Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kathryn Swank's driver's license was suspended after a police officer arrested Swank for suspicion of driving under the influence. When the officer found Swank, she had pulled into a driveway and was already out of her car. Swank admitted she had been drinking, but the officer did not ask Swank if she had consumed any alcohol after she pulled into the driveway. Swank then tested positive to a breath test. Swank filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision. The district judge ruled in Swank's favor and set the agency order of suspension aside. At issue on appeal was the appropriate role, if any, for evidence and legal argument regarding post-driving alcohol consumption. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the evidence demonstrated the existence of the officer's reasonable grounds and that Swank's post-driving alcohol consumption could not be considered because it was not among the legal issues enumerated in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1020(h)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider Swank's testimony about her post-driving alcohol consumption. Remanded. View "Swank v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant James Mossman appealed from the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision following his conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant contended lifetime postrelease supervision constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence to lifetime postrelease supervision under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), holding that the sentence was not disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime, was not grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Kansas or similar crimes in other states, and was not categorically unconstitutional. View "State v. Mossman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy, both class B felonies. Under the indeterminate sentencing scheme then in effect, class B felonies required a minimum prison term of between five and fifteen years and a maximum term of twenty years to life. Because Defendant had a prior conviction, the court sentenced Defendant to thirty years to life on his rape conviction and ten to forty years for his aggravated criminal sodomy conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Later, the district court summarily denied Defendant's pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district district court did not err in summarily denying Defendant's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel; and (2) Defendant did not receive an illegal sentence. View "State v. Heronemus" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burglary of a nonresidence, criminal damage to property, and obstruction of a legal duty. The strongest evidence against Defendant was an eyewitness' identification of Defendant as the burglar. On appeal Defendant raised two issues related to the eyewitness' identification. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) a prosecutor can commit prejudicial misconduct when respondent to comments by defense counsel, but under the facts of this case, any misconduct committed by the prosecutor in commenting about the eyewitness' credibility was harmless; and (2) Defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that a contested instruction on eyewitness identification was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Marshall" on Justia Law

As required by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), the district court in this case sentenced Defendant, in part, to lifetime postrelease supervision for his convictions of three counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the lifetime postrelease supervision sentence was not disproportionate to the seriousness of Defendant's crime, was not grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Kansas or similar crimes in other states, and was not categorically unconstitutional; and (2) the district court did not have discretion to sentence Defendant to a postrelease supervision term of twenty-four months, as there was no reasonable doubt that the Legislature intended that the more severe penalty of lifetime postrelease supervision must be imposed when a defendant is sentenced for a sexually violent crime. View "State v. Cameron" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years on each count to run concurrently. The court did not order restitution at sentencing. After Defendant filed his notice of appeal, the district court entered an order establishing restitution. Defendant appealed, contending that restitution be ordered before imposition of sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to impose restitution after imposing sentence; and (2) Defendant's argument that the sentencing court erred in including lifetime electronic monitoring in the journal entry of judgment was moot because the error was corrected in an amended journal entry of judgment. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the felony murder of his son and of the child abuse of two of his other children. Edgar was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Edgar's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective during closing argument. The district court summarily denied the motion. A panel of the court of appeals reversed without discussing the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, instead remanding for an evidentiary hearing. The State appealed, claiming that the court of appeals erred when it did not consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Chamberlain test. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district judge's denial of Defendant's motion, holding (1) the court of appeals could and should have reviewed the district judge's ruling on the second prong of the Strickland/Chamberlain test, but (2) under the Court's review, the district judge correctly concluded that Defendant failed to establish prejudice. View "Edgar v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Wilson pleaded guilty to one count of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant challenged, among other things, the district judge's doubling of his twenty-five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence under Jessica's Law because of his status as a persistent sex offender under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4704(j), the persistent sex offender statute that permits doubling of a maximum presumptive sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence imposed by the district judge, holding that the persistent sex offender did not apply to double the mandatory minimum of twenty-five years' imprisonment for an off-grid Jessica's Law offense pursuant to section 21-4704(j). Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant Essex Sims directly appealed the summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant asserted five claims of error, four challenging his convictions, not his sentence, and the fifth contending that the district court's order was unclear as to whether his sentences were consecutive or concurrent. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary denial, holding (1) the four claims attacking Defendant's convictions were not properly raised, as a motion to correct an illegal sentence cannot be used to challenge a conviction; and (2) there was no reasonable interpretation that supported Defendant's fifth argument. View "State v. Sims" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to consecutive hard twenty life and 247-month sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and consecutive sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Parks' post-Miranda silence; (2) the violation of an order in limine prohibiting reference to Defendant's possession of illegal drugs did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial; (3) Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated by limitation of his counsel's cross-examination of a State's witness about the witness' immigration status; (4) the district judge did not err in including an Allen-type instruction; (5) cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; and (6) the district judge did not err in sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law