Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Topeka attempted to purchase a new police helicopter from Schreib-Air, Inc. with financing by Municipal Services Group, Inc. (MSG) After a lease-purchase agreement was signed, the State filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement between the City and Schreib-Air was invalid, void ab initio, and ultra vires because the lease-purchase agreement failed to comply with the cash-basis law. Although the helicopter was never actually purchased, the district court held that the transactions with Schreib-Air and MSG violated the cash-basis law and ordered that any money given to MSG or Schreib-Air related to the helicopter purchase was to be returned. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schreib-Air's agreement with the City was void when entered into because the contract was made in violation of the cash-basis law and, consequently, the contract was unenforceable. View "State, ex rel. Hecht v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

At the conclusion of Defendant's seizure pursuant to a traffic stop, law enforcement officers returned to Defendant's car and asked him if they could search the vehicle. Defendant consented to the search of the car. The officers subsequently found crack cocaine in the trunk. Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. At issue on appeal was whether the traffic stop leading to Defendant's arrest became a voluntary encounter before Defendant gave consent to search. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant gave his consent to search his vehicle during a voluntary encounter with the officer. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, among other crimes. Law enforcement officers found drug evidence on Defendant after they seized him under the suspicion that he knew the whereabouts of someone for whom police had a warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted, as the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity before they initiated the stop, and therefore, the seizure was illegal. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether a driver's favorable results from field sobriety tests administered prior to a request for a preliminary breath test (PBT) dissipate the reasonable suspicion statutorily required to support a request for a PBT, and (2) whether the investigating officer in this case substantially complied with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012(c), which requires oral notice that refusal to take a PBT is a traffic infraction, when the officer incorrectly told Defendant he had not right to refuse the PBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) sobriety tests administered prior to a PBT request are part of the totality of circumstances examined by a court when determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the PBT request under section 8-1012(c); and (2) the officer in this case failed to comply with the notice requirements in section 8-1012(c) by incorrectly informing Defendant that he had no right to refuse the PBT. Remanded. View "State v. Edgar" on Justia Law

Corporation owned a club with exotic dancers who were treated as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance. In 2005, the Department of Labor determined that the dancers were employees. A hearing officer upheld the determination, concluding that the dancers received wages for services and therefore, the dancers were employees under the Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). The district court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the relationship between provisions in the KESL as they existed before amendments that took effect in 2011 and common-law rules used to determine the existence of employee status. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the determinative question in this case was whether the dancers had the status of employees under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. Because the critical common-law factor in this analysis is the employer's right of control over the employee and her work, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dancers were employees, where Corporation possessed such a right of control over the club's dancers. View "Milano's, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

This capital murder case resulted from a double homicide and shooting of a third victim. After a trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed, claiming he was denied his right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court (1) reversed the death sentence where the State stipulated that Defendant's attorney was ineffective during the trial's penalty phase; and (2) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that defense counsel was deficient in certain areas, but that there was no evidence that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different without these deficiencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's representation denied Defendant his right to a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Doctor for medical malpractice arising out of surgeries to treat her tracheal stenosis. Doctor filed a motion in limine to prevent Plaintiff's subsequent treating physician from testifying about the standard of care. The district court granted the motion because Plaintiff's treating physician did not meet the requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-3412. Under the statute, Plaintiff's treating physician must have spent at least fifty percent of his professional time within the two years before Plaintiff's first surgery in actual clinical practice if Plaintiff wished him to testify as an expert on the applicable standard of care. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Doctor because, in the absence of expert testimony on the standard of care, Plaintiff could not carry her burden of proof. the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fifty percent rule for expert witnesses under section 60-3412 is inapplicable to treating physicians; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Doctor. View "Schlaikjer v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained an injury while working for Employer. During the course of the workers compensation proceedings, it was confirmed that Claimant was an unauthorized alien. An ALJ denied Claimant's claim for permanent partial general work disability based on public policy grounds, concluding that awarding an unauthorized alien a work disability would be inconsistent with the Workers Compensation Act's legislative intent. The Workers Compensation Board disagreed and awarded Claimant a fifty-nine percent work disability, concluding that the Act's plain language did not prohibit an unauthorized alien from receiving an award for work disability. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's award of work disability, holding that, under the statutes in effect when Claimant was injured in this case, Claimant's immigration status did not preclude her from receiving work disability compensation. View "Fernandez v. McDonald's" on Justia Law

Three corporations, each of which owned a nursing home facility, requested a hearing with the Kansas Department on Aging, challenging new reimbursement rates for each facility, arguing that because the facilities underwent a change of ownership, the rates should be recalculated. The hearing officer rejected the corporations' arguments, finding that, by operation of law for Medicaid reimbursement purposes, there was no change of ownership. The Kansas Health Policy Authority upheld the ruling, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency orders were valid, did not violate equal protection or due process, and were not vague. View "Village Villa v. Kan. Health Policy Auth." on Justia Law

Douglas Girard and Eugene Mallard were both convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The State filed petitions for their continued confinement as sexually violent predators, a designation that required proof that Defendants were likely to commit repeat acts of sexual violence because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder. Defendants urged the court to apply the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals, Inc. test to the actuarial risk assessments used by the State's expert witnesses in helping to predict the odds of Defendants reoffending. In both cases, the district court ruled that Frye v. United States applied to the actuarial risk assessments and admitted the scientific opinion testimony based partially on these statistical calculations of risk. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that neither Frye nor Daubert applied because the actuarial assessments were not scientific. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that Frye applied in this case and that the actuarial risk assessments survived Frye's scrutiny. View "In re Care & Treatment of Girard" on Justia Law