Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Anthony Kidd was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and aggravated battery. Kidd appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, (1) the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; and (2) the prosecutor violated his duty to inform the State that an order in limine prohibited reference to Kidd's prior crimes, but this error and one witness's subsequent violation of that order did not affect the outcome of the trial, and therefore, the error was harmless. The Court rejected Kidd's remaining claims. View "State v. Kidd" on Justia Law

Ricky Hyche pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law offense, and received a hard twenty-five sentence with lifetime electronic monitoring. Hyche appealed, arguing (1) he should be eligible for parole after twenty years, not twenty-five, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2); (2) lifetime electronic monitoring was an invalid component of his sentence under State v. Jolly; and (3) his motion for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five sentence should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the balance of Hyche's sentence but vacated the component of his sentence imposing lifetime electronic monitoring, holding that under Jolly, this part of Hyche's sentence was inappropriate. View "State v. Hyche" on Justia Law

John Harsh pled nolo contendere to one count of rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of fourteen. Prior to sentencing, Harsh moved for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence under Jessica's Law, seeking instead a sentence of 258 months. The district court denied Harsh's motion and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Harsh's departure motion, concluding that reasonable persons could take the view adopted by the district court; but (2) vacated the portion of Harsh's sentence ordering lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the relevant sentencing statutes in this case. View "State v. Harsh" on Justia Law

Saul Miller was convicted of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Miller's first trial ended in a mistrial when the State repeatedly violated the trial court's pretrial order limiting admission of the victim's statement. After retrial, the court of appeals affirmed Miller's convictions and sentences. Miller filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court rejected all of Miller's arguments on appeal and affirmed Miller's conviction and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) double jeopardy did not bar Miller's second trial and convictions because, while the mistrial was warranted, there was no evidence the prosecutor intended to provoke the mistrial; and (2) under an objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the child victim's statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner were nontestimonial, and therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the statements. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

William Bennington was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, rape, two counts of criminal use of a financial card, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy. Bennington appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court rejected most of Bennington's arguments but reversed his convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that the statements of the victim, who died before the trial, to a sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and should not have been admitted by the trial court because the statements (1) were made in the presence of a law enforcement officer who asked questions, and (2) reported past events rather than information regarding an ongoing public safety or medical emergency. View "State v. Bennington" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County amended its zoning regulations to permit small wind energy conversion systems. The regulations, however, prohibited the placement of commercial wind energy conversion systems in the county. Plaintiffs and Intervenors, landowners and owners of wind rights in the county, sued the Board, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board's action be null and void. The district court granted the Board's various dispositive motions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) the district court did not err by disposing of a Takings Clause claim as a matter of law, and because there was no taking, the court did not err in also disposing of Intervenors' related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and their claim for inverse condemnation; (2) the district court did not err in dismissing a Commerce Clause claim as a matter of law, but a claim alleging the Board's decision placed incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits was remanded for analysis under Pike v. Bruce Church; and (3) because Intervenors also made a burden-based claim under the Commerce Clause in their 42 U.S.C. 1983 contention, that specific claim was also remanded. View "Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The case involved a manufacturer of conveyor pizza ovens, Wolfe Electric, its former employee, Terry Duckworth, and the competing business Duckworth helped form, Global Cooking Systems. Wolfe Electric brought suit against Duckworth and Global Cooking for misappropriation of secrets under the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Wolfe Electric also separately alleged Duckworth breached his fiduciary duty and his employment contract while Global allegedly tortiously interfered with Duckworth's employment contract. A jury found for Wolfe Electric on all causes of action and awarded damages in a variety of categories. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple erroneous jury instructions and a verdict that failed to specify which of the innumerable acts alleged actually caused which of the particular damages awarded required reversal. Remanded. View "Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count each of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties, aggravated indecent liberties, and criminal sodomy. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the State agreed to join in Jacobs' motion for departure from Jessica's Law to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid for the off-grid aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The sentencing judge conformed to the parties' agreement on the departure motion and imposed three sentences for each conviction, all of which were ordered to run consecutive to each other. Jacobs appealed, arguing that his sentence under Jessica's Law violated the state and federal constitutions and that the sentencing judge erred by making his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument could not be ruled upon for the first time on appeal, and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to address Jacobs' second argument. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Appellant Nathan Inkelaar was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated criminal sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Appellant's alleged prior sexual abuse and determined the evidence was not unduly prejudicial; (2) the prosecutor questions during cross-examination of Appellant's brother were improper but there was no showing of deliberate misconduct, and the State met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect Appellant's substantial rights; (3) the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Appellant under Jessica's Law, as the amended complaints listed Appellant's date of birth and the court's error in failing to instruct the jury regarding Appellant's age was harmless; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of third-party guilt. View "State v. Inkelaar" on Justia Law

John Brennan sued his physician, who had a $200,000 professional liability insurance policy, for medical malpractice. The insurer was declared insolvent after Brennan filed his claim but before he recovered. The insurer's insolvency triggered the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association's (KIGA) statutory obligation to cover the insurer's obligations to the extent provided by the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association Act. KIGA, which intervened in the suit, denied liability because Brennan received medical reimbursements from his personal health insurance policy that totaled more than the insolvent insurer's policy limits. The dispositive issue was whether Brennan's due process rights were violated by a retroactive statutory amendment permitting KIGA to offset Brennan's personal health insurance benefits against its liability on the insolvent insurer's $200,000 policy. The district court declared the statute's retroactive feature unconstitutional and entered judgment against KIGA for $200,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the retroactivity provision violated due process, and (2) Brennan's rights were governed by the preamended statute. View "Brennan v. Kan. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law