose of the hospital technician's laboratory report, and that absence precluded the Court from a proper review on the right of confrontation issue; (2) Defendant's argument that the jury's verdict on the charge of endangering a child was legally inadequate because the State presented evidence of three alternative means for committing the offense, two of which were legally insufficient, was without merit; (3) the omission of a lesser included offense instruction on simple criminal sodomy was not erroneous; and (4) the use of Appellant's prior convictions in his criminal history score to enhance his sentences without requiring the State to prove the convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt was not error. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant sought review of the court of appeals' decision affirming his conviction and sentence for felony DUI. Appellant's primary argument was that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting into evidence the certificate of calibration for the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine used to determine the level of alcohol in Appellant's breath without requiring the person who completed the certificate to testify in person at Appellant's trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of calibration was not testimonial in nature, and therefore, its admission did not violate Appellant's right of confrontation; and (2) in accordance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, Appellant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated wen the district court imposed an enhanced sentence, based on prior convictions, without proving those convictions to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Benson" on Justia Law