Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and child abuse for shaking or roughly handling his two-month-old daughter. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court’s admission under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 of prior instances where Defendant had shaken his daughter was not reversible; (2) the trial court did not commit clear error in giving a jury instruction that limited the jury’s consideration of evidence admitted under section 60-455; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing arguments but the error did not affect the verdict; (4) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly accepted the jury’s verdict under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3421; (5) the two instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not substantially prejudice Defendant; and (6) Defendant’s criminal history score did not need to be proven to a jury in order for it to affect his sentence. View "State v. Barber" on Justia Law

The lessee-operator of twenty-five oil and gas leases sold its raw natural gas at the wellhead to third parties, who processed the gas before it entered the interstate pipeline system. The price the operator was paid, and the price upon which royalties were calculated, was based on a formula that starts with the price the third parties received for the processed gas and then deducts certain costs incurred or adjustments made. At issue here was whether the operator may take into account the deductions and adjustments identified in the third-party purchase agreements when calculating royalties. The class of royalty owners in this case argued that post-production, post-sale expenses necessary to transform natural gas into the quality required for interstate pipeline transmission were attributable solely to the operator as part of the operator’s sole responsibility to make the gas marketable. The district court grand summary judgment in favor of the class for an as-yet undetermined amount of unpaid royalties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the duty to make gas marketable is satisfied when the operator delivers the gas to the purchaser in a condition acceptable to the purchaser in a good faith transaction. View "Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kan." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the aggravated indecent liberties conviction and to a concurrent term of 155 months’ imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision for the attempted aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The court of appeals vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s argument that the district court erred in excluding certain evidence was not preserved for appellate review; (2) the aggravated indecent liberties statute does not create an alternative means crime; (3) the prosecutor’s comment during closing arguments that “Today, you have the power to say to [the victim], ‘We believe you’” was an impermissible attempt to engender sympathy for the victim, but the error was harmless; and (4) Defendant’s hard-twenty-five prison sentence is constitutional under the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Swint" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated arson, and aggravated child endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under the arson statute; (2) the arson statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments; and (4) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the trial court erred in admitting several out-of-court statements that the victim made in the days leading up to the fire. View "State v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty in Saline County District Court to nonresidential burglary, possession of stolen marijuana, and possession of stolen property. The district court judge ordered that Defendant’s sentences in Saline County run consecutive to a sentence Defendant received for a Dickinson County conviction that was imposed the previous day. After Defendant’s probation was revoked, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge lacked the statutory authority to make his Saline County sentences run consecutive to his Dickinson County sentence. The judge denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of State v. Chronister, Defendant’s sentences conformed to Kansas law and were not illegal. View "State v. Quested" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his wife. Defendant received a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction DNA testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512. The postconviction court summarily denied the petition because the statute limited the availability of such testing to cases involving convictions of first-degree murder or of rape. The Supreme Court extended section 21-2512 to Defendant and other similarly situated individuals under the authority of the Equal Protection Clause. While his appeal was still pending, Defendant was released from prison and placed on parole. When the district court took up his DNA testing petition on remand, the judge denied it, ruling that the legislature did not intend to allow consideration of section 21-2512 petitions from individuals on conditional release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant was in prison at the time his section 21-2512 petition for DNA testing was filed, he was “in state custody” at the relevant time. Remanded. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder based on the deaths of his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s two-year-old niece. At the plea hearing, Defendant admitted he intentionally set fire to an apartment, killing the victims. The district court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive life sentences with a mandatory minimum of twenty years each. Defendant appealed the consecutive nature of his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court made an adequate record of its decision to order Defendant to serve the sentences consecutively and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to two consecutive life sentences. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. Both the State and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant conviction but vacated his sentence, holding (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial did not attach to the questioning of the victim, and therefore, the closure of the courtroom for a hearing to determine whether the witness would testify did not violate Defendant’s right to a public trial; (2) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (3) due to problems in the district judge’s decision to grant a downward durational departure, the case must be remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

An infant died from respiratory failure after becoming trapped between the mattress and footboard of an adult bed at the home of Defendant, his daycare provider. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated endangering a trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss because the motion was untimely; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s convictions; (3) the district court’s instructions to the jury on two means of committing involuntary manslaughter did not violate Defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict; (4) the district court did not clearly err by declining to define “imminence” for the jury; (5) the district court did not err in refusing to issue Defendant’s limiting instruction regarding the evidentiary value of a state regulation; and (6) the district court’s response to the deliberating jury’s question was harmless error. View "State v. Bolze-Sann" on Justia Law

Tenth-grader Jesus Rodriguez was injured while traveling to a soccer match in the bed of a pickup truck driven by a fellow student and teammate. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company had issued a policy to the Kansas State High School Activities Association, which administered various extracurricular activities in the state. Rodriguez’s mother (Plaintiff) filed a claim with Mutual of Omaha. Mutual of Omaha denied the claim, reasoning that the travel during which Rodriguez was injured did not qualify as covered under the policy. Plaintiff sued the school district, Mutual of Omaha, and other defendants. The district judge held that Mutual of Omaha should be dismissed as a defendant in the case because Rodriguez’s travel was neither authorized by the school district nor subject to reimbursement, the two requirements for “covered travel” under the definition in the Mutual of Omaha policy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the travel involved in this case did not qualify as subject to reimbursement, and thus there was no coverage under the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the travel during which Rodriguez was injured was “authorized” and “subject to reimbursement,” and therefore, there was coverage under the policy language. View "Rodriguez v. United Sch. Dist. No. 500" on Justia Law