Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joshua Cash pled guilty to sex crimes covered by Jessica's Law, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643, after confessing to having had sexual contact with his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The district court (1) imposed three concurrent life sentences with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than twenty-five years, and (2) included lifetime postrelease supervision in Cash's sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the hard-twenty-five life sentence but vacated that portion of the sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision instead of lifetime parole because Cash received an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence. View "State v. Cash" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Tahah of felony murder and the underlying felony of discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm. During trial, Tahah argued for a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter. The felony-murder rule then in effect provided that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3), requiring instructions on lesser-included offenses where there is evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser-included crime did not apply when murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The district court applied the felony-murder rule and denied Tahah's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction in light of the Court's recent decision in State v. Berry, which held that section 22-3414(3) no longer makes an exception for felony murder. View "State v. Tahah" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea. View "State v. Hulett" on Justia Law

The Taranto Group contracted with two outside vendors to send out advertising via facsimile transmissions on its behalf. It was later calculated that at least 5,000 transmissions were made in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). A doctor brought an action individually and as a class representative against the Taranto Group, seeking damages and injunction relief under the TCPA and tort damages for conversion. A professional corporation then sought to intervene as an additional class representative. The district court issued an order certifying the proposed class and, in an amended order, certified the order for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that class certification was appropriate in this case, holding, among other things, that the district court (1) correctly found the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating that they met the statutory requirements for class certification, (2) properly determined that a class action in this case was superior to individual small claims actions, and (3) properly concluded that a class action would avoid inconsistent adjudications. View "Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Anthony Stapleton committed suicide while he was incarcerated in the Shawnee County Adult Detention Center. Plaintiffs, including the administratrix of Stapleton's estate, filed suit against Defendants, Shawnee County, a detention center guard, and an assistant shift supervisor at the detention center, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care, and (2) even if Defendants breached their duty of care, they were immune from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the guard and shift supervisor were not entitled to summary judgment, and (2) Defendants were not entitled to KTCA immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as (i) the guard and supervisor owed a duty of reasonable care to Stapleton and breached that duty, and (ii) the County was alleged to be vicariously liable for the guard's and supervisor's negligence; and (2) the discretionary function under KTCA was not applicable to immunize Defendants from liability for negligence in this lawsuit. View "Thomas v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Tully of one count of rape. The court of appeals affirmed Tully's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Tully's rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona and Doyle v. Ohio were violated by the State's improper comments on Tully's postarrest silence; (2) the district court gave an improper jury instruction on the element of force; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing a State's expert witness to offer an opinion beyond her qualifications, which also invaded the province of the jury; and (4) the cumulative errors denied Tully a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Tully" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Barnes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. Barnes was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole with a consecutive fourteen months for the aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench despite Barnes' difficulty in choosing between jury and bench trial; (2) the district judge did not err in accepting Barnes' knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of two children. Mother's husband, Stepfather, petitioned to adopt the children without the consent of their biological Father. The district court determined that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted Stepfather's adoption. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination that Father had failed to assume his parental duties for the two consecutive years immediately preceding the adoption petition. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding (1) a natural parent's unfitness will not obviate the need for his or her consent to a stepparent adoption unless the district court finds that the unfitness has prevented the natural parent from assuming the duties of a parent for two consecutive years immediately preceding the filing of the adoption for petition, and (2) the evidence was sufficient in this case to establish that Father had failed to assume the parental duty of providing for his children's needs in the two years preceding the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of J.M.D." on Justia Law

Lafayette Cosby was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder after a second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, (1) The district court properly excluded evidence of a question Cosby asked police because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) the district judge correctly decided not to include a lesser included offense on voluntary manslaughter in the jury instructions; (3) the evidence of premeditation in this case was plainly sufficient to support Cosby's conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in reversible conduct or improperly shift the burden of proof on the element of premeditation to the defense with a certain comment to the jury because the prosecutor's challenged comment was within the wide latitude allowed the State in discussing the evidence. View "State v. Cosby" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Phouthavy Chanthaseng was convicted for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Chanthaseng argued that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and commenting on the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing the delayed and piecemeal "process of disclosure" of the abuse victim and by using personal experiences of venire panel members as substitute for evidence of disclosure pattern relevant to reliability; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing the abuse victim's credibility because the prosecutor's comments, when viewed in context, where accompanied by a discussion of the evidence presented at trial and merely asked the jury to draw permissible inferences from that evidence; and (3) the prosecutor's "process of disclosure" misconduct did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of Chanthaseng's conviction. View "State v. Chanthaseng" on Justia Law