Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a guilty or no contest plea to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which was a nonperson felony due to Defendant's two previous misdemeanor convictions for the same offense. During the proceeding, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the State's reliance on one of his misdemeanor convictions, claiming that his attorney had filed a guilty plea in that case without consulting him. On appeal, Defendant again objected to the inclusion of the prior misdemeanor in his criminal history. The court of appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a defendant charged with felony DUI pleads guilty or no contest to the felony, and wishes to challenge the validity of a prior misdemeanor DUI used to classify the severity level of the current charge or to enhance the sentence following conviction on the current charge, the defendant will be limited on appeal to arguing the impropriety of the prior misdemeanor's effect as a sentencing enhancement; and (2) the court of appeals should have considered the merits of Defendant's claim in this case that he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor DUI rather than felony DUI. Remanded. View "State v. Key" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) under Kansas' version of a stand-your-ground-law in effect at the time of the crime, he was immune from prosecution; and (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he was immune from prosecution under the stand-your-ground statute because he made the argument for the first time on appeal, and the statute must be asserted before trial or opens or a dispositive plea is entered; and (2) the prosecutor made an incorrect statement of law about the jury's process during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Appellant was seriously injured in a gasoline fire. Appellant filed a complaint against Employer for negligently failing to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the common-law assumption of risk doctrine barred recovery in this case because Appellant knew of the dangerous situation and voluntarily exposed himself to that danger. The court of appeals affirmed based on existing precedent. The Supreme Court (1) overruled prior caselaw adhering to the assumption of risk as an absolute bar to recovery, holding that the state's statutory comparative fault system, in which any alleged assumption of risk is considered as just one factor when determining proportionality of fault based on the circumstances, should control; and (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the district court erred when it granted Employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Appellant assumed the risk from which his injuries followed. Remanded for consideration of Appellant's negligence claims under the principles of comparative fault. View "Simmons v. Porter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated murder. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion for a separate sentencing proceeding. The assistant county attorney personally served on Defendant's counsel a notice of her intent to request a separate sentencing proceeding. After Defendant's conviction, the district court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Defendant to a hard forty life sentence. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the service and filing of the notice of the State's intent to ask for a separate sentencing hearing had not complied with statutory mandates. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the State complied with the statutory notice provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4624(1). View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not aid and abet Michael Navarro, the person who actually killed the victim, but was merely present at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict because there was evidence Defendant took an active role in the commission of the crimes and intended to aid and abet Navarro; (2) the trial court did not err in declining to add Defendant's proposed language to the aiding and abetting jury instruction; and (3) any error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury to consider the testimony of Navarro's girlfriend with caution because she was an accomplice was harmless. View "State v. Llamas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of malicious second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se petition under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 for postconviction DNA testing of evidence collected from the crime scene. The district court summarily denied Defendant's petition because the plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 permits only persons convicted of first-degree murder and rape to petition for DNA testing. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Kansas' postconviction DNA testing scheme. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling denying Defendant's petition, (1) holding that section 21-2512 violates the Fourth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by denying access to postconviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; and (2) extending the statute to include offenders in the same situation as Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment decided to issue an air emission source construction to permit Sunflower Power Corporation for the construction of a coal-fired power plant at the site of Sunflower's existing plant. Sierra Club contended that the permit failed to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, implementing federal regulations, the Kansas Air Quality Act (KAQA), and applicable Kansas Administrative Regulations. The Supreme Court reversed the KDHE's action of issuing the permit, holding that the KDHE erroneously interpreted and applied the CAA and the KAQA when it failed to apply the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding emission limits for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide during the permitting process, as the CAA, KAWA and implementing regulations required the KDHE to apply the EPA regulations during the permitting process. View "Sierra Club v. Moser" on Justia Law

Thoroughbred Associates drilled a gas well (Well) in Comanche County. Thoroughbred subsequently acquired leases of land near the Well and created a unit called the Thoroughbred-Rietzke Unit (Rietzke Unit). Defendants became successors-in-interest to a lease (OXY Lease) Thoroughbred entered into for oil and gas underlying a tract near the Well. The parties disagreed, however, about whether the Well was draining the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred stopped submitting royalty payments to Defendants accruing from the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred subsequently filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had been mistaken when it included the OXY Lease in the Rietzke Unit. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court concluded (1) Defendants failed to prove that any drainage of the leased lands occurred; and (2) the Lease was properly included in the Rietzke Unit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendants failed to prove their drainage claim; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously granted summary judgment to Defendants on their claim that the Lease should be included in the Rietzke Unit. View "Thoroughbred Assocs., LLC v. Kansas City Royalty Co., LLC " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial in granting the State's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court did erred in giving the jury an eyewitness identification instruction that included the degree of certainty factor disapproved of by the Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, but because there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict absent the error, reversal was not required in this case. View "State v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

Steven Novotny appealed his jury convictions of first-degree felony murder and aggravated battery. Novotny argued the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his house; (2) denying his motion to suppress one victim's identification of him as the shooter; and (3) improperly instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. Furthermore, Novotny argued the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing arguments and the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. Finding none of these arguments availing, the Supreme Court affirmed Novotny's convictions and sentences. View "Kansas v. Novotny" on Justia Law