Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a habeas petition and a motion to correct an illegal sentence, both of which were unsuccessful. Approximately twelve years later, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the district court did not advise him of various constitutional rights in open court contrary to the mandate of Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3210(a)(3). The district court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Four years later, Defendant filed a second motion to withdraw pleas, arguing, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective in arguing his first motion to withdraw pleas. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's motion to withdraw pleas was untimely and procedurally barred. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy of a child less than fourteen years of age. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his right to counsel under the federal and state constitutions was violated when he was interrogated without his attorney being present and the resulting statements were admitted at trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4503 entitled Defendant to the assistance of counsel at a State-initiated polygraph examination and interview of Defendant; (2) after Defendant's statutory right to counsel attached, his uncounseled waiver of that right was not valid because it was not made in writing and on the record in open court; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to suppress the uncounseled statement Defendant made during the police-initiated interrogation after Defendant invoked his right to the assistance of counsel under section 22-4503. View "State v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court violated Defendant's constitutional and statutory rights when it replayed Defendant's recorded statement about specific incidents involving the child victim to a deliberating jury outside of his presence but in the courtroom, but the error was harmless; (2) Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the court erred when it allowed the child victim to testify with a comfort person alongside her; and (3) the court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt was legally appropriate. View "State v. Herbel" on Justia Law

This appeal arose over the administration of a Trust between Lawrence, the Trust's beneficiary, and the Trust's trustees, Dennis and Leona (collectively, Trustees). Lawrence moved to set aside a contract for deed executed between Dennis and his wife and the Trustees for the sale of farmland owned by the Trust and also sought to remove the Trustees, alleging they engaged in self-dealing and breached their fiduciary duties. The district court concluded (1) the Trust permitted the Trustees to finance the sale of the farmland to Dennis under the terms set forth in the contract for deed; and (2) Lawrence violated the Trust's no-contest clause by challenging the Trustee's sale of the farmland to Dennis, which required Lawrence's disinheritance. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling regarding the Trustees' authority to finance the sale of the farm and its enforcement of the no-contest clause against Lawrence, holding (1) the Trustees' execution of the contract for deed violated the terms of the Trust; and (2) Lawrence had probable cause to challenge the Trustees' sale of the farm to Dennis. Remanded. View "Hamel v. Hamel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a drug-related crime. During trial, evidence of Defendant's prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine was admitted into evidence. The jury convicted Defendant of one count of manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing, inter alia, that evidence of his prior conviction was erroneously admitted. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's presentation of evidence that he was on probation at the time the current crime was committed opened the door to rebuttal evidence regarding his prior crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the nature of Defendant's prior conviction even after Defendant presented evidence regarding his probation, as the evidence was not relevant to prove a material fact, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Everett" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug-related crime and was sentenced to eighteen months' probation. The district court made no findings justifying Defendant's extended prison probation term from twelve months to eighteen months pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6411(c)(5). More than eighteen months after Defendant's sentence was imposed, the district court resentenced Defendant to correct the failure to make findings justifying the extended probation term. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him because he had already completed the twelve-month presumptive probation term. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) if a district court fails to comply with the requirements of section 21-4611(c)(5) by imposing an extended period of probation without making required findings and the sentence is therefore illegal, the district court only has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant during the period of probation that complied with section 21-4611(c)(5); and (2) because the district court imposed the "corrected" sentence after the twelve-month probation period had expired, the "corrected" sentence was unlawful. View "State v. Alonzo" on Justia Law

Defendant Ritchie Corporation conveyed title to a tract of land a waste systems corporation (BFI). Ritchie and BFI entered into an escrow agreement that entitled BFI to operate the property as a nonhazardous waste transfer station for thirty-five years. Ritchie granted BFI a right of first refusal to buy the transfer station from Ritchie. BFI later assigned its title and interest in the escrow agreement to Plaintiff Waste Connections, which began operating the transfer station. Later, a third party agreed to buy the transfer station and an adjoining landfill. Waste Connections asserted its right of first refusal to purchase the transfer station. Waste Connections and Ritchie subsequently disputed the proper price owed under the escrow agreement - $1.45 million or $2 million. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Ritchie. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because genuine issues of material fact remained on Waste Connections' breach of contract action against Ritchie, summary judgment for either party was inappropriate. View "Waste Connections of Kan., Inc. v. Ritchie Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) several of the issues raised by Defendant were not properly preserved or presented for review; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting certain autopsy photographs at trial; (3) the trial judge did not err in not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Defendant's best friend, who was a witness for the State, regarding the friend's involvement in drug sales; and (4) the trial judge did not err in giving a pattern jury instruction regarding aiding and abetting the commission of a crime. View "State v. Tague" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy for acts committed against his stepdaughter. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent hard twenty-five life sentences under Jessica's Law and to lifetime postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) Defendant's Jessica's Law hard twenty-five life sentences for rape and aggravated indecent liberties were not disproportionate to his crime; but (2) Defendant was entitled to vacation of the postrelease supervision term ordered by the district judge, as this portion of Defendant's sentence was illegal. View "State v. Seward" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties for his conduct with his third-grade stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive Jessica's Law hard twenty-five life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) rape is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on rape were sufficient; (2) aggravated indecent liberties is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on aggravated indecent liberties were sufficient; (3) Defendant's sentence for rape was proportional under section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) Defendant's sentence for aggravated indecent liberties was proportional under section 9. View "State v. Newcomb" on Justia Law