Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged his conviction for criminal possession of a firearm in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), which imposes a ten-year prohibition on the possession of a firearm by persons convicted of certain felonies. Defendant had a 1994 conviction for aggravated battery, one of the felonies listed in section 21-4204(a)(4)(A), for which he served a prison sentence. Defendant was released from prison on that sentence in 2004. The district court found the ten-year firearm prohibition period began upon Defendant's release from prison in 2004. Defendant argued that, as applied to him, the statutory language prohibited firearm possession for ten years from his date of conviction, which period had expired before his firearm possession in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the ten-year ban on the possession of firearms began to run against Defendant on the date he was released from prison on the aggravated battery sentence. View "State v. LaGrange" on Justia Law

After pleading no contest to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing (1) the State breached the plea agreement by arguing against the recommended sentence in the agreement, and (2) the district court erred in determining the minimum prison term Defendant must serve before becoming eligible for parole and in including lifetime electronic monitoring in the journal entry of judgment. The Supreme Court (1) remanded the case to the district court for entry of a nunc pro tunc order deleting the reference to electronic monitoring in the journal entry, holding that the district court had no authority to impose lifetime electronic monitoring; and (2) affirmed the remainder of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Antrim" on Justia Law

In this State appeal, the State contended the district court erred in expunging Allen Jaben's 1977 convictions for attempted rape, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated battery. The State urged the Supreme Court to find that the district court should have applied the expungement statute in effect at the time Jaben filed his expungement petition, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4619(c), which prohibited expungement of those convictions. Instead, the district court applied the statute in effect at the time Jaben committed his crimes of conviction, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4617, which permitted expungement of Jaben's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the expungement statute in effect at the time the crimes underlying the convictions sought to be expunged were committed, as because the legislature did not clearly indicate an intent to retrospectively apply the statute in effect at the time Jaben filed his petition, section 21-4619 applies only prospectively. View "State v. Jaben" on Justia Law

This case arose as an interpleader action to settle the rights to one-half of a brokerage commission resulting from a residential real estate transaction. Reece & Nicholas Realtors, Inc. (RAN), the listing broker, refused to split the brokerage commission with Patrick McGrath, who acted as the broker for the buyer. McGrath was a licensed Kansas attorney but was not licensed under the Kansas Real Estate Brokers' and Salespersons' License Act (KREBSLA). RAN contended it was statutorily prohibited from paying a commission to any person not licensed under the KREBSLA. McGrath maintained that, as an attorney, he was exempt from the requirements of the KREBSLA. The district court granted RAN's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an attorney is exempt from the provisions of the KREBLA, including the prohibition against splitting a fee with a nonlicensee, only to the extent he or she is performing activities that are encompassed within or incidental to the practice of law; (2) this attorney exemption does not create an exception to the commission-splitting prohibition of KREBSLA; and (3) consequently, an attorney who is not licensed under the KREBSLA cannot share in a real estate brokerage commission. View "Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors" on Justia Law

Alesia Warrior was convicted by a jury of the premeditated first-degree murder of her husband and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Warrior received a controlling hard 50 life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Warrior's convictions and sentence, holding (1) statements Warrior made to law enforcement officers while she was hospitalized were not custodial but were rather investigatory; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Warrior's motion for a new trial on the basis that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence pertaining to a juvenile burglary adjudication of a key prosecution witness, as, under the reasonable probability test, the jury's verdict was not compromised; (3) the admission of hearsay testimony regarding statements made by the victim, Warrior's husband, indicating his belief that his marriage was in trouble, assuming it was error, was harmless; (4) the trial court did not clearly err in giving a deadlocked jury instruction prior to deliberations; (5) Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional; and (6) in light of the record as a whole, there was not a reasonable probability that the combined errors affected the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Warrior" on Justia Law

Michael Mitchell was convicted of aggravated robbery based entirely on the victim's eyewitness identification. The victim picked Mitchell out of a photo lineup a few days after the robbery and indicated with 100 percent certainty that Mitchell was the assailant. At trial, the victim testified he had known Mitchell for several months before the attack but did not know his name. On appeal, Mitchell argued that the district court should have deleted the degree of certainty factor from those listed in the cautionary eyewitness identification instruction. Mitchell contended that this factor improperly focused the jury on expressions of certainty when evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness identification. The Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell's conviction, holding (1) the witness certainty factor in the instruction should no longer be used because it prompts the jury to conclude that eyewitness identification evidence is more reliable when the witness expresses greater certainty; but (2) the instruction could not have misled the jury since the eyewitness knew his attacker and was subjected to a thorough cross-examination. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Vernon Gilliland was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated criminal sodomy with a child under fourteen years of age. Because Gilliland was over the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, his conviction was for an off-grid person felony. Under Jessica's Law, the prescribed sentence for Gilliland's conviction was life imprisonment. Although the sentencing court denied Gilliland's motion for a departure sentence, the court did not impose a life sentence. Instead, the court imposed a sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act for a specific term. Thus, the effect of the sentence was contrary to the explicit finding of the sentencing court. The Supreme Court affirmed Gilliland's conviction but vacated Gilliland's sentence, holding that the sentence was illegal because of the ambiguity created by a finding that contradicted the sentence. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Gilliland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Rashawn Anderson of intentional second-degree murder and reckless aggravated battery for shooting two men on a downtown street following a rap concert. There were several eyewitnesses. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Anderson's convictions, holding (1) it was error to instruct the jury to consider the degree of certainty expressed by an eyewitness when determining if an identification was reliable; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; but (3) the jury could not have been misled by the instruction under the facts in this case, and the prosecutor's comments were harmless. Moreover, any cumulative impact from these errors was harmless. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Bryan Sprung was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated criminal sodomy, two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and one count of criminal threat. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Sprung's aggravated indecent liberties convictions were multiplicitous because the charges arose from the same act or transaction, and the plain language of the charging statute provided only one unit of prosecution rather than two; (2) the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's statements regarding the credibility of the victim, Sprung's expert witness, and Sprung's investigator, even if improper, did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sprung's motion to compel a psychological examination of the victim; and (4) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Sprung's sentencing claim for lack of jurisdiction. The Court reversed one of Sprung's aggravated indecent liberties convictions and vacated Sprung's sentence in part. View "State v. Sprung" on Justia Law

Defendant Antwan Peppers was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Peppers' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting gang affiliation evidence with a limiting instruction; (2) the jury instructions on the gang affiliation evidence and the instruction that another trial would be a burden on both sides were not error; and (3) although the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by straying into impermissible expressions of the prosecutor's personal opinion on Peppers' guilt, there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's expressions of personal opinion about Peppers' guilt affected the jury's verdict. View "State v. Peppers" on Justia Law