Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether Probationer was entitled to jail time credit toward a sentence for the time she spent in a residential drug abuse treatment facility when her sojourn had not been ordered as a condition of probation in the case where that prison sentence had been imposed. Probationer was statutorily required, and ordered as a condition of probation, to complete drug abuse treatment in the case involving a conviction for cocaine possession. But drug treatment was not statutorily required, or ordered as a condition of probation, in the case where her convictions concerned nondrug offenses. Probationer failed to complete her mandatory drug treatment, and the district court revoked her probation in both cases. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have awarded Probationer jail time credit toward her nondrug offense case's sentence for her time spent in drug abuse treatment. Although the treatment was ordered only as a condition of probation in Probationer's cocaine possession case, there was no statutory requirement that the time spent in such treatment be ordered in the same case in which the jail time credit was sought. Remanded. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that an action seeking reformation of an executory contract does not accrue until a party discovers a mutual mistake in the contract language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's reformation claim was barred by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-511(1) because the mutual mistake occurred when the contract was executed, which was more than five years before this case was filed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) a cause of action for reformation of a contract based on an alleged mutual mistake accrues when the mistake is made, not when the mutual mistake is discovered; and (2) the application of these rules does not depend on whether a contract is executed or executory, and the rules do not vary just because the contract relates to the title of real property. View "Law v. Law Co. Bldg. Assocs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for stabbing her long-time friend multiple times in the head with a steak knife during an altercation inside of Defendant's home. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court should have, sua sponte, given instructions on no duty to retreat, use of force in defense of a dwelling, and a lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in omitting the no duty to retreat instruction in this case, Defendant failed to establish the requisite level of prejudice; (2) the defense of dwelling instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case, and it was not clearly erroneous to fail to give that instruction; and (3) it was error not to give the lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery, but the failure to give the unrequested instruction was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error in (1) denying Defendant's motion to compel a psychological examination of the victim; (2) denying Defendant's motion for a bill of particulars; (3) failing to give a limiting instruction after admitting evidence of Defendant's prior traffic offenses; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Court also held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3511(a) does not present an alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, and therefore, this case did not involve an alternative means issue. Lastly, the district court had jurisdiction to enter the restitution portion of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Rojas-Marceleno" on Justia Law

Defendant sought review of the court of appeals' decision affirming his convictions for second-degree murder, kidnapping, and other crimes related to the beating death of his longtime companion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court violated Defendant's right of confrontation by admitting the victim's testimonial statements to the police into evidence, but (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that the error was harmless. The court of appeals, however, did not have the advantage of caselaw that was available after the court of appeals decided the case. Pursuant to the subsequently decided State v. Ward, the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Belone" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and four counts of aggravated assault. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution as an adult because he was not initially charged in juvenile court and the State never obtained authorization to prosecute him as an adult. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding, inter alia, (1) Defendant did not demonstrate he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court did not err in allowing into evidence statements made at the previous trial because vacating the earlier trial did not render the sworn testimony from that trial void, did not remove the constitutional protections in place at that trial, and did not change the credibility of the testimony; and (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments. View "State v. Breedlove" on Justia Law

After Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor theft in municipal court for violating a city ordinance, his conviction was vacated and he was charged with and convicted of felony theft in state district court for the same offense. Defendant argued that double jeopardy attached to the municipal court proceeding. The State countered that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal court proceeding because the municipal court did not have jurisdiction over felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy did not attach, as (1) a city ordinance that conflicts with a state statute by classifying the offense as a misdemeanor when the legislature has classified the crime as a felony does not vest the municipal court with jurisdiction; and (2) the municipal court had the authority to vacate Defendant's plea, and the State could prosecute Defendant for felony theft. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor practicing medicine in Kansas and Missouri, appealed from the district court's order denying her petition to revoke an administrative subpoena issued by the Kansas Board of Healing Arts. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Appellant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-2839a(b)(3)(B). On the merits of the appeal, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition based on its conclusion that the Board had authority under the Kansas Healing Arts Act to investigate and subpoena Appellant, a Kansas licensee who was practicing under the Act, even though the investigation was based upon her practice of medicine in Missouri. View "Ryser v. State" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant accidentally released about 90,000 gallons of crude oil into floodwaters of a river in Coffeyville. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed an action in federal court alleging the oil spill damaged their pecan grove. Plaintiffs asserted a statutory right to recover damages under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-6203. Defendant argued Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-513(a)(4). Plaintiffs contended they timely filed their action under the three-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-512(2). Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that section 65-6203 creates an "absolute" liability different in kind than the strict liability doctrine applied under Kansas common law, and therefore, the three-year limitation period applied. The federal district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) section 65-6203 imposes liability for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state that differs from the Kansas common-law strict liability standard; and (2) the three-year statute of limitations in section 60-512(2) applies to actions brought under section 65-6203. View "Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg." on Justia Law

On direct appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated battery, arguing that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense. The court of appeals agreed, reversed Defendant's conviction, and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied a complete standard of review when it declared that trial court is obligated to instruct on any lesser included offense on which a jury might reasonably return a verdict after considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant; and (2) the court of appeals properly interpreted the skip rule. View "State v. Simmons" on Justia Law