Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

LaFarge Corporation operated a cement manufacturing facility on a tract of property that included a contiguous limestone quarry on one side at which LaFarge used its Caterpillar equipment to load the raw material and haul it across the property to the hammermills that performed the initial step in the cement manufacturing process. LaFarge paid sales taxes to Martin Tractor Company on the purchase of repair parts for its loaders and haulers, but then unsuccessfully sought a refund of the sales taxes from the Kansas Department of Revenue. Ultimately, the court of tax appeals (COTA) determined that the equipment, and therefore the repair parts, was exempt under Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-3606(kk)(2)(D) as being an integral or essential part of the integrated production operation of the cement manufacturing facility. The Supreme Court affirmed COTA's refund of sales taxes, agreeing that the equipment was being primarily used in the cement manufacturing business and at the manufacturing facility was was therefore subject to the exemption. View "In re Tax Appeal of LaFarge Midwest" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Raskie was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced to a hard twenty-five life sentence for one offense and sixty-one months for the other. Raskie appealed, attacking his convictions on several grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed Raskie's convictions and vacated Raskie's hard twenty-five life sentence, holding (1) Raskie either failed to preserve or waived his evidentiary arguments; (2) the district court did not err in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal or in giving a certain instruction to the jury; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct by making comments during closing argument about Raskie's lurid intent, but this error did not warrant reversal of Raskie's convictions; and (4) the district court failed to make adequate findings and conclusions of law on the issue of whether Raskie's hard twenty-five sentence violated that Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights or the Eighth Amendment. Remanded for consideration of Raskie's motion regarding the constitutionality of his sentence. View "State v. Raskie" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Clifford O'Rear of one count of reckless aggravated battery. O'Rear appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to show that he acted recklessly in intentionally shooting the victim. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence established that O'Rear intentionally shot a gun at the center mass of the victim, and thus, O'Rear intended the conduct of shooting and the result of causing injury; and (2) even though O'Rear mistook the facts and acted under the mistaken and unreasonable belief that he needed to defend himself or others, those facts did not change the intentional nature of O'Rear's action to shoot and disable the victim. View "State v. O'Rear" on Justia Law

Dana Deal was convicted for unintentional but reckless second-degree murder in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3402(b) for the death of Donald Irvin. Deal appealed, arguing (1) the evidence established that he intentionally hit Irvin with a metal tire iron and Irvin died as a result of these intentionally inflicted blows, and (2) because he acted intentionally in inflicting those blows, he could not be guilty of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed Deal's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 21-3402 focuses culpability on whether a killing is intentional, not on whether a deliberate and voluntary act leads to death; and (2) in this case, there was evidence that Deal did not intend to kill Irvin, and this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that Deal committed an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. View "State v. Deal" on Justia Law

A state trooper arrested Lindsay May for driving under the influence. May agreed to submit to a breath test, but her initial efforts failed to provide an adequate breath sample. After the trooper informed her that the insufficient breath sample constituted a test refusal under Kansas law, May requested an opportunity to retake the breath test. The trooper denied the request. At trial, the district court found that May had validly rescinded her her test refusal and suppressed any evidence of a test refusal or of the test result on the insufficient sample. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that May effected a valid rescission of her constructive test refusal, and therefore, the district court was correct in suppressing the evidence. View "State v. May" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Theodore Burnett of capital murder and aggravated kidnapping for his role in the kidnapping and murder of a pregnant fourteen-year-old. After the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict in the penalty phase of the trial regarding imposition of the death penalty, the sentencing court imposed a life sentence with no possibility of parole on the capital murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Burnett's argument that the verdict forms used in the penalty phase of the trial insufficiently protected his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy in any future prosecution was not ripe for appellate review; (2) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by making certain comments during closing argument; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting autopsy photographs and in instructing that another trial would be a burden on both sides; and (4) the Court had no jurisdiction to address Burnett's challenge to his presumptive sentence for his kidnapping conviction. View "State v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Jamaal Summers was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Summers' convictions, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting statements Summers made to police during an interview at his father's house; (2) allowing the victim's wife and neighbor to testify that the victim told them his friend, Homie, was coming over that evening; and (3) handling the prosecutor's inappropriate question during cross-examination of a defense witness by sustaining defense counsel's objection to the question, thus curing any possible prejudice. The Court then vacated the portion of Summers' sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the trial court did not have the authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence. View "State v. Summers" on Justia Law

Defendant Mauricio Macias-Medina pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child pursuant to a plea agreement. After entering his plea but before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that his attorney and his interpreter had coerced him into accepting the plea agreement. The district court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Defendant's pleas were knowingly and intelligently made and that they were not caused by dishonest interpretation of information or by coercion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an absence of good cause to permit Defendant to withdraw his pleas. View "State v. Macias-Medina" on Justia Law

Katreal Harris was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense; (2) denying Harris' motion to suppress statements made to police where the statements were voluntary; (3) denying Harris' motion for mistrial during jury selection where there was no showing of substantial prejudice; (5) imposing a hard fifty sentence without first submitting the aggravating factors to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) including Harris' prior juvenile adjudication in his criminal history without a jury determination. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Katrina Allen pleaded guilty to attempted possession of methamphetamine pursuant to a plea agreement but did not appear for her scheduled sentencing hearing as ordered pursuant to the plea agreement. Allen eventually appeared in court, but the district court released the State from its plea obligation to recommend probation at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. Allen appealed, arguing that the district court erred in releasing the State from its obligations because she substantially complied with her obligations under the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the merits of Allen's argument, as Allen failed to address a dispositive procedural holding of the court of appeals in her petition. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law