Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Keely Foster, a minor, and her parents, Kim and Kevin Foster, sued Keely's pediatric orthapedic surgeon, Dr. Michelle Klaumann, for injury done to a nerve in Keely's leg while Keely was undergoing surgery. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Klaumann. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict, holding (1) it was not error to instruct the jury on both a general physician standard of care and a specialist standard of care when the parties did not dispute Klaumann was a specialist; and (2) the "best judgment" instruction does not misstate the law by instructing the jury that the physician has a right to use his or her best judgment in the selection of the choice of treatment. View "Foster v. Klaumann" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were royalty owners entitled to receive a share of the production of natural gas in a gas field. Plaintiffs brought a class action against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (APC) and its affiliates challenging the manner in which APC was paying royalties on natural gas production under the respective oil and gas leases. Timothy Coulter represented the plaintiff class and negotiated a settlement agreement. More than 6,000 members made up the settlement class, one of whom was Stan Boles. Boles objected to the amended class certification and the class settlement agreement negotiated by Coulter. The district court approved the settlement despite Boles' objection. Boles appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the adequacy of the class representation or the character of the settlement agreement. View "Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Parents, individually and on behalf of their daughter (Daughter), filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital under respondeat superior, alleging that Hospital's employee, an obstetrical nurse (Nurse), breached the standard of care which caused permanent injury to Daughter. The jury returned a verdict for Hospital. The court of appeals affirmed. Parents appealed, contending that one jury instruction erroneously directed the jury to apply a community nursing standard of care when all of their twelve negligence claims were governed by a national standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction given was correct for the negligence allegation based upon chain of command because it was governed by a community standard of care. View "Bates v. Dodge City Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

This eminent domain proceeding involved City's condemnation of a tract of land owned by Landowner. Company leased from Landowner approximately 500 square feet of the property for operation of a billboard. The tract was valued at $1,075,600 with no compensation given for the billboard structure and no consideration as to the advertising income produced by Company's leasehold. City and Landowner accepted the appraisers' award, but Company appealed. The district court granted City's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the appraisers' award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for City, as (1) evidence of advertising income generated by the billboard was irrelevant to the value of the property under any authorized valuation approach; and (2) Company did not come forward with relevant and admissible evidence that could alter the appraisers' valuation of the land at issue. View "City of Wichita v. Denton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for touching the faces, hair, arms, and legs of two young girls, who were playing outside a movie theater. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence of a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which provides that aggravated indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any lewd fondling or touching of a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the touches did not tend to undermine the children's morals and were not so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Ta" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) it was error for the district judge not to give a second-degree intentional murder instruction, but Defendant's failure to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court placed upon him a burden he could not bear, as the judge's failure to so instruct was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his aggravated kidnapping conviction; (3) the district court did not err in its instruction on aggravated robbery; and (4) the Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional. View "State v. Haberlein" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two criminal charges. The court placed Defendant on probation, but his probation was subsequently revoked. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney's position as the guardian ad litem for the victim of one of Defendant's crimes created a per se conflict of interest that denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation proceeding. Relying on State v. Jenkins, Defendant argued this conflict so offended his rights that reversal was automatic and he was not required to show the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation. The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the court held (1) Defendant had to show the multiple representation had an adverse effect on the attorney's representation because Defendant did not object to the multiple representation; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden and was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mickens overrules portions of Jenkins; (2) the lower court correctly concluded that Defendant must establish that the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation; but (3) this determination cannot be made on the record on appeal. Remanded. View "State v. Galaviz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1989 of aggravated sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. More than a decade later, while Petitioner was still imprisoned on these convictions, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2005, Petitioner petitioned for discharge or transitional release. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a de novo standard of review applied to the court's denial of Petitioner's petition; (2) Petitioner bore the burden of proof in this case; and (3) Petitioner here failed to establish the requisite probable cause entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or transitional release. View "In re Burch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving while suspended (DWS). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district court violated his due process rights and his right to present his defense by interfering with a defense witness' decision to testify, (2) DWS is an alternative means crime, and (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the alternative means of committing DUI and DWS. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not substantially interfere with a defense witness' choice to testify or violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; (2) DWS is not an alternative means crime; and (3) Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567(a) does not contain alternative means of committing DUI, and the State presented sufficient proof to sustain Defendant's conviction for DUI. View "State v. Suter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district judge erred in admitting evidence of other crimes and in giving a cautionary accomplice witness instruction over a defense objection, (2) the prosecution engaged in misconduct requiring reversal, (3) the cumulative effect of these errors required reversal, and (4) his convictions and sentences were multiplicitous. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the disputed evidence and in instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor's repeated references to the "truth" during closing argument did constitute misconduct, but the error was harmless; (3) and Defendant's multiplicity argument was without merit. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law