Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After entering into a plea agreement with the State, Defendant entered no contest pleas to numerous crimes in exchange for the State's promise to recommend at sentencing that the district court impose a controlling term of 102 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by making negative comments at sentencing that undermined the parties' recommendation of a 102-month prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's sentences. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments at sentencing effectively undermined her sentencing recommendation to the district court, thereby violating the State's plea agreement with Defendant; and (2) this error was not harmless. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Urista" on Justia Law

After digital photographs of children engaged in sexual acts were found on Defendant's work computer, Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted sexual exploitation of a child. The district court imposed a fifty-two year sentence of imprisonment, with lifetime postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed, contending that the State violated the plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor was not required to "stand silent at sentencing" and that her statements were permissible to correct factual misstatements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor's questions challenging factual misstatements were appropriate and did not violate the plea agreement; but (2) the prosecutor's comment about Defendant's likelihood of recidivism violated the State's plea agreement promise to stand silent. Remanded. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Workers Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff benefits under the Workers Compensation Act for an injury he sustained while operating a go-cart at an event sponsored by his employer (Employer). Employer and its insurance carrier (Insurer) appealed the award, claiming that Plaintiff's injuries were not compensable because they were sustained during a recreational or social event that Plaintiff was not required to attend. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether Plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the error was not harmless. Remanded to the Board to make the determination based on the statutory criteria of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f). View "Douglas v. Ad Astra Info. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant owned a first-priority security interest in LLC. The Cass Trust owned LLC membership interest, and the Cass Trust and Cohen Trust owned common stock shares in Corporation. The Cohen and Cass trustees later made an agreement with Company to sell the membership interests in LLC, including Defendant's first priority security interest in LLC, and Corporation's assets. A dispute arose over whether Defendant was entitled to know details of the sale agreements. Before the sale agreements were to close, Defendant sued the trusts, LLC, and Corporation in Missouri, alleging that the trustees engaged in self-dealing and financially manipulated Corporation and LLC to dilute Defendant's ownership interest. After learning of the lawsuit, Company refused to close the transaction without additional substantive requirements. After closing, the Cohen and Cass trustees filed this lawsuit against Defendant, alleging that Defendant tortiously interfered with their existing contracts and prospective business relationships by filing the lawsuit then faxing to Company a suit copy. The trial court dismissed the claims. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant could not interfere with a contractual relation by giving Company "truthful information." The Supreme Court reversed because at the time the instant suit was filed, the court of appeals was not in a position to decide the truth of the claims set out in the Missouri action. View "Cohen v. Battaglia" on Justia Law

The City of Topeka attempted to purchase a new police helicopter from Schreib-Air, Inc. with financing by Municipal Services Group, Inc. (MSG) After a lease-purchase agreement was signed, the State filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement between the City and Schreib-Air was invalid, void ab initio, and ultra vires because the lease-purchase agreement failed to comply with the cash-basis law. Although the helicopter was never actually purchased, the district court held that the transactions with Schreib-Air and MSG violated the cash-basis law and ordered that any money given to MSG or Schreib-Air related to the helicopter purchase was to be returned. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schreib-Air's agreement with the City was void when entered into because the contract was made in violation of the cash-basis law and, consequently, the contract was unenforceable. View "State, ex rel. Hecht v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

At the conclusion of Defendant's seizure pursuant to a traffic stop, law enforcement officers returned to Defendant's car and asked him if they could search the vehicle. Defendant consented to the search of the car. The officers subsequently found crack cocaine in the trunk. Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. At issue on appeal was whether the traffic stop leading to Defendant's arrest became a voluntary encounter before Defendant gave consent to search. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant gave his consent to search his vehicle during a voluntary encounter with the officer. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, among other crimes. Law enforcement officers found drug evidence on Defendant after they seized him under the suspicion that he knew the whereabouts of someone for whom police had a warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted, as the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity before they initiated the stop, and therefore, the seizure was illegal. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether a driver's favorable results from field sobriety tests administered prior to a request for a preliminary breath test (PBT) dissipate the reasonable suspicion statutorily required to support a request for a PBT, and (2) whether the investigating officer in this case substantially complied with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012(c), which requires oral notice that refusal to take a PBT is a traffic infraction, when the officer incorrectly told Defendant he had not right to refuse the PBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) sobriety tests administered prior to a PBT request are part of the totality of circumstances examined by a court when determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the PBT request under section 8-1012(c); and (2) the officer in this case failed to comply with the notice requirements in section 8-1012(c) by incorrectly informing Defendant that he had no right to refuse the PBT. Remanded. View "State v. Edgar" on Justia Law

Corporation owned a club with exotic dancers who were treated as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance. In 2005, the Department of Labor determined that the dancers were employees. A hearing officer upheld the determination, concluding that the dancers received wages for services and therefore, the dancers were employees under the Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). The district court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the relationship between provisions in the KESL as they existed before amendments that took effect in 2011 and common-law rules used to determine the existence of employee status. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the determinative question in this case was whether the dancers had the status of employees under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. Because the critical common-law factor in this analysis is the employer's right of control over the employee and her work, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dancers were employees, where Corporation possessed such a right of control over the club's dancers. View "Milano's, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

This capital murder case resulted from a double homicide and shooting of a third victim. After a trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed, claiming he was denied his right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court (1) reversed the death sentence where the State stipulated that Defendant's attorney was ineffective during the trial's penalty phase; and (2) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that defense counsel was deficient in certain areas, but that there was no evidence that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different without these deficiencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's representation denied Defendant his right to a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law