Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion for postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court determined that Appellant would participate by telephone at the evidentiary hearing and refused to allow him to physically appear at the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that Appellant had to be physically present for the proceedings and that the district court had no discretion to order otherwise. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals because its decision stripped district courts of the discretion they lawfully have; but (2) reversed the district court's judgment because the record on appeal was inadequate for the Court to conclude whether the district court abused that discretion. Remanded. View "Fischer v. State" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

Defendant and Plaintiff were in a long-time, same-sex relationship, during which they had two children via artificial insemination. In conjunction with the birth of each child, the couple executed a coparenting agreement that addressed the contingency of a separation. After the couple separated, Defendant notified Plaintiff that she was taking the children to Texas. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action seeking to enforce the coparenting agreement. The district court's final order divided the parties' property, awarded the parties joint legal custody of the two children, designated Defendant as the residential custodian, established unsupervised parenting time for Plaintiff, and ordered Plaintiff to pay child support. The Supreme Court held (1) because the coparenting agreement was enforceable, the district court had the discretion to make appropriate orders addressing child custody, reasonable parenting time, and child support; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the court's determination that its custody and parenting time orders were in the best interests of the children; and (3) the court should have conducted an asset-by-asset analysis under Eaton v. Johnson regarding division of the parties' property. Remanded. View "Frazier v. Goudschaal" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and violation of a protection order. The State elicited evidence of multiple acts that would support the violation of a protection order charge, but it failed to elect one particular act upon which the jury could rely. The district court did not give the jury a unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the particular act that would support a conviction on the protection order charge, nor did Defendant request a unanimity instruction or object to its omission. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the unanimity error to be harmless because Defendant presented a unified defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to give a unanimity instruction was not clearly erroneous under the facts of this case. View "State v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing in part that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements and a drawing he provided law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the State did not carry its burden to show Defendant's confessions and drawing were given voluntarily under the Fifth Amendment, and thus the trial court violated Defendant's right to remain silent; and (2) the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "State v. Swindler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and three counts of forgery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on direct appeal but reversed and remanded his hard fifty prison term for the first-degree murder conviction because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when imposing it. On remand, the district court found three aggravating factors were established by a preponderance of the evidence and re-imposed a hard fifty sentence, holding that any one of the aggravating factors outweighed the court's finding in mitigation that the victim physically abused Defendant as a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the hard fifty sentence under these facts. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree intentional murder and aggravated battery. The sentencing court imposed a controlling, downward durational departure sentence of twenty-four months' imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed the sentence, concluding that the victim's request for leniency did not constitute a substantial and compelling reason for a departure in this case because the facts established that Defendant had acted with the intent to kill the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the sentence imposed, holding that, based on the facts of this case, the victim's request for leniency did not constitute a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the presumptive sentences for each of Defendant's convictions. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Hines" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to twenty-six counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a downward durational and/or dispositional departure motion, asking the court to depart from the presumptive prison term based on seven mitigating factors. The district court considered each mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing and denied the motion, finding that the mitigating factors were not substantial and compelling. Defendant was sentenced to a hard twenty-five life-imprisonment sentence. With the exception of vacating a portion of Defendant's sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's hard twenty-five life sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's departure motion; and (2) the postrelease lifetime supervision sentence imposed by the district court was illegal. View "State v. Floyd" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of possession of drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. The drugs and paraphernalia were first observed in Defendant's apartment by a public housing employee who had made an uninvited entry into the apartment to check for potential damage from a sewer back-up at the facility. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements and the drug-related evidence as being products of an unlawful search and seizure. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a public housing employee was not a government actor subject to the constitutional restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the public housing employees that entered Defendant's apartment in reaction to a maintenance problem were not government actors within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Brittingham" on Justia Law

The Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) filed a formal disciplinary action against Dr. Amir Friedman that resulted in an order of the Board revoking Friedman's license to practice medicine and surgery in the state. The district court upheld the Board's order. Friedman appealed, raising several issues, including the question of whether the Board had jurisdiction to initiate a revocation proceeding after Friedman's license had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board had jurisdiction to revoke Friedman's license because Friedman was practicing medicine under the authority of a license issued by the Board when he committed the misconduct at issue in the revocation proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the administrative hearing officer's initial order and the Board's final order. View "Friedman v. State Bd. of Healing Arts" on Justia Law