Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John filed suit against his mother, Bernice, both individually and in her capacity as trustee for two trusts. Bernice subsequently died, and John's brother and sister, Richard and Diana, were substituted as defendants. John made three claims - breach of contract, breach of trust, and constructive fraud. John's claims arose after Bernice executed a trust in 2004 and a new will with the express intent to disinherit John. John claimed that Bernice's actions constituted a breach of her joint and contractual will made in 1989 with John's father, Frank. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed and remanded, concluding that an irrevocable 1996 trust created by Frank and Bernice implicitly revoked or modified the 1989 will. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the 1996 trust did not fully revoke the 1989 will; (2) because in 2004 Bernice was still bound by any contractual provisions in the 1989 will that survived the creation of the irrevocable 1996 trust, John could prove a breach of contract to the extent the 2004 will and trust violated the 1989 will's surviving provisions; and (3) summary judgment was not appropriate on any of John's claims. Remanded. View "Boucek v. Boucek" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and attempted rape and sentenced to two terms of life in prison without parole as an aggravated habitual sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted rape and vacated the remaining rape conviction, holding (1) Defendant's convictions for rape and attempted rape were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (2) the reversal of the attempted rape conviction rendered moot Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction on that count; (3) rape is not an alternative means crime; and (4) the aggravated habitual sex offender provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4642 are constitutional. Remanded for a determination of whether the State established that Defendant meets the statutory definition of an aggravated habitual sex offender under section 21-4642. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The sentencing judge sentenced Defendant to six concurrent life sentences and imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court reversed four of Defendant's six convictions of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, vacated the corresponding sentences, and vacated the order of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding (1) any error in the admission of Defendant's prior sexual misconduct did not affect his substantial rights; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support four of Defendant's six convictions; (3) Defendant's life sentences for the remaining to convictions did not violate the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) the sentencing court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision rather than parole. View "State v. Spear" on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, a Mississippi court entered a child-custody order granting residential custody of Child to Mother. Mother and Child moved to Kansas. Stepfather, Mother's husband, subsequently filed a petition for the stepparent adoption of Child. The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the stepparent adoption, determining that the Mississippi court had not relinquished jurisdiction over matters regarding Child, and a Mississippi court was a more appropriate forum to hear the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-2127, the jurisdiction provision of the Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act, conflicted with provisions of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and that under the UCCJEA, only the Mississippi court could determine it no longer had continuing jurisdiction to modify the child-custody order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 59-2127 controls the determination of whether a Kansas court has jurisdiction over an adoption; (2) under section 29-2127, a Kansas court can determine if the Mississippi court has continuing jurisdiction over the child-custody order or this adoption; and (3) the district court's error in failing to apply section 59-2127 and in determining Mississippi a more convenient forum was not harmless. Remanded. View "In re Adoption of H.C.H." on Justia Law

After Employee was injured in a car accident with a police officer, Employer's workers compensation carrier (Claimant) sought to bring this tort action against City. Claimant gave notice to City that it was pursuing a negligence claim against it, claiming damages in the amount of $19,590. Claimant then brought a lawsuit in the district court, requesting $19,590 in damages. Several months later, Claimant sought leave to amend its petition to raise the amount of alleged damages to $228,088. City objected, arguing that Claimant's notice did not include "a statement of the amount of monetary damages that is being requested" as required under Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-105b(d)(5). The district court granted Claimant's petition, finding that Claimant's statutory notice substantially complied with 12-105b(d). A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the notice was in substantial compliance with the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Claimant's notice substantially complied with 12-105b(d), as the notice contained all the information required by the statute; and (2) when a notice conforms with section 12-105b(d), subsequent amendments to the pleadings are subject to an inquiry into a claimant's bad faith or misleading conduct. View "Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Shultz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and child abuse and sentenced to consecutive terms of life and fifty-five months' incarceration with lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated the postrelease portion of her sentence, holding, inter alia, (1) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument stayed within the bounds of proper comment on the evidence; (2) the district judge's failure to conduct further inquiry upon Defendant's notice of dissatisfaction with her attorney did not violate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel; (3) the three phrases in the felony-murder statute do not create alternative means; and (4) the lifetime postrelease portion of Defendant's sentence was illegal. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

After Defendant stole a television from Timothy Schulze's home, Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and four counts of theft. The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $1,862, of which the majority was payable to Schulze. Defendant challenged $1,035 of the award, which represented a three-year, $345 annual surcharge placed on Schulze's homeowner's policy by his insurance company for having made a theft claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the sentencing judge did not erroneously include the amount of Schulze's increased insurance cost in the restitution amount; and (2) the sentencing judge did not err by failing to rely on fair market value of the property stolen by Defendant. View "State v. Hand" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was employed at an animal clinic, altered computer records to erase outstanding bills for services performed for her own pets and stole clinic inventory. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of computer crime and left. The trial court imposed restitution in the amount of $14,293. A portion of this amount was based on the retail rather than the wholesale price of the stolen inventory. The court of appeals vacated the restitution order, holding, as a matter of law, that retail value was not a proper measure of restitution because the loss the clinic suffered was the wholesale price it had paid for the inventory. The Supreme Court affirmed but for other reasons, holding (1) in determining restitution for stolen inventory, there is no bright-line rule favoring either retail or wholesale cost; (2) rather, the sentencing judge must consider all the evidence to determine a value that compensates the victim for the actual loss caused by a defendant's crime; and (3) in this case, the sentencing judge's adoption of retail value as an appropriate measure of loss to the clinic for Defendant's theft of inventory was arbitrary and without substantial evidentiary support. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, who provided daycare services for children in her home, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based on the underlying crime of endangering a child. Defendant appealed, contending that the district court should have supplemented the pattern jury instruction on the elements of endangering a child by explaining to the jury what "reasonable probability" meant. Specifically, Defendant argued that the State had to prove she knew that there was a reasonable probability her actions would endanger the child's life, and that "reasonable probability" was "something more than a faint or remote possibility." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court's failure to define "reasonable probability" was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(B). Pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643(a)(1)(3), the district court imposed a life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years for each count and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 21-4643(a)(1)(3) violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment because a hard twenty-five life sentence was disproportionate to the crime section 21-3504(a)(3)(B) defined. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that imposition of a hard twenty-five life sentence under Jessica's Law for each of Defendant's convictions was not categorically disproportionate and, therefore, was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Ruggles" on Justia Law