Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Dumler was arrested for driving under the influence and transported to the sheriff’s office. On several occasions before a breath alcohol test was administered Dumler requested that he be permitted to confer with an attorney. The requesting officer never gave Dumler an opportunity to confer with an attorney, and Dumler did not repeat his request for an attorney after he failed his breath test. The suspension of Dumler’s driving privileges was upheld in administrative proceedings. Dumler petitioned the district court for review, arguing that his statutory right to counsel was violated. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Dumler did not ask to consult with an attorney after he failed to breath test, he had not invoked his statutory right to an attorney and, therefore, that right was not violated. The Supreme Court remanded with directions, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard on the question of whether Dumler’s post-testing right to counsel was violated, and therefore, a remand was required; and (2) suppression of the alcohol testing result is the appropriate remedy for the denial of a driver’s statutory right to counsel. Remanded. View "Dumler v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the ownership of a 5.5-acre tract of real estate. Keith Elliott at one time deeded away the land to his then-wife’s daughter, Polly Grant, but continued living on the property. After Keith died, his daughter, Suzann Elliott, took possession of the disputed tract. The district court concluded that Keith regained possession of the disputed tract by adverse possession, which he then passed to Suzann by intestate succession. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Suzann did not carry her burden to present clear and positive proof that Keith’s possession was knowingly adverse, and therefore, her adverse possession claim failed. View "Ruhland v. Elliott" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal; (2) the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that it must make a specific finding whether that the aggravated burglary offense was so distinct from the homicide as to not be an ingredient of the homicide; (3) Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on the alternative means of aggravated battery failed; (4) the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of felony murder; (5) the district judge did not err in refusing to give a requested voluntary intoxication instruction; and (6) the district judge did not err in admitting certain hearsay evidence during trial. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and child abuse for shaking or roughly handling his two-month-old daughter. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court’s admission under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 of prior instances where Defendant had shaken his daughter was not reversible; (2) the trial court did not commit clear error in giving a jury instruction that limited the jury’s consideration of evidence admitted under section 60-455; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing arguments but the error did not affect the verdict; (4) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly accepted the jury’s verdict under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3421; (5) the two instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not substantially prejudice Defendant; and (6) Defendant’s criminal history score did not need to be proven to a jury in order for it to affect his sentence. View "State v. Barber" on Justia Law

The lessee-operator of twenty-five oil and gas leases sold its raw natural gas at the wellhead to third parties, who processed the gas before it entered the interstate pipeline system. The price the operator was paid, and the price upon which royalties were calculated, was based on a formula that starts with the price the third parties received for the processed gas and then deducts certain costs incurred or adjustments made. At issue here was whether the operator may take into account the deductions and adjustments identified in the third-party purchase agreements when calculating royalties. The class of royalty owners in this case argued that post-production, post-sale expenses necessary to transform natural gas into the quality required for interstate pipeline transmission were attributable solely to the operator as part of the operator’s sole responsibility to make the gas marketable. The district court grand summary judgment in favor of the class for an as-yet undetermined amount of unpaid royalties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the duty to make gas marketable is satisfied when the operator delivers the gas to the purchaser in a condition acceptable to the purchaser in a good faith transaction. View "Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kan." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the aggravated indecent liberties conviction and to a concurrent term of 155 months’ imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision for the attempted aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The court of appeals vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s argument that the district court erred in excluding certain evidence was not preserved for appellate review; (2) the aggravated indecent liberties statute does not create an alternative means crime; (3) the prosecutor’s comment during closing arguments that “Today, you have the power to say to [the victim], ‘We believe you’” was an impermissible attempt to engender sympathy for the victim, but the error was harmless; and (4) Defendant’s hard-twenty-five prison sentence is constitutional under the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Swint" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated arson, and aggravated child endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under the arson statute; (2) the arson statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments; and (4) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the trial court erred in admitting several out-of-court statements that the victim made in the days leading up to the fire. View "State v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty in Saline County District Court to nonresidential burglary, possession of stolen marijuana, and possession of stolen property. The district court judge ordered that Defendant’s sentences in Saline County run consecutive to a sentence Defendant received for a Dickinson County conviction that was imposed the previous day. After Defendant’s probation was revoked, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge lacked the statutory authority to make his Saline County sentences run consecutive to his Dickinson County sentence. The judge denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of State v. Chronister, Defendant’s sentences conformed to Kansas law and were not illegal. View "State v. Quested" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his wife. Defendant received a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction DNA testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512. The postconviction court summarily denied the petition because the statute limited the availability of such testing to cases involving convictions of first-degree murder or of rape. The Supreme Court extended section 21-2512 to Defendant and other similarly situated individuals under the authority of the Equal Protection Clause. While his appeal was still pending, Defendant was released from prison and placed on parole. When the district court took up his DNA testing petition on remand, the judge denied it, ruling that the legislature did not intend to allow consideration of section 21-2512 petitions from individuals on conditional release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant was in prison at the time his section 21-2512 petition for DNA testing was filed, he was “in state custody” at the relevant time. Remanded. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder based on the deaths of his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s two-year-old niece. At the plea hearing, Defendant admitted he intentionally set fire to an apartment, killing the victims. The district court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive life sentences with a mandatory minimum of twenty years each. Defendant appealed the consecutive nature of his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court made an adequate record of its decision to order Defendant to serve the sentences consecutively and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to two consecutive life sentences. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law