Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were two Kansas residents who entered into an agreement with an out-of-state limited liability company (LLC) to assist them in managing their consumer debt and in dealing with their creditors. Plaintiffs brought an action against the LLC, its managing member, and other entities in federal court for alleged violations of the Kansas Credit Services Organization Act (KCSOA) and the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The U.S. district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the application of KCSOA and KCPA to attorneys and law firms. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) If an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Kansas and who is acting within the course and scope of his or her practice is exempt from the provisions of the KCSOA, the attorney's law firm is also exempt; and (2) attorneys are not inherently exempt from the reach of the KCPA by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, but certain statutory remedies may be unconstitutional if they encroach on the traditional exclusive powers of the court, especially the powers relating to issuing and regulating the license to practice law. View "Hays v. Ruther" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including the crime of forgery in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3710(a)(2). Defendant appealed his forgery conviction, which was based upon his attempt to cash a $350 check at CheckSmart. Defendant argued that the terms "issuing or delivering" in section 21-3710(a)(2) established alternative means of committing forgery and that the State did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant issued the forged check. The court of appeals upheld the forgery conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend to create alternative means of committing forgery, and consequently, the State did not have to present evidence that Defendant both issued the check and delivered the check; and (2) the substantial competent evidence that established that Defendant delivered a fraudulent check knowingly and with intent to defraud was sufficient to support Defendant's forgery conviction. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, arson, and aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the district judge's denial of his motion to suppress a videotape of his interview with law enforcement. Defendant subsequently filed several motions, including a motion to correct an illegal sentence, raising issues related to the use of his statements to law enforcement. A later motion was also entitled motion to correct illegal sentence and contained arguments similar to those Defendant raised earlier. The motions were denied by the district court. Defendant appealed the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lack of an evidentiary hearing below did not preclude the Court's meaningful review; and (2) res judicata applied in this case. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder for the intentional and premeditated killing of Rachel Dennis in the commission of, or subsequent to the commission of, attempted rape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that (1) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by commenting on the defense expert's compensation or in drawing inferences from forensic evidence during closing argument; (2) the trial judge did not err in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior, premarital sexual relationship because the evidence was relevant, not prohibited by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-447, and not unduly prejudicial; (3) the trial judge did not err in admitting opinion testimony of a lay witness regarding Defendant's state of mind; and (4) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Lowrance" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty or no contest plea to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which was a nonperson felony due to Defendant's two previous misdemeanor convictions for the same offense. During the proceeding, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the State's reliance on one of his misdemeanor convictions, claiming that his attorney had filed a guilty plea in that case without consulting him. On appeal, Defendant again objected to the inclusion of the prior misdemeanor in his criminal history. The court of appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a defendant charged with felony DUI pleads guilty or no contest to the felony, and wishes to challenge the validity of a prior misdemeanor DUI used to classify the severity level of the current charge or to enhance the sentence following conviction on the current charge, the defendant will be limited on appeal to arguing the impropriety of the prior misdemeanor's effect as a sentencing enhancement; and (2) the court of appeals should have considered the merits of Defendant's claim in this case that he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor DUI rather than felony DUI. Remanded. View "State v. Key" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) under Kansas' version of a stand-your-ground-law in effect at the time of the crime, he was immune from prosecution; and (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he was immune from prosecution under the stand-your-ground statute because he made the argument for the first time on appeal, and the statute must be asserted before trial or opens or a dispositive plea is entered; and (2) the prosecutor made an incorrect statement of law about the jury's process during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Appellant was seriously injured in a gasoline fire. Appellant filed a complaint against Employer for negligently failing to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the common-law assumption of risk doctrine barred recovery in this case because Appellant knew of the dangerous situation and voluntarily exposed himself to that danger. The court of appeals affirmed based on existing precedent. The Supreme Court (1) overruled prior caselaw adhering to the assumption of risk as an absolute bar to recovery, holding that the state's statutory comparative fault system, in which any alleged assumption of risk is considered as just one factor when determining proportionality of fault based on the circumstances, should control; and (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the district court erred when it granted Employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Appellant assumed the risk from which his injuries followed. Remanded for consideration of Appellant's negligence claims under the principles of comparative fault. View "Simmons v. Porter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated murder. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion for a separate sentencing proceeding. The assistant county attorney personally served on Defendant's counsel a notice of her intent to request a separate sentencing proceeding. After Defendant's conviction, the district court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Defendant to a hard forty life sentence. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the service and filing of the notice of the State's intent to ask for a separate sentencing hearing had not complied with statutory mandates. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the State complied with the statutory notice provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4624(1). View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not aid and abet Michael Navarro, the person who actually killed the victim, but was merely present at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict because there was evidence Defendant took an active role in the commission of the crimes and intended to aid and abet Navarro; (2) the trial court did not err in declining to add Defendant's proposed language to the aiding and abetting jury instruction; and (3) any error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury to consider the testimony of Navarro's girlfriend with caution because she was an accomplice was harmless. View "State v. Llamas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of malicious second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se petition under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 for postconviction DNA testing of evidence collected from the crime scene. The district court summarily denied Defendant's petition because the plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 permits only persons convicted of first-degree murder and rape to petition for DNA testing. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Kansas' postconviction DNA testing scheme. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling denying Defendant's petition, (1) holding that section 21-2512 violates the Fourth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by denying access to postconviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; and (2) extending the statute to include offenders in the same situation as Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law