Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Workers Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff benefits under the Workers Compensation Act for an injury he sustained while operating a go-cart at an event sponsored by his employer (Employer). Employer and its insurance carrier (Insurer) appealed the award, claiming that Plaintiff's injuries were not compensable because they were sustained during a recreational or social event that Plaintiff was not required to attend. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether Plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the error was not harmless. Remanded to the Board to make the determination based on the statutory criteria of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f). View "Douglas v. Ad Astra Info. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Corporation owned a club with exotic dancers who were treated as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance. In 2005, the Department of Labor determined that the dancers were employees. A hearing officer upheld the determination, concluding that the dancers received wages for services and therefore, the dancers were employees under the Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). The district court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the relationship between provisions in the KESL as they existed before amendments that took effect in 2011 and common-law rules used to determine the existence of employee status. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the determinative question in this case was whether the dancers had the status of employees under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. Because the critical common-law factor in this analysis is the employer's right of control over the employee and her work, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dancers were employees, where Corporation possessed such a right of control over the club's dancers. View "Milano's, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained an injury while working for Employer. During the course of the workers compensation proceedings, it was confirmed that Claimant was an unauthorized alien. An ALJ denied Claimant's claim for permanent partial general work disability based on public policy grounds, concluding that awarding an unauthorized alien a work disability would be inconsistent with the Workers Compensation Act's legislative intent. The Workers Compensation Board disagreed and awarded Claimant a fifty-nine percent work disability, concluding that the Act's plain language did not prohibit an unauthorized alien from receiving an award for work disability. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's award of work disability, holding that, under the statutes in effect when Claimant was injured in this case, Claimant's immigration status did not preclude her from receiving work disability compensation. View "Fernandez v. McDonald's" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Hughes was the driver in a one-car accident that killed one passenger and injured two others. At the time of the accident, the four were traveling together to work on a drilling crew for employer Duke Drilling. The two injured passengers and the common law wife of the deceased passenger brought civil suits against Hughes. After a jury trial, Hughes was found to be negligent. Because the jury found Hughes was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the trial court concluded Hughes was not covered by a fellow servant immunity under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the travel in which Hughes was engaged on the morning of the accident was an intrinsic part of Hughes' job, and thus, Hughes was within the course and scope of his employment; and (2) therefore, Hughes was entitled to fellow servant immunity, and Plaintiffs' civil lawsuits against him were barred. View "Scott v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The case involved a manufacturer of conveyor pizza ovens, Wolfe Electric, its former employee, Terry Duckworth, and the competing business Duckworth helped form, Global Cooking Systems. Wolfe Electric brought suit against Duckworth and Global Cooking for misappropriation of secrets under the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Wolfe Electric also separately alleged Duckworth breached his fiduciary duty and his employment contract while Global allegedly tortiously interfered with Duckworth's employment contract. A jury found for Wolfe Electric on all causes of action and awarded damages in a variety of categories. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple erroneous jury instructions and a verdict that failed to specify which of the innumerable acts alleged actually caused which of the particular damages awarded required reversal. Remanded. View "Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth" on Justia Law

Shelly Herrell filed suit against National Beef Packing Company to recover for a knee injury she suffered while working in its plant as an independent contractor, alleging negligence in maintaining a dangerous condition and failing to warn of a dangerous condition. The district court denied National Beef's motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment as a matter of law on the duty issue, and the jury entered a verdict in favor of Herrell. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of National Beef, holding that Herrell's remedy was limited to workers compensation because National Beef did not maintain substantial control over Herrell's employer's activities on the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly denied judgment as a matter of law to National Beef because National Beef owed Herrell a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances; and (2) the inclusion in the jury instruction a description of an OSHA regulation, with no opportunity for the jury to differentiate any liability based upon it in the general verdict form, polluted the trial of the case and necessitated reversal. Remanded. View "Herrell v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co." on Justia Law

Twenty years before the current dispute arose, Cory Saylor, who worked for Westar Energy, injured his left knee on the job. More recently, Saylor underwent knee replacement surgery. On March 28, 2006, after the surgery, Saylor served a notice of intent and written claim on Westar seeking workers compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded Saylor seventy-four weeks of permanent partial disability compensation. The Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Saylor's date of injury was the date he provided notice to Westar on March 28, 2006. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board and court of appeals correctly interpreted and applied Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(d) as it was written, which resulted in the assignment of March 28, 2006 as Saylor's date of accident; (2) there was substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that Westar had knowledge of Saylor's work-related injury before the surgery and that Westar refused or neglected to provide medical treatment for that injury, and therefore, the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510j(h) was triggered, rendering Westar liable for the cost of Saylor's knee replacement surgery. View "Saylor v. Westar Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee injured his back before beginning work as a service technician for Employer. While working for Employer, Employee experienced a sudden, severe increase of pain in his back. Employee eventually underwent surgery and, later, quit his job after several months of physical therapy. Before undergoing surgery, Employee filed an application for a hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. The ALJ found Employee was injured during the course of his employment and entered an award for Employee. On review, the Kansas Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the ALJ and the Board, finding that Employee was precluded from compensation because his injuries were the result of the normal activities of daily living. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee was not engaged in the normal activities of day-to-day living when he reached for his tool belt or when he bent down to carry out a welding task. Accordingly, Employee's injury was covered by the Kansas workers compensation statute. View "Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Campbell was an at-will employee of Appellee Husky Hogs, LLC, for about one year when he brought a complaint with the state Department of Labor. In his complaint, Appellee alleged Husky Hogs was not paying him as required by the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA). Appellant was subsequently fired one day after the Department of Labor acknowledged receipt of his claim. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether a common-law retaliatory discharge may be brought against an employer when an employee claims he was fired for filing a wage claim act under the KWPA. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Appellant did not make a valid common law retaliation claim but that there were remedies under the KWPA itself. The Supreme Court found that Appellant stated a valid claim for retaliatory discharge, and that the statutory remedies under the KWPA were an insufficient substitute for the common-law remedies. The Court reversed the decision of the district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.