Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement officers stopped Defendant’s vehicle for displaying an improper license. An officer had Defendant, the driver, and his passenger exit the vehicle and searched the vehicle, which led to the seizure of a wallet from inside the vehicle. The wallet contained Defendant’s identification, which led to the discovery that Defendant’s driver’s license was revoked. The officers placed Defendant under arrest and conducted a pat-down search that produced cocaine from Defendant’s pants pocket. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arrest was illegal and the subsequent search incident to arrest was invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals affirmed on procedural grounds, noting that the district court did not have an opportunity to consider and rule upon the search and seizure challenge that Defendant presented on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ refusal to entertain the merits of Defendant’s arguments, holding that defense counsel’s stipulations in the district court prevented the evidentiary inquiry necessary to produce the factual findings below that would permit appellate consideration of Defendant’s fruit of the poisonous tree theory without speculation as to what the facts might have been. View "State v. Estrada-Vital" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI). The charge was based upon a 2002 DUI diversion and a 2004 DUI conviction. Defendant filed a motion to strike the diversion from consideration of his criminal history and a discharge from the felony charges. The district court granted the motion and excluded Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion from his criminal history. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion could properly be counted as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes because Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings. The court also found that although Defendant had a statutory right to counsel during the diversion proceedings, the diversion agreement that Defendant signed showed that he had validly waived this statutory right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counting Defendant’s 2002 diversion as a prior DUI conviction for purposes of classifying and sentencing him for his current DUI conviction did not violate his constitutional or statutory right to counsel, as (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached during the diversion proceedings; and (2) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory right to counsel during the DUI diversion proceedings. View "State v. Tims" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated escape from custody. The district court sentenced Defendant to nineteen months in prison, basing the sentence in part upon Defendant’s criminal history score of A, which it calculated by classifying two of his 1986 Kansas juvenile burglary adjudications as person felonies. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly classified Defendant’s prior burglary adjudications as person crimes for criminal history purposes because the classifications required judicial fact-finding that went beyond merely finding the existence of a prior adjudication or the statutory elements of the prior adjudication. Remanded. View "State v. Cordell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State violated Defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, but the error did not require reversal; (2) the district judge did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; (4) the district judge did not err by denying Defendant a mistrial or a new trial based on improper testimony by State witnesses, as Defendant failed to establish substantial prejudice warranting a new trial in the interest of justice; and (5) cumulative error did not necessitate reversal. View "State v. Brownlee" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was charged with felony murder and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, the district court ordered and Defendant received a competency evaluation. The record, however, did not reflect that the district court conducted the mandated competency hearing mandated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Defendant was subsequently convicted. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him due to the court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing. The district court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a retrospective competency hearing and found that Defendant was competent to stand trial in 1983. The court then denied Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not exceed the Murray I mandate; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the retrospective competency hearing could rectify the procedural due process error in Defendant’s underlying case. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was charged with felony murder and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, the district court ordered and Defendant received a competency evaluation. The record, however, did not reflect that the district court conducted the mandated competency hearing mandated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Defendant was subsequently convicted. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him due to the court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing. The district court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a retrospective competency hearing and found that Defendant was competent to stand trial in 1983. The court then denied Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not exceed the Murray I mandate; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the retrospective competency hearing could rectify the procedural due process error in Defendant’s underlying case. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

In Ford I, a district court presiding over Defendant’s criminal case ordered and received a competency evaluation. There was no record of a subsequent competency hearing, and yet the court did not suspend proceedings pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Rather, the court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him. In Ford II, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the Ford I court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The Ford II court denied Defendant’s motion after conducting a retrospective competency hearing and finding that Defendant had been competent when he entered his plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) future movants cannot use a motion to correct an illegal sentence to claim a violation of section 22-3302; (2) under the facts of this case, a meaningful retrospective competency hearing could rectify the district court’s failure to comply with section 22-3302 during Ford I; but (3) because Defendant was not present for the Ford II retrospective competency hearing and there was no indication he waived his right to be present, the procedural competency error had not been rectified. Remanded. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

In Ford I, a district court presiding over Defendant’s criminal case ordered and received a competency evaluation. There was no record of a subsequent competency hearing, and yet the court did not suspend proceedings pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. Rather, the court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced him. In Ford II, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the Ford I court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The Ford II court denied Defendant’s motion after conducting a retrospective competency hearing and finding that Defendant had been competent when he entered his plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) future movants cannot use a motion to correct an illegal sentence to claim a violation of section 22-3302; (2) under the facts of this case, a meaningful retrospective competency hearing could rectify the district court’s failure to comply with section 22-3302 during Ford I; but (3) because Defendant was not present for the Ford II retrospective competency hearing and there was no indication he waived his right to be present, the procedural competency error had not been rectified. Remanded. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to whether the murder was premeditated or committed during the course of the robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict Defendant of first-degree murder based on the combined theories of premeditated and felony murder; (2) the jury was not precluded from convicting Defendant of first-degree murder based on both alternative means of felony and premeditated murder based on the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (3) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress items seized pursuant to a search warrant that was obtained with statements made by Defendant apart from his un-Mirandized confessions. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) claimed that Father owed $173,654 in child support back payments and was granted an income withholding order in that amount. SRS sought to enforce the district court’s order by registering it in Texas, where Father was living. The Texas Attorney General subsequently filed a notice of registration of a foreign support order and sought its enforcement, requesting judgment in the amount of $133,110 - representing the principal child support as of April 1, 2011 - with no accrued interest. Father paid the judgment in its entirety. Back in Kansas, Mother sought an order determining the amount of interest owed on the arrearages as of October 14, 2011. The district court concluded that Mother’s claim for interest was barred by the res judicata effect of the Texas judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mother and the Texas Attorney General were not the “same party” for res judicata purposes, and therefore, Mother’s claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Mother was entitled to appellate attorney fees and costs. Remanded to the district court for a calculation of the postjudgment interest owed on the child support arrearages. View "Cain v. Jacox" on Justia Law