Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two police officers and two training officers entered a locked apartment without a warrant to assist Defendant, who was lying unresponsive on the couch. Once Defendant was awake and clearly not needing emergency medical assistance, the officers began a criminal investigation. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and felony use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence obtained as a result of the officers' warrantless entry. The district court granted the motion, holding (1) the officers’ initial entry was permitted under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, but (2) the officers’ ensuing search was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the officers unreasonably exceeded the permissible scope of their warrantless entry. In so holding, the Supreme Court realigned its previous Kansas test for applying the emergency aid exception with more recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. View "State v. Neighbors" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contendere to one count each of aggravated sodomy and attempted aggravated sodomy. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to a sentencing recommendation that permitted Defendant to seek a shorter prison term through a durational departure. The Board of Indigents’ Defense Services approved Defendant’s request to fund a sex offender evaluation to use in support of his motion for a durational departure sentence, but the district court denied Defendant’s request to continue the sentencing hearing to allow for the completion of that evaluation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to continue sentencing so he could present evidence in mitigation of his punishment and to support his motion for downward departure. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court erred in denying Defendant the additional opportunity to present mitigation evidence, but the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court committed reversible error by denying Defendant’s motion to continue the sentencing hearing. Remanded. View "State v. Haney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two counts of felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to life with a mandatory minimum term of forty years for his capital murder conviction and 238 months on his remaining convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the underlying convictions were multiplicitous. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the issue raised in Defendant’s motion was not a sentencing matter but, rather, a collateral attack on his convictions, and the issue was improper when raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Bradford" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Before trial, the State moved for a determination as to the admissibility of Defendant’s inculpatory statements to police. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Defendant had the opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of the statements. The district court allowed the statements to be admitted. After he was convicted and sentenced, Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police, and (2) structural error occurred when he was not allowed to testify in support of his motion to reconsider the trial court’s earlier ruling that his statements to police were voluntarily given. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Defendant’s statements to the police were voluntary and knowingly given; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant a second opportunity to testify and his request proffer his testimony at the motion to reconsider. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that that two prosecutors who made arguments to the jury misstated the law by suggesting that premeditation could occur after a homicidal act. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) although the prosecutors misstated the law, it was not reasonably probable that the prosecutors’ misstatements of law affected the outcome of the trial, and therefore, reversal of Defendant’s convictions was not warranted; and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted into evidence two jailhouse letters written by Defendant. View "State v. Huddleston" on Justia Law

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company issued an automobile insurance policy, which included uninsured motorist coverage, to Melvin Briggs. After Nationwide sent Briggs a notice of nonrenewal of the policy, Briggs was involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Briggs's children filed a claim under the Nationwide policy for uninsured motorist benefits, which Nationwide denied. Nationwide subsequently sued Briggs’s children, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had nonrenewed Briggs’s policy before the automobile accident. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Nationwide, concluding that it had complied with statutory and policy requirements for notice of nonrenewal. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered the certified question as follows: Notice to nonrenew an insurance policy that complies with the procedure set out in Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-3118(b) and a consistent provision in the policy itself is sufficient to force a lapse of coverage, regardless of whether a proper substantive basis for nonrenewal exists under Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-276a(a) and consistent policy language. View "Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briggs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under fourteen years of age. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he had the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires, the sexual desires of the children, or both. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Defendant engaged in the lewd fondling or touching of the two children with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires, the desires of the children, or both; but (2) vacated the sentences in part, holding that the sentencing court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime electronic monitoring. Remanded. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against a hospital and its employee after Plaintiffs’ son died from a punctured bowel. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, concluding (1) the hospital was a municipality as defined by section 12-105a(a); and (2) Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements under Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-105b(d). The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding (1) compliance with section 12-105b(d) is not achieved when a claimant’s notice fails to provide any statement of monetary damages; (2) the provision in section 12-105b(d) giving a municipality 120 days to investigate and review a claim is a statutory condition precedent to filing a lawsuit, and a claimant’s premature filing of a lawsuit leaves a court without subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) in this case, even if Plaintiffs substantially complied with section 12-105b(d) by providing the hospital with a statement of damages, the district court properly dismissed their case because they prematurely filed it. View "Sleeth v. Sedan City Hosp." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences in two cases. The first case, which was tried to a jury, involved sex offenses against a thirteen-year-old, and the second case arose from an unrelated incident involving burglary and theft that was tried to the bench on stipulated facts while the jury in the first case deliberated. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in both cases, holding (1) prosecutor improperly opined on the credibility of a witness during the trial on the sex crime charges, but the mistake did not require reversal of Defendant’s sex crime convictions; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel did not provide him with ineffective assistance; (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s sex crime convictions; and (4) Defendant’s argument that the district court’s failure to make on-the-record findings on Defendant’s departure motion rendered his sentences in the burglary and theft case illegal was without merit. View "State v. Dull" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3502(a)(1)(A), which defines rape as sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual intercourse under circumstances when “the victim is overcome by force or fear.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the phrase “force or fear” establishes alternative means of committing rape, and because the State failed to present evidence establishing the victim was overcome by fear, there was insufficient evidence to support the rape conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the issue of alternative means did not need to be decided definitively in this case because the evidence established that the victim was overcome by both force and fear. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) including the language “force or fear” in the jury instruction on rape did not make this an alternative means case because the phrase “force or fear” merely presents options within a means; and (2) sufficient evidence was presented at trial that the victim was overcome by force when Defendant had nonconsensual sex with him. View "State v. Nunez" on Justia Law