Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the premeditated first-degree murder of Joseph Beier. Defendant admitted to shooting Beier during a bar fight but appealed his conviction on several grounds. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial without addressing all of Defendant's arguments, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence of premeditation for first-degree premeditated murder; but (2) the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, as Defendant's testimony and his theory of defense supported the requested instruction, and the error was not harmless in this circumstance. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to void judgment pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-260(b)(4), claiming that the district court's refusal to give his requested lesser included offense instructions on the felony-murder charge rendered void his conviction and sentence for that charge. The district court summarily denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 60-260(b)(4) does not provide a procedure for a criminal defendant to obtain postconviction relief from his conviction or sentence, and therefore, Defendant sought a remedy under section 60-260(b)(4) to which he was not entitled, and the district court was correct to deny the motion. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the off-grid person felony of rape (sexual intercourse with a child under fourteen years old) and the off-grid person felony of aggravated criminal sodomy (sodomy with a child under fourteen years old). The district court imposed sentences totaling 310 months for Defendant's Jessica's Law convictions. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant's sentence for his rape conviction was illegal because the district court did not follow statutory authority in imposing the departure sentence; and (2) the State was not required to prove Defendant's criminal history score to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior. The district court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years to life under Jessica's Law. The court imposed concurrent sentences of varying lengths for the three remaining convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence of twenty-five years to life was unconstitutional because it was cruel or unusual punishment and that it was contrary to statute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the sentence, concluding (1) the sentence was constitutional and was not contrary to statute, as the legislature intended individuals convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child be eligible for parole after twenty-five years; but (2) the district court improperly sentenced Defendant to lifetime postrelease supervision instead of parole. View "State v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a habeas petition and a motion to correct an illegal sentence, both of which were unsuccessful. Approximately twelve years later, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the district court did not advise him of various constitutional rights in open court contrary to the mandate of Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3210(a)(3). The district court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Four years later, Defendant filed a second motion to withdraw pleas, arguing, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective in arguing his first motion to withdraw pleas. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's motion to withdraw pleas was untimely and procedurally barred. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy of a child less than fourteen years of age. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his right to counsel under the federal and state constitutions was violated when he was interrogated without his attorney being present and the resulting statements were admitted at trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4503 entitled Defendant to the assistance of counsel at a State-initiated polygraph examination and interview of Defendant; (2) after Defendant's statutory right to counsel attached, his uncounseled waiver of that right was not valid because it was not made in writing and on the record in open court; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to suppress the uncounseled statement Defendant made during the police-initiated interrogation after Defendant invoked his right to the assistance of counsel under section 22-4503. View "State v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court violated Defendant's constitutional and statutory rights when it replayed Defendant's recorded statement about specific incidents involving the child victim to a deliberating jury outside of his presence but in the courtroom, but the error was harmless; (2) Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the court erred when it allowed the child victim to testify with a comfort person alongside her; and (3) the court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt was legally appropriate. View "State v. Herbel" on Justia Law

This appeal arose over the administration of a Trust between Lawrence, the Trust's beneficiary, and the Trust's trustees, Dennis and Leona (collectively, Trustees). Lawrence moved to set aside a contract for deed executed between Dennis and his wife and the Trustees for the sale of farmland owned by the Trust and also sought to remove the Trustees, alleging they engaged in self-dealing and breached their fiduciary duties. The district court concluded (1) the Trust permitted the Trustees to finance the sale of the farmland to Dennis under the terms set forth in the contract for deed; and (2) Lawrence violated the Trust's no-contest clause by challenging the Trustee's sale of the farmland to Dennis, which required Lawrence's disinheritance. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling regarding the Trustees' authority to finance the sale of the farm and its enforcement of the no-contest clause against Lawrence, holding (1) the Trustees' execution of the contract for deed violated the terms of the Trust; and (2) Lawrence had probable cause to challenge the Trustees' sale of the farm to Dennis. Remanded. View "Hamel v. Hamel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a drug-related crime. During trial, evidence of Defendant's prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine was admitted into evidence. The jury convicted Defendant of one count of manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing, inter alia, that evidence of his prior conviction was erroneously admitted. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's presentation of evidence that he was on probation at the time the current crime was committed opened the door to rebuttal evidence regarding his prior crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the nature of Defendant's prior conviction even after Defendant presented evidence regarding his probation, as the evidence was not relevant to prove a material fact, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Everett" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug-related crime and was sentenced to eighteen months' probation. The district court made no findings justifying Defendant's extended prison probation term from twelve months to eighteen months pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6411(c)(5). More than eighteen months after Defendant's sentence was imposed, the district court resentenced Defendant to correct the failure to make findings justifying the extended probation term. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him because he had already completed the twelve-month presumptive probation term. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) if a district court fails to comply with the requirements of section 21-4611(c)(5) by imposing an extended period of probation without making required findings and the sentence is therefore illegal, the district court only has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant during the period of probation that complied with section 21-4611(c)(5); and (2) because the district court imposed the "corrected" sentence after the twelve-month probation period had expired, the "corrected" sentence was unlawful. View "State v. Alonzo" on Justia Law