Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a dispute between Timothy Towne and the Unified School District No. 259, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed the lower courts' rulings, finding that self-insured school districts are not exempt from regulation under the Kansas Insurance Code. Towne, an employee of the school district, was injured in a car accident and received benefits from the school district's self-funded medical benefit plan. After Towne recovered funds from a third party, the school district required him to reimburse the plan. Towne claimed that the plan's subrogation clause, which allowed for this reimbursement, was unenforceable under Kansas regulations. The district court and Court of Appeals held that the school district's plan was exempt from the Kansas Insurance Code, thereby making the subrogation clause enforceable. However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the medical benefit plan offered by the school district is a "health benefit plan" and the school district is a "health insurer" under Kansas law, making the school district subject to the anti-subrogation regulation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Towne v. U.S.D. 259" on Justia Law

In the State of Kansas, Robert Lowell-Lawrence Ward, the defendant, attempted to withdraw his 2013 plea of no contest to various crimes, eight years later in 2021. The district court summarily denied his motion, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmatively upheld these rulings. The Court found that Ward's motion to withdraw his plea was untimely and procedurally barred, as he failed to prove "excusable neglect," a necessary condition to overcome the one-year time bar for such motions as per Kansas statute K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3210(e). The Court clarified that a motion's untimeliness does not necessarily prevent its consideration, provided the defendant can demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay, which the defendant failed to do. The Court emphasized that a district court cannot bypass this procedural requirement and directly address the merits of an untimely motion without first determining the presence or absence of excusable neglect. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts, but for different reasons, focusing on the procedural bar rather than the merits of the motion. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

In the state of Kansas, a number of non-profit groups, including the League of Women Voters of Kansas and the Kansas Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, challenged a law which made it a felony to engage in conduct that gives the appearance of being an election official or that would cause another person to believe a person is an election official. The non-profits argued that the law was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, as it could criminalize their voter education and registration activities. They also claimed that the law violated their rights to free speech and association. The district court denied their request for a temporary injunction and the Court of Appeals dismissed the non-profits' claims for lack of standing, arguing that they were not at risk of prosecution under the statute. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed these decisions, finding that the non-profits did have standing to challenge the law. The Court held that when a law criminalizes speech and does not clearly demonstrate that only constitutionally unprotected speech is being criminalized, the law is unclear enough to confer pre-enforcement standing on a plaintiff challenging the law. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Devawn T. Mitchell was convicted for first-degree felony murder, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, two counts of felony fleeing and eluding, and misdemeanor fleeing and eluding. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the district court inappropriately found him competent to stand trial, failed to obtain a psychological evaluation before sentencing him, and incorrectly applied his "B" criminal history score to increase his mandatory minimum sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decisions. In addressing Mitchell's competence to stand trial, the court determined that the district court had correctly followed procedure, ordering a competency evaluation and holding a hearing. The court found that Mitchell failed to prove he was incompetent and therefore upheld the lower court's finding of competence.Regarding the failure to order a psychological evaluation, the Supreme Court noted that Mitchell did not explicitly request such an evaluation. As the request was not made, the district court was under no obligation to order an evaluation.As for the application of Mitchell's criminal history score, the court ruled that the lower court correctly applied the score to Mitchell's mandatory minimum life sentence before parole eligibility. The court found that neither the plain language nor any reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibited the use of Mitchell's criminal history score to calculate his minimum life sentence before parole eligibility.In sum, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed Mitchell's conviction and sentence. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In a defamation case involving a cosmetic surgeon and a former patient who posted negative and false reviews on Yelp, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the district court's judgment that the surgeon failed to show any actual damage to his reputation. The court held that defamation requires proof of harm to reputation, and mere speculation about reputational harm is not sufficient. Reputational harm may be indicated by reasonable inferences such as declining revenue or decreased professional opportunities, but these inferences must be tied to a fact in the real world. The court clarified that defamation per se and presumed damages have been abolished in Kansas, and thus, a plaintiff must show injury to reputation to establish a valid claim for defamation. The court found that the surgeon failed to prove reputational harm caused by the defamatory statements, and rejected the argument that the jury's finding of malice relieved him from proof of reputational harm. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to set aside the defamation judgment. View "Marcus v. Swanson" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the appellant, Melissa Lowe, was convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon involving an incident with her ex-husband's girlfriend. Lowe appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury on simple assault, a misdemeanor, as a lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with Lowe that the district court erred by failing to give a lesser included offense instruction, as there was evidence which could have justified a conviction for simple assault.However, the court noted that under Kansas law, Lowe bore the burden to firmly convince the court that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the district court not failed to give the lesser included offense instruction. Looking at the entire record, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that there was nothing to establish that the jury would have reached a different result. The jury had rejected Lowe's version of events, finding the witnesses' accounts that Lowe swerved her car towards the victim credible enough to convict her of aggravated assault. Consequently, the court held that the failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was not reversible error. The court affirmed both the judgment from the district court and the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court ruling that R.R.'s best interests would be served as naming T.R. the legal father, holding that the district court did not misapply the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2201 et seq. in this case.Under the KPA, when competing statutory presumptions of parentage exist based on genetics, adoption, and other circumstances, the court is to decide parentage based on the presumption yielding "the weightier considerations of policy and logic, including the best interests of the child." T.T. sought paternity rights to R.R., his biological son who was conceived and born to Mother during her marriage to T.R. The district court held that T.R. had the weightier presumption and that the relevant factors weighed in favor of T.R. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court applied the correct legal standard; and (2) the district court properly weighed the parties' competing presumptions of paternity by following the KPA's statutory scheme and the guidance set forth in Greer v. Greer, 324 P.3d 310 (Kan. 2014). View "In re Parentage of R.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Defendant's felony theft charge as multiplicitous and reversed the ruling of a panel of the court of appeals reversing that decision, holding that the State's theory of felony theft was insufficient as a matter of law on the facts of this case.Defendant was charged with one count each of felony theft and violation of the Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The district court dismissed the felony theft charge on multiplicity grounds. The panel reversed, concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the court to bind Defendant over on felony theft. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's arguments regarding the asserted incompatibility between statutory theft and a statutory Tax Act violation were unavailing. View "State v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the results of an evidentiary breath test (EBT) based on a violation of his statutory right to counsel under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1001(c)(1).In his motion to suppress, Defendant alleged that he invoked his right to counsel at least two times before the EBT was administered but that law enforcement failed to honor his statutory right to counsel after he submitted to the EBT. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a pre-EBT request for counsel is not sufficient to invoke the post-EBT right. The district court subsequently found Defendant guilty of driving under the influence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 8-1001(c)(1) is ambiguous as to the timing of a post-EBT request for counsel and permits the post-EBT right to counsel to be invoked either before or after the EBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a person properly to invoke the statutory right to post-EBT counsel, the plain language of the amended statute requires the person to make a request for counsel after administration of the EBT. View "State v. Kerrigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Dameon Baumgarner's wrongful conviction claim seeking compensation under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-5004, holding that Baumgarner was "imprisoned" for purposes of the wrongful conviction compensation statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g).Baumgarner was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to a ten-month prison term, suspended. After Baumgarner was released from jail, the court of appeals reversed his conviction. Thereafter, Baumgarner brought this action alleging a wrongful conviction under section 60-5004, under which he was required to establish that he was "convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned." The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Baumgarner had not been "imprisoned" because he was not confined in a Kansas Department of Corrections facility. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Baumgarner was imprisoned for purposes of the wrongful conviction statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g), which contemplates sixty days imprisonment in a county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Baumgarner" on Justia Law