Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ritchie Corporation conveyed title to a tract of land a waste systems corporation (BFI). Ritchie and BFI entered into an escrow agreement that entitled BFI to operate the property as a nonhazardous waste transfer station for thirty-five years. Ritchie granted BFI a right of first refusal to buy the transfer station from Ritchie. BFI later assigned its title and interest in the escrow agreement to Plaintiff Waste Connections, which began operating the transfer station. Later, a third party agreed to buy the transfer station and an adjoining landfill. Waste Connections asserted its right of first refusal to purchase the transfer station. Waste Connections and Ritchie subsequently disputed the proper price owed under the escrow agreement - $1.45 million or $2 million. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Ritchie. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because genuine issues of material fact remained on Waste Connections' breach of contract action against Ritchie, summary judgment for either party was inappropriate. View "Waste Connections of Kan., Inc. v. Ritchie Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) several of the issues raised by Defendant were not properly preserved or presented for review; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting certain autopsy photographs at trial; (3) the trial judge did not err in not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Defendant's best friend, who was a witness for the State, regarding the friend's involvement in drug sales; and (4) the trial judge did not err in giving a pattern jury instruction regarding aiding and abetting the commission of a crime. View "State v. Tague" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy for acts committed against his stepdaughter. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent hard twenty-five life sentences under Jessica's Law and to lifetime postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) Defendant's Jessica's Law hard twenty-five life sentences for rape and aggravated indecent liberties were not disproportionate to his crime; but (2) Defendant was entitled to vacation of the postrelease supervision term ordered by the district judge, as this portion of Defendant's sentence was illegal. View "State v. Seward" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties for his conduct with his third-grade stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive Jessica's Law hard twenty-five life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) rape is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on rape were sufficient; (2) aggravated indecent liberties is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on aggravated indecent liberties were sufficient; (3) Defendant's sentence for rape was proportional under section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) Defendant's sentence for aggravated indecent liberties was proportional under section 9. View "State v. Newcomb" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle within the boundaries of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation's (Nation) reservation, Appellant, an enrolled member of the nation, was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) subsequently suspended Appellant's Kansas driver's license based on Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567a, which prohibits any person less than twenty-one years of age from operating a vehicle in the state with a blood alcohol content of .02 or greater. Upon judicial review of the suspension order, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of KDR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over any civil matter arising from the incident, and the KDR acted outside the scope of its authority in this case. Remanded with directions to order the reinstatement of Appellant's driver's license. View "Rodewald v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) claimed several gas and energy companies (collectively, ONEOK and Lumen) wrongfully converted natural gas by purchasing gas from two producers (collectively, Nash and L.D.), which operated wells on land near Northern's underground natural gas storage field. ONEOK and Lumen filed third-party identification claims against Nash and L.D. Nash and L.D., in turn, asserted various claims against Northern, ONEOK, and Lumen. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nash and L.D. on the third-party identification claims, concluding that Northern lost title to its migrating storage gas, and thus, Nash and L.D. had title to the gas produced by wells located beyond property adjoining the certificated boundaries of Northern's gas storage field and purchased by ONEOK and Lumen. Before the court journalized its order, Northern expanded the certificated boundaries of its storage field, bringing the wells at issue within the expansion area. The district court denied Northern's motion to modify its summary judgment ruling but limited its ruling to matters prior to June 2, 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by application of the rule of capture, Nash and L.D. possessed title to the gas produced from their wells before June 2, 2010. View "N. Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Servs. Co., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, capital murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, requesting that his capital murder conviction be reversed because the complaint did not list the names of both individuals whose deaths served as the basis for the capital murder charge. The district court summarily denied Defendant's petition. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the summary denial of Defendant's motion because a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504 cannot be used to collaterally challenge a conviction; and (2) denied Defendant's request to treat the motion as a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. View "State v. Trotter" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child under fourteen years of age and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting (1) evidence of his previous conviction for attempted aggravated incest of his daughter under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455, and (2) a videotaped interview in which Defendant contended detectives implied he was not being truthful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's previous conviction for attempted aggravated incest, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant's second argument was not properly before the Court. View "State v. Longstaff" on Justia Law

Decedent created an inter vivos revocable trust. Until her death, Decedent served as the trust's sole trustee. At Decedent's request, Attorney drafted the trust documents and a pour-over will. Bank was named successor trustee of Decedent's trust. After Decedent died, the personal representative (Representative) of Decedent's estate sued Attorney and Bank. Against Attorney, the petition alleged claims of negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract based on the alleged failure of Defendants to protect Decedent's assets from tax liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions of summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that Representative's tort claims for legal malpractice did not survive Decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Representative's cause of action did not accrue until after Decedent's death, it did not qualify as a survival action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1801 and was therefore barred. View "Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery. Counts I and II were a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(A) and Count III was a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(B), which prohibits "recklessly causing bodily harm...to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted." Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in requiring Defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his use-of-force was justified in defense of others or property other than a dwelling pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3219, but this error was harmless; (2) the Kansas Legislature did not state alternative means of committing aggravated battery under the aggravated battery statute; (3) the district court did not err by giving a unanimity instruction; and (4) while the district court may have erred in denying Defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses regarding why they did not honor their subpoenas, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ultreras" on Justia Law