Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State violated Defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, but the error did not require reversal; (2) the district judge did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; (4) the district judge did not err by denying Defendant a mistrial or a new trial based on improper testimony by State witnesses, as Defendant failed to establish substantial prejudice warranting a new trial in the interest of justice; and (5) cumulative error did not necessitate reversal. View "State v. Brownlee" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was charged with felony murder and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, the district court ordered and Defendant received a competency evaluation. The record, however, did not reflect that the district court conducted the mandated competency hearing mandated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Defendant was subsequently convicted. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him due to the court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing. The district court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a retrospective competency hearing and found that Defendant was competent to stand trial in 1983. The court then denied Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not exceed the Murray I mandate; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the retrospective competency hearing could rectify the procedural due process error in Defendant’s underlying case. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was charged with felony murder and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, the district court ordered and Defendant received a competency evaluation. The record, however, did not reflect that the district court conducted the mandated competency hearing mandated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Defendant was subsequently convicted. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him due to the court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing. The district court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a retrospective competency hearing and found that Defendant was competent to stand trial in 1983. The court then denied Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not exceed the Murray I mandate; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the retrospective competency hearing could rectify the procedural due process error in Defendant’s underlying case. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

In Ford I, a district court presiding over Defendant’s criminal case ordered and received a competency evaluation. There was no record of a subsequent competency hearing, and yet the court did not suspend proceedings pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Rather, the court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him. In Ford II, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the Ford I court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The Ford II court denied Defendant’s motion after conducting a retrospective competency hearing and finding that Defendant had been competent when he entered his plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) future movants cannot use a motion to correct an illegal sentence to claim a violation of section 22-3302; (2) under the facts of this case, a meaningful retrospective competency hearing could rectify the district court’s failure to comply with section 22-3302 during Ford I; but (3) because Defendant was not present for the Ford II retrospective competency hearing and there was no indication he waived his right to be present, the procedural competency error had not been rectified. Remanded. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

In Ford I, a district court presiding over Defendant’s criminal case ordered and received a competency evaluation. There was no record of a subsequent competency hearing, and yet the court did not suspend proceedings pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Rather, the court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him. In Ford II, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the Ford I court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The Ford II court denied Defendant’s motion after conducting a retrospective competency hearing and finding that Defendant had been competent when he entered his plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) future movants cannot use a motion to correct an illegal sentence to claim a violation of section 22-3302; (2) under the facts of this case, a meaningful retrospective competency hearing could rectify the district court’s failure to comply with section 22-3302 during Ford I; but (3) because Defendant was not present for the Ford II retrospective competency hearing and there was no indication he waived his right to be present, the procedural competency error had not been rectified. Remanded. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to whether the murder was premeditated or committed during the course of the robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict Defendant of first-degree murder based on the combined theories of premeditated and felony murder; (2) the jury was not precluded from convicting Defendant of first-degree murder based on both alternative means of felony and premeditated murder based on the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (3) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress items seized pursuant to a search warrant that was obtained with statements made by Defendant apart from his un-Mirandized confessions. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) claimed that Father owed $173,654 in child support back payments and was granted an income withholding order in that amount. SRS sought to enforce the district court’s order by registering it in Texas, where Father was living. The Texas Attorney General subsequently filed a notice of registration of a foreign support order and sought its enforcement, requesting judgment in the amount of $133,110 - representing the principal child support as of April 1, 2011 - with no accrued interest. Father paid the judgment in its entirety. Back in Kansas, Mother sought an order determining the amount of interest owed on the arrearages as of October 14, 2011. The district court concluded that Mother’s claim for interest was barred by the res judicata effect of the Texas judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mother and the Texas Attorney General were not the “same party” for res judicata purposes, and therefore, Mother’s claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Mother was entitled to appellate attorney fees and costs. Remanded to the district court for a calculation of the postjudgment interest owed on the child support arrearages. View "Cain v. Jacox" on Justia Law

Robert Dumler was arrested for driving under the influence and transported to the sheriff’s office. On several occasions before a breath alcohol test was administered Dumler requested that he be permitted to confer with an attorney. The requesting officer never gave Dumler an opportunity to confer with an attorney, and Dumler did not repeat his request for an attorney after he failed his breath test. The suspension of Dumler’s driving privileges was upheld in administrative proceedings. Dumler petitioned the district court for review, arguing that his statutory right to counsel was violated. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Dumler did not ask to consult with an attorney after he failed to breath test, he had not invoked his statutory right to an attorney and, therefore, that right was not violated. The Supreme Court remanded with directions, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard on the question of whether Dumler’s post-testing right to counsel was violated, and therefore, a remand was required; and (2) suppression of the alcohol testing result is the appropriate remedy for the denial of a driver’s statutory right to counsel. Remanded. View "Dumler v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the ownership of a 5.5-acre tract of real estate. Keith Elliott at one time deeded away the land to his then-wife’s daughter, Polly Grant, but continued living on the property. After Keith died, his daughter, Suzann Elliott, took possession of the disputed tract. The district court concluded that Keith regained possession of the disputed tract by adverse possession, which he then passed to Suzann by intestate succession. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Suzann did not carry her burden to present clear and positive proof that Keith’s possession was knowingly adverse, and therefore, her adverse possession claim failed. View "Ruhland v. Elliott" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal; (2) the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that it must make a specific finding whether that the aggravated burglary offense was so distinct from the homicide as to not be an ingredient of the homicide; (3) Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on the alternative means of aggravated battery failed; (4) the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of felony murder; (5) the district judge did not err in refusing to give a requested voluntary intoxication instruction; and (6) the district judge did not err in admitting certain hearsay evidence during trial. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law