Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a consolidated jury trial on two homicide cases against Defendant, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting the State's motion to consolidate the two cases for trial after finding that the crimes were of the same or similar character; (2) did not err in allowing the jury to decide whether eyewitness identification evidence was reliable under the totality of the circumstances even though the identification procedure used by the police was unnecessarily suggestive; (3) incorrectly instructed the jury on eyewitness identification testimony, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; and (4) did not err in admitting gang evidence. Lastly, the errors in this proceeding did not deny Defendant his right to a fair trial. View "State v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of unintentional reckless second-degree murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to 117 months' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) district court did not deny Defendant his right to present his theory of defense by refusing to admit Defendant's expert witness testimony; (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to investigators; (3) Defendant's argument that witnesses inappropriately commented on his credibility was not preserved for appeal; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, but the error was harmless; (5) the identical offense sentencing doctrine did not require reversing and remanding for resentencing; and (7) the district court did not err in applying a Board of Indigents' Defense application fee. View "State v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. Within one year of the resentencing hearing but more than one year after remand, Defendant filed a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the motion as untimely filed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the time limitation under section 60-1507 began ten days after resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Defendant's motion was timely. Remanded. View "Baker v. State " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in the course of a surgery performed by Doctor. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations Plaintiff filed sued against Doctor and his practice. Doctor wasn't properly served. The district court later granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the malpractice action without prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed through different counsel a new lawsuit seeking damages against Doctor. Doctor filed a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. Plaintiff's original attorneys (Attorneys) filed a motion to intervene to oppose Doctor's motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. Thereafter, the court granted Doctor's motion to dismiss based on an expired statute of limitations. Attorneys appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Attorneys again appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Attorneys lacked standing to intervene in district court and thus lacked standing to take this appeal. View "Ternes v. Galichia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a prisoner, was convicted of criminal threat for yelling at a pizza delivery person. The jury trial was held before Judge John McNally, who had presided over three cases involving Defendant. Defendant sought Judge McNally's recusal, but Judge McNally declined to recuse. After his conviction, Defendant appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the probability of actual bias in this case was too high to be tolerable under the due process clause; and (2) the judge did not err in giving the jury a permissive inference instruction. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. During the trial, the victim testified that Defendant had a scar on his penis. Defendant appealed, claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek a continuance to obtain evidence to rebut the existence of the scar. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's counsel's assistance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's unconstitutionally ineffective assistance denied Defendant the opportunity to impeach the victim's credibility by rebutting her testimony about his alleged penile scar, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, denied Defendant a fair trial, and created a reasonable probability that the trial would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Rineharts contracted with Morton Buildings for a preengineered building to serve as their personal residence and business location for their business, Midwest Slitting. Upon disputes regarding the structure's quality, the Rineharts and Midwest Slitting sued. A jury found for the Rineharts on several of their claims and for Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claim. The court of appeals affirmed and granted the Rineharts appellate attorney fees. Morton appealed, arguing that the economic loss doctrine, which originated with product liability litigation to prohibit tort claims when the only damages were to the product itself, should extend to bar the negligent misrepresentation claim in this case. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claims, holding that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation claims because the duty at issue arises by operation of law, and the doctrine's purposes would not be further by extending it to such claims; and (2) reversed the appellate attorney fee award because the Court could not determine from the record whether the court of appeals included time and expenses in the award not reimbursable under the applicable statute. Remanded. View "Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc." on Justia Law

Russell Graham shot himself and his son, Zeus, with a gun Russell purchased at Baxter Springs Gun & Pawn Shop. The pawn shop's owners, Joe and Patsy George, filled out the paperwork by listing Russell's mother as the purchaser of the gun because Russell had a prior felony conviction. Russell then paid for the gun and ammunition. Zeus's mother, Elizabeth Shirley, sued the pawn shop and the Georges for negligence in selling a firearm to a party while knowing it was intended for another and without performing a background check on the intended owner. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of Shirley's negligence per se claim but reversed the court's rejection of Shirley's negligent entrustment claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision allowing Shirley to proceed with a negligent entrustment claim; and (2) reversed the portion of the court's decision holding that Defendants were not held to the highest standard of reasonable care in exercising control over firearms. Remanded. View "Shirley v. Glass" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of introducing a controlled substance into a correctional facility after marijuana was found in his socks. Defendant requested that he be given a departure sentence because the amount of marijuana he possessed was very small. The district court concluded that it could not consider a lesser sentence on that basis and sentenced Defendant to an additional 122 months in prison. The court of appeals vacated the sentence, holding (1) the district court could have given Defendant a downward departure sentence because possession of a small quantity of drugs constitutes a valid factor upon which a departure sentence may be entered on a prison-contraband conviction, but the court incorrectly refused to consider the possibility because it misinterpreted a sentencing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals was correct in its reasoning and judgment. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law