Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A law enforcement officer, while working on a saturation patrol, stopped a vehicle driven by Defendant and conducted a DUI investigation. Defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test but passed the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests. The officer subsequently requested a preliminary breath test (PBT), the results of which led to Defendant’s arrest and conviction for DUI. Defendant moved to suppress the PBT and breath test results. At the suppression hearing, the district court found that although an HGN test result was inadmissible at trial, it could be used to support “probable cause,” and, under the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion to request the PBT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) the HGN test could be used to establish reasonable suspicion of DUI that would permit a request for a PBT; and (2) even if the HGN test results were excluded, the officer had enough other evidence to form a reasonable suspicion of DUI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the HGN test results were inappropriately relied upon to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that permitted the officer to request that Defendant submit to a PBT, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "City of Wichita v. Molitor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, seeking determinations related to paternity and custody and an equitable distribution of the parties’ jointly acquired assets. The district court referred the matter to a special master. The court adopted the master’s findings and conclusions and entered judgment on the master’s report without hearing evidence. The judgment included an order that Defendant pay Plaintiff a sum representing the minor child’s unreimbursed medical expenses. The court later entered additional orders, including its decision to make its own determination regarding the unreimbursed medical expenses. Defendant appealed, raising several allegations of error. The court of appeals affirmed and granted Plaintiff’s request for appellate costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court did not enter a final, appealable order, having left unresolved the unreimbursed medical expenses issue, and therefore, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction when it affirmed the district court and entered an attorney fees award. View "Kaelter v. Sokol" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for fifty years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied Defendant’s request for a jury instruction on second-degree intentional murder, but the error was harmless; (2) the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing argument, but the comment did not constitute reversible error; and (3) the remaining alleged trial errors raised on appeal were without merit. The Court vacated Defendant’s sentence, however, holding that the district court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial based on Alleyne v. United States because the court made explicit factual findings that subjected Defendant to an enhanced sentence. View "State v. Killings" on Justia Law

After being escorted outside a bar, Defendant was involved in a fight with Scott Nienke. Defendant punched Nienke, and Nienke fell backwards and down to the ground, hitting his head on the bumper of a car. Nienke suffered a serious, life-threatening injury but ultimately survived. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of aggravated battery under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5413(b)(1)(A) because the statute required that he intentionally caused the great bodily harm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that only the underlying act that caused the great bodily harm must be intentional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 21-5413(b)(1)(A) requires proof that an aggravated battery defendant acted while knowing that some type of great bodily harm or disfigurement of another person was reasonably certain to result from the defendant’s action; and (2) the evidence against Defendant was sufficient to uphold his conviction of aggravated battery. View "State v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The day after seeking treatment at Ashland Health Center, a municipal hospital, Ann Krier died. Four days after the executor of Krier’s estate (Plaintiff) submitted a notice of claim to Ashland, asserting claims against the hospital for the alleged negligence of its employees, Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action and a survivor action against one of Ashland’s employees (Defendant). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements in Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-105b by not waiting to file the lawsuits until the statutorily required time of 120 days had elapsed after submitting the written notice to the hospital. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to comply with section 12-105b(d) does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a municipal employee because the jurisdictional bar in the statute unambiguously applies only to lawsuits against municipalities. View "Whaley v. Sharp" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for distribution of methamphetamine, unlawful use of a communication facility to arrange a drug sale, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, among other crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, holding (1) the State established that venue to prosecute the use of a communication facility charge was proper in Lyon County; (2) the district court did not err in failing to instruct on underlying moving violations supporting the fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer charge; (3) the district court did not err in failing to give a unanimity instruction on the obstruction of official duty charge; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of the distribution of methamphetamine charge; and (5) the imposition of an enhanced sentence was proper. View "State v. Castleberry" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in two separate trials of first-degree premeditated murder in the death of Alfred Mack, second-degree intentional murder in the later death of Justin Letourneau, theft, and aggravated assault. Defendant appealed, raising several allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed all of Defendant’s convictions under the cumulative error doctrine, holding (1) the district judge erred in excluding testimony about a statement Letourneau made in the hours before his death; (2) the jury instruction on alternative first-degree murder theories contained a misstatement of law with respect to reasonable doubt; (3) the district judge erred by not instructing the jury to begin its deliberations anew after one juror had been dismissed and replaced by an alternative juror; and (4) the district judge’s failure to recall some members of the jury when one juror raised the issue of jury misconduct after trial. View "State v. Smith-Parker" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of Jocelyn and Justine. Father was the biological father of Justine and acted as Jocelyn’s father from the time she was born. After the parties separated, Father filed a petition requesting residential custody of Justine and a continuing relationship with Jocelyn. After a trial, the district court granted residential custody of Justine to Zachary and granted residential custody of Jocelyn to Justine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to award residential custody of Justine to Zachary on a misapplication of Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-3207(b). Remanded. View "Cheney v. Poore" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree intentional murder for fatally shooting her former partner, Wesley Smith. Prior to trial, Defendant received an evaluation by an expert on battered woman syndrome. The district court refused to allow the report or testimony into evidence and also ruled that evidence of specific instances of Smith’s prior acts of violence were inadmissible. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court violated her right to a fair trial by refusing her request to establish a claim of self-defense based on the battered woman syndrome. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not assert a claim of self-defense or give any indication to the trial court that she was attempting to assert a claim of self-defense at trial, she had no claim on appeal that she was denied the right to present evidence on the theory of self-defense. View "State v. Meeks" on Justia Law

During his marriage to Wife, Husband, an attorney, drafted a “Post-Nuptial Agreement Dissolution of the Marriage” that reserved most of the assets for Wife. Husband later petitioned for divorce. Wife filed a motion seeking a ruling that the agreement was valid and controlled disposition of the real and personal property in the dispute. The district court concluded that the agreement was void because of the lopsided property division and allocated the couple’s assets based on the court’s determination of what was just and reasonable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the parties’ agreement was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1610(b)(3), which requires a separation agreement to be incorporated into the divorce decree if the court finds it valid, just and equitable; and (2) the district court erred when it determined that the agreement was void as against public policy under the rationale that it “encouraged” divorce, as that common-law analysis was abrogated when the legislature adopted section 60-1610(b)(3)’s “just and equitable” requirement. Remanded for a more detailed review into whether the agreement is just and equitable under section 60-1610(b)(3). View "In re marriage of Traster" on Justia Law