Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant, a prisoner, was convicted of criminal threat for yelling at a pizza delivery person. The jury trial was held before Judge John McNally, who had presided over three cases involving Defendant. Defendant sought Judge McNally's recusal, but Judge McNally declined to recuse. After his conviction, Defendant appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the probability of actual bias in this case was too high to be tolerable under the due process clause; and (2) the judge did not err in giving the jury a permissive inference instruction. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. During the trial, the victim testified that Defendant had a scar on his penis. Defendant appealed, claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek a continuance to obtain evidence to rebut the existence of the scar. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's counsel's assistance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's unconstitutionally ineffective assistance denied Defendant the opportunity to impeach the victim's credibility by rebutting her testimony about his alleged penile scar, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, denied Defendant a fair trial, and created a reasonable probability that the trial would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Rineharts contracted with Morton Buildings for a preengineered building to serve as their personal residence and business location for their business, Midwest Slitting. Upon disputes regarding the structure's quality, the Rineharts and Midwest Slitting sued. A jury found for the Rineharts on several of their claims and for Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claim. The court of appeals affirmed and granted the Rineharts appellate attorney fees. Morton appealed, arguing that the economic loss doctrine, which originated with product liability litigation to prohibit tort claims when the only damages were to the product itself, should extend to bar the negligent misrepresentation claim in this case. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claims, holding that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation claims because the duty at issue arises by operation of law, and the doctrine's purposes would not be further by extending it to such claims; and (2) reversed the appellate attorney fee award because the Court could not determine from the record whether the court of appeals included time and expenses in the award not reimbursable under the applicable statute. Remanded. View "Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc." on Justia Law

Russell Graham shot himself and his son, Zeus, with a gun Russell purchased at Baxter Springs Gun & Pawn Shop. The pawn shop's owners, Joe and Patsy George, filled out the paperwork by listing Russell's mother as the purchaser of the gun because Russell had a prior felony conviction. Russell then paid for the gun and ammunition. Zeus's mother, Elizabeth Shirley, sued the pawn shop and the Georges for negligence in selling a firearm to a party while knowing it was intended for another and without performing a background check on the intended owner. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of Shirley's negligence per se claim but reversed the court's rejection of Shirley's negligent entrustment claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision allowing Shirley to proceed with a negligent entrustment claim; and (2) reversed the portion of the court's decision holding that Defendants were not held to the highest standard of reasonable care in exercising control over firearms. Remanded. View "Shirley v. Glass" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of introducing a controlled substance into a correctional facility after marijuana was found in his socks. Defendant requested that he be given a departure sentence because the amount of marijuana he possessed was very small. The district court concluded that it could not consider a lesser sentence on that basis and sentenced Defendant to an additional 122 months in prison. The court of appeals vacated the sentence, holding (1) the district court could have given Defendant a downward departure sentence because possession of a small quantity of drugs constitutes a valid factor upon which a departure sentence may be entered on a prison-contraband conviction, but the court incorrectly refused to consider the possibility because it misinterpreted a sentencing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals was correct in its reasoning and judgment. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law

John filed suit against his mother, Bernice, both individually and in her capacity as trustee for two trusts. Bernice subsequently died, and John's brother and sister, Richard and Diana, were substituted as defendants. John made three claims - breach of contract, breach of trust, and constructive fraud. John's claims arose after Bernice executed a trust in 2004 and a new will with the express intent to disinherit John. John claimed that Bernice's actions constituted a breach of her joint and contractual will made in 1989 with John's father, Frank. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed and remanded, concluding that an irrevocable 1996 trust created by Frank and Bernice implicitly revoked or modified the 1989 will. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the 1996 trust did not fully revoke the 1989 will; (2) because in 2004 Bernice was still bound by any contractual provisions in the 1989 will that survived the creation of the irrevocable 1996 trust, John could prove a breach of contract to the extent the 2004 will and trust violated the 1989 will's surviving provisions; and (3) summary judgment was not appropriate on any of John's claims. Remanded. View "Boucek v. Boucek" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and attempted rape and sentenced to two terms of life in prison without parole as an aggravated habitual sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted rape and vacated the remaining rape conviction, holding (1) Defendant's convictions for rape and attempted rape were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (2) the reversal of the attempted rape conviction rendered moot Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction on that count; (3) rape is not an alternative means crime; and (4) the aggravated habitual sex offender provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4642 are constitutional. Remanded for a determination of whether the State established that Defendant meets the statutory definition of an aggravated habitual sex offender under section 21-4642. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The sentencing judge sentenced Defendant to six concurrent life sentences and imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court reversed four of Defendant's six convictions of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, vacated the corresponding sentences, and vacated the order of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding (1) any error in the admission of Defendant's prior sexual misconduct did not affect his substantial rights; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support four of Defendant's six convictions; (3) Defendant's life sentences for the remaining to convictions did not violate the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) the sentencing court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision rather than parole. View "State v. Spear" on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, a Mississippi court entered a child-custody order granting residential custody of Child to Mother. Mother and Child moved to Kansas. Stepfather, Mother's husband, subsequently filed a petition for the stepparent adoption of Child. The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the stepparent adoption, determining that the Mississippi court had not relinquished jurisdiction over matters regarding Child, and a Mississippi court was a more appropriate forum to hear the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-2127, the jurisdiction provision of the Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act, conflicted with provisions of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and that under the UCCJEA, only the Mississippi court could determine it no longer had continuing jurisdiction to modify the child-custody order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 59-2127 controls the determination of whether a Kansas court has jurisdiction over an adoption; (2) under section 29-2127, a Kansas court can determine if the Mississippi court has continuing jurisdiction over the child-custody order or this adoption; and (3) the district court's error in failing to apply section 59-2127 and in determining Mississippi a more convenient forum was not harmless. Remanded. View "In re Adoption of H.C.H." on Justia Law