Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A highway patrol trooper stopped Daniel Allen's vehicle for traffic infractions and noticed that Allen exhibited clues of intoxication. Allen agreed to a preliminary breath test (PBT) as authorized by Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012, then failed the test. Allen was arrested and later failed an evidentiary breath test. After an administrative hearing, the Department of Revenue issued an administrative order suspending Allen's driving privileges. On review, the district court reversed, holding (1) section 8-1012 was unconstitutional, both as applied in this case and on its face, and (2) there were no reasonable grounds for the trooper to administer an evidentiary breath test absent the PBT result. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding the district court erred in ruling there were no reasonable grounds to require an evidentiary breath test absent the result of the PBT. As the trooper possessed reasonable grounds for requesting the breath test even without the PBT, the Court did not address Allen's constitutional challenge to section 8-1012. Remanded. View "Allen v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property near an airport that was zoned as agricultural. Landowners filed an application with the City to classify their property as planned single-family residential and to approve a preliminary plat for a subdivision. Initially, the rezoning was approved, but after the County brought suit, Landowners initiated a new application to rezone the property and, following the directives of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3-307e, to seek the approval of the County once the City approved the rezoning and the plat. The County denied Landowners' rezoning application. On review, the district court held that the City was the zoning authority and the County took a quasi-judicial role in reviewing the City's rezoning decision. The court concluded that the County had failed to overcome the presumption that the City's decision was reasonable and upheld the City's decision to approve the rezoning. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court's ruling was erroneous because section 3-307e allows the County to reach an independent determination that a court must presume to be reasonable, and to successfully challenge the County's action under section 3-307e, a landowner must prove that the County's action was unlawful or unreasonable. Remanded. View "143rd Street Investors v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs " on Justia Law

Yvonne Ward was convicted for fourteen felonies related to four separate cocaine sales. On appeal, Ward (1) argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial that she made after witnesses for the prosecution identified two individuals sitting in the courtroom and wearing orange jail jumpsuits as people who were with Ward during one or more of the sales, and (2) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, Ward added a new issue, which the Supreme Court declined to address because it was not properly before the Court. The Supreme Court then affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, and (2) the evidence was sufficient. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

Julie Stieben was pulled over by a highway patrol trooper after the trooper watched Stieben's car cross the fog line three times. A jury found Stieben guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in the way it answered the jury's question about whether Stieben crossed the fog line when she first encountered the trooper, concluding (1) the failure of the trial court to give the jury additional information to clarify a point of fact was prejudicial and denied the defendant a fair trial, and (2) the court intruded on the province of the jury as the factfinder, interfering with Stieben's constitutional right to a trial by jury by not only answering the question, but by answering it incorrectly, possibly prejudicing Stieben's defense. View "State v. Stieben" on Justia Law

Employee injured his back before beginning work as a service technician for Employer. While working for Employer, Employee experienced a sudden, severe increase of pain in his back. Employee eventually underwent surgery and, later, quit his job after several months of physical therapy. Before undergoing surgery, Employee filed an application for a hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. The ALJ found Employee was injured during the course of his employment and entered an award for Employee. On review, the Kansas Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the ALJ and the Board, finding that Employee was precluded from compensation because his injuries were the result of the normal activities of daily living. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee was not engaged in the normal activities of day-to-day living when he reached for his tool belt or when he bent down to carry out a welding task. Accordingly, Employee's injury was covered by the Kansas workers compensation statute. View "Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Hernandez was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and residential burglary following a jury trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) a comment made by the prosecutor during his closing argument on a matter outside the evidence was in error, but the statement was little more than harmless retrospection that did not contribute to the verdict obtained; and (2) the trial court did not err in concluding there was insufficient evidence to find that Hernandez's mental faculties were so impaired by his consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the night of the murder as to render him unable to form the requisite intent. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Gregory Berry was convicted of first-degree felony murder after striking and killing another motorist during a high-speed getaway. The underlying felony for the conviction was possession of cocaine. At trial, Berry requested lesser included offense instructions for second-degree reckless murder, involuntary manslaughter, and vehicular homicide. Berry's request was denied pursuant to the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule, which requires lesser included offense instructions only when evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Berry's conviction and sentence on the felony-murder charge, holding (1) the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule must be abandoned; (2) Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3) should be applicable to felony murder, and accordingly, instructions on lesser degrees of homicide are proper in felony-murder cases when there is some evidence reasonably justifying a conviction of some lesser included crime beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) in Berry's case, and using the statutory viewpoint directed by section 22-3414(3), the evidence could reasonably justify a conviction for lesser included crimes. Remanded. View "State v. Berry" on Justia Law

Defendant Bradley Whorton pled guilty to aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Whorton filed a motion in which he argued that his lack of criminal history justified a departure from the mandatory minimum hard twenty-five life sentence prescribed in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643(a)(1). The sentencing court was unable to find substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the life sentence and denied Whorton's motion. Whorton was sentenced to a life sentence on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly considered to Wharton's absence of criminal history as a mitigating factor; (2) the district court's refusal to depart from the mandatory minimum was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) it was not arbitrary for the district court to grant a departure based on a lack of criminal history in one case but to deny departure in another case where the same mitigating factor existed. View "State v. Whorton" on Justia Law

Defendant David McDaniel pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. At the sentencing hearing, the district judge denied McDaniel's request for a nonprison sentence and imposed thirty-four months' incarceration. At a later hearing on the restitution amount, McDaniel stipulated to a restitution amount of $7,744 payable to Medicaid for the victim's medical expenses. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge's failure to require that any hearing on the amount of restitution occur before sentencing in this case did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction; (2) the setting of restitution in the second hearing was not an impermissible change in McDaniel's sentence; and (3) sentencing to the highest term in an applicable Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid box without proof of aggravating facts to a jury does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey. View "State v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, John Horton was convicted of first-degree felony murder. During the jury deliberations, Horton moved to suspend deliberations in order to give the defense time to analyze additional evidence it had received. The district court concluded that it did not have the authority to suspend the jury deliberations to allow for he introduction of additional evidence. Horton appealed, contending that the district court committed reversible error when it held that it had no jurisdiction to reopen the evidence after the jury began deliberating. The Supreme Court agreed and suspended the appeal with directions to remand, holding that a district court has broad discretion to determine whether a party may reopen its case, including the authority to suspend jury deliberations, to allow for the introduction of additional evidence. View "State v. Horton" on Justia Law