Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was 4.5 miles of a railroad right-of-way that was railbanked and is now operated as a recreational trail. The appeal focused on the relationship between the Kansas Recreational Trails Act (KRTA) and the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), specifically: (1) whether the Trails Act preempts KRTA, (2) whether KRTA violates equal protection rights, and (3) whether the district court has jurisdiction to set the amount of bond required under KRTA. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that (1) a bond requirement and setting of a bond do not create a conflict with the Trails Act; (2) because KRTA does not provide a benefit to local competitors or burden local, nonpublic competitors, KRTA is not preempted because it violates the dormant Commerce Clause; (3) KRTA does not violate equal protection rights by establishing statutory requirements for interim recreational trails in railroad rights-of-way that differ from other categories of recreational trails that result from the terms of the Trails Act; and (4) the district court did have jurisdiction to set the amount of the bond and to require the appellant, Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, to pay the bond. View "Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy" on Justia Law

After pleading no contest to his criminal charges, appellant Rafael Flores was convicted of one count of first-degree felony murder and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Flores moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because felony murder with an underlying felony of attempted voluntary manslaughter is not a crime. The district court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed. The court held that (1) although attempted voluntary manslaughter is not specifically mentioned in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3436(a) as an inherently dangerous felony capable of supporting a felony-murder charge, voluntary manslaughter is listed as a felony that may be inherently dangerous in certain circumstances, and because Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3401(b) anticipates that an attempt to commit an inherently dangerous felony may support a felony-murder charge, an attempted voluntary manslaughter may support a felony-murder charge; and (2) a defendant can be charged with felony murder with the underlying charge of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter if the latter charge was so distinct from the homicide that was the subject of the felony murder charge as not to be an ingredient of the homicide. View "State v. Flores" on Justia Law

Appellant Corinthian Bricker pleaded no contest to one count each of aggravated battery, driving under the influence, and failure to present proof of insurance. Contrary to the plea bargain agreement that recommended sentencing to Labette Bootcamp Probation, the district court sentenced Bricker to prison. Bricker then filed a motion to withdraw plea, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to learn Bricker was ineligible for Labette. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the admission criteria of Labette was not sufficient to meet one prong of Strickland v. Washington test, which states that defendant must show counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's failure to advise Bricker that he could file a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea was insufficient grounds to warrant post-sentence withdrawal of the plea. View "State v. Bricker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to an oil and gas lease with Appellee Trees Oil Company (Trees), Appellant Arthur Hockett had a 1/8-royalty interest in the production from a Haskell County well that produced natural gas. Trees operated the well, and sold the gas produced to âfirst purchasers.â Before paying Trees for production, the first purchasers deduct taxes and fees imposed by the state. Trees then pays Appellant 1/8 of the net sales proceeds. In 2009, Appellant filed a complaint against Trees, seeking recovery of the amount in tax deducted from the sales proceeds from the first purchasers. Trees moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it could not be held liable for complying with state law by paying the sales taxes. The district court held that the taxes and fees were to be imposed on all owners in the venture, including royalty owners. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court found that state law does not require royalty owners pay the oil and gas taxes and fees if they do not operate the well. The fees withheld by the first purchaser are an expense attributable to the oil company as the well operator. In computing Appellantâs royalties, Trees was not permitted to deduct the amount of its fees expenses from the gross sale price under contract with the first purchaser. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in ruling in favor of Trees. The Court remanded the remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant William Albright missed the deadline to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for a waiver of the deadline in his case because he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellantâs counsel missed the deadline, and the district court dismissed his appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court should not have dismissed Appellantâs case because his appointed counselâs performance was indeed ineffective. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Appellantâs appeal.

Appellant Robert Campbell was an at-will employee of Appellee Husky Hogs, LLC, for about one year when he brought a complaint with the state Department of Labor. In his complaint, Appellee alleged Husky Hogs was not paying him as required by the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA). Appellant was subsequently fired one day after the Department of Labor acknowledged receipt of his claim. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether a common-law retaliatory discharge may be brought against an employer when an employee claims he was fired for filing a wage claim act under the KWPA. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Appellant did not make a valid common law retaliation claim but that there were remedies under the KWPA itself. The Supreme Court found that Appellant stated a valid claim for retaliatory discharge, and that the statutory remedies under the KWPA were an insufficient substitute for the common-law remedies. The Court reversed the decision of the district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Jerry Sellers was convicted on two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and received a consecutive 72-month prison sentence on one count, and a 59-month sentence on the other. The district court judge held that Appellant was subject to a lifetime of post-release supervision and a lifetime of electronic monitoring. Appellant raised several issues on appeal, notably, that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a lifetime of post-release monitoring. This monitoring, he argued, was unconstitutional. On review of the lower courtâs record, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not preserve his challenge to the constitutionality of the lifetime post-release sentence under state law. However, Appellant was not subject to the post-release supervision because the State failed to prove he was subject to it. Accordingly, the Court vacated the post-release supervision portion of Appellantâs sentence, and remanded the case for re-sentencing to a 36-month post-release term.

Darwin Williams was convicted in 1987 of two counts of indecent liberties with a child pursuant to state law and sentenced to five to twenty yearsâ imprisonment. In May, 1998, Williams was paroled, but six months later, his parole was revoked because of drug use. After serving more time in prison, Williams was paroled in June 2002, but that parole was revoked six months later. The basis for the second revocation was explained at trial when the Stateâs expert read from a portion of the Department of Correctionsâ Clinical Services Report (CSR). The CSR indicated that Williamsâ parole was revoked âfor having sexual contact with a minor, consuming alcohol, unsuccessful discharge from a Sex Offender Treatment Program, and admitting to viewing pornographic/sexually explicit materials.â As Williamsâs prison term neared its end, the State filed a petition requesting the civil commitment of Williams as a sexually violent predator. The district court determined that probable cause existed for the allegation and sent Williams to a State hospital for evaluation. The district court also appointed a psychologist to perform an independent evaluation pursuant to state law. At trial, experts gave conflicting opinions regarding whether a mental abnormality or personality disorder made Williams likely to repeat acts of sexual violence. After hearing the testimony, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was a sexually violent predator. The appellate court examined the sole issue raised by Williams on appeal: whether there was sufficient evidence to support the requirement under the state Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) that he was âlikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violenceâ in that âthe personâs propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.â The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient and reversed the district court. The Supreme Court on review found the evidence was sufficient to conclude a reasonable person could find that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was a sexually violent predator, and affirmed the district courtâs decision.