Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Seller and his real estate agent (Agent) entered into an agency agreement requiring Agent to inform potential buyers of material defects in Seller's home of which she had actual knowledge. Seller completed a signed a seller's disclosure form. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed this lawsuit against Seller, Agent, and Agent's brokerage firm (Firm), alleging, inter alia, fraud, negligent misrepresentation for providing false representations in the disclosure form, breach of contract, and violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The court of appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Seller and affirmed summary judgment in favor of Agent and Firm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to Seller on Buyers' fraudulent inducement, fraud by silence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims; and (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Agent and Firm for Buyers' negligent misrepresentation and KCPA claims. Remanded. View "Stechschulte v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Decedent created an inter vivos revocable trust. Until her death, Decedent served as the trust's sole trustee. At Decedent's request, Attorney drafted the trust documents and a pour-over will. Bank was named successor trustee of Decedent's trust. After Decedent died, the personal representative (Representative) of Decedent's estate sued Attorney and Bank. Against Attorney, the petition alleged claims of negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract based on the alleged failure of Defendants to protect Decedent's assets from tax liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions of summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that Representative's tort claims for legal malpractice did not survive Decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Representative's cause of action did not accrue until after Decedent's death, it did not qualify as a survival action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1801 and was therefore barred. View "Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant owned a first-priority security interest in LLC. The Cass Trust owned LLC membership interest, and the Cass Trust and Cohen Trust owned common stock shares in Corporation. The Cohen and Cass trustees later made an agreement with Company to sell the membership interests in LLC, including Defendant's first priority security interest in LLC, and Corporation's assets. A dispute arose over whether Defendant was entitled to know details of the sale agreements. Before the sale agreements were to close, Defendant sued the trusts, LLC, and Corporation in Missouri, alleging that the trustees engaged in self-dealing and financially manipulated Corporation and LLC to dilute Defendant's ownership interest. After learning of the lawsuit, Company refused to close the transaction without additional substantive requirements. After closing, the Cohen and Cass trustees filed this lawsuit against Defendant, alleging that Defendant tortiously interfered with their existing contracts and prospective business relationships by filing the lawsuit then faxing to Company a suit copy. The trial court dismissed the claims. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant could not interfere with a contractual relation by giving Company "truthful information." The Supreme Court reversed because at the time the instant suit was filed, the court of appeals was not in a position to decide the truth of the claims set out in the Missouri action. View "Cohen v. Battaglia" on Justia Law

Keely Foster, a minor, and her parents, Kim and Kevin Foster, sued Keely's pediatric orthapedic surgeon, Dr. Michelle Klaumann, for injury done to a nerve in Keely's leg while Keely was undergoing surgery. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Klaumann. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict, holding (1) it was not error to instruct the jury on both a general physician standard of care and a specialist standard of care when the parties did not dispute Klaumann was a specialist; and (2) the "best judgment" instruction does not misstate the law by instructing the jury that the physician has a right to use his or her best judgment in the selection of the choice of treatment. View "Foster v. Klaumann" on Justia Law

Parents, individually and on behalf of their daughter (Daughter), filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital under respondeat superior, alleging that Hospital's employee, an obstetrical nurse (Nurse), breached the standard of care which caused permanent injury to Daughter. The jury returned a verdict for Hospital. The court of appeals affirmed. Parents appealed, contending that one jury instruction erroneously directed the jury to apply a community nursing standard of care when all of their twelve negligence claims were governed by a national standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction given was correct for the negligence allegation based upon chain of command because it was governed by a community standard of care. View "Bates v. Dodge City Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the only child of Susan Shore. Susan and her children were beneficiaries of the Shore Family Trust. After Susan died, Plaintiff sued Defendant, the trustee of the trust, alleging (1) Defendant sold the farmland that formed the principal of the of the trust and distributed the proceeds to himself for his personal use, and (2) Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant's actions until within two years before filing suit. Plaintiff's complaint claimed breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and constructive fraud. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the applicable statues of limitations and repose barred all of Plaintiff's claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that three of four of Plaintiff's causes of action were time barred, but his claim based on constructive fraud survived. Remanded. View "Hemphill v. Shore" on Justia Law

Kody Bicknell sought review of a court of appeals decision permitting Tammy Anderson to pursue punitive damages in her lawsuit against him after Bicknell rear-ended Adamson's vehicle at a train crossing. The punitive damages claim was based, in part, on Bicknell's drug use prior to the collision. Bicknell also appealed from the panel's decision permitting Adamson to submit medical bill write-offs to the jury. On the punitive damages issue, the Supreme Court (1) agreed with the panel's decision that the district court set a higher burden of proof for the punitive damages claim than statutorily necessary by requiring that Adamson provide what would amount to scientific evidence of Bicknell's impairment resulting from his consumption of drugs; (2) concluded that the panel erred in deciding the district court should have permitted Adamson to amend for punitive damages based on the evidence as the panel perceived it; and (3) remanded for rehearing on that issue and application of the proper legal standard. On the medical bill write-off question, the Court held that the court of appeals erred in reaching the merits because the issue was not preserved for appeal. View "Adamson v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into an oral agreement with his sister, Defendant, for the bailment of farm animals and farm equipment on her land. After their cooperative effort to breed horses broke down, Defendant sold her farm and the horses. Plaintiff subsequently retrieved most of his equipment from the farm and sued Defendant for conversion and breach of the bailment contract. Defendant counterclaimed for the expenses of maintaining the equipment and caring for the horses. The district court awarded no damages. The court of appeals affirmed the rulings against Plaintiff but found the district court erred in denying sanctions against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' action in tort was not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the district court erred by rejecting Plaintiff's claim for conversion; (3) the court of appeals correctly found that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorney fees as a sanction, but the question of attorney fees was remanded to the district court for determining the amount of fees to be awarded. View "Schoenholz v. Hinzman" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant accidentally released about 90,000 gallons of crude oil into floodwaters of a river in Coffeyville. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed an action in federal court alleging the oil spill damaged their pecan grove. Plaintiffs asserted a statutory right to recover damages under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-6203. Defendant argued Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-513(a)(4). Plaintiffs contended they timely filed their action under the three-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-512(2). Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that section 65-6203 creates an "absolute" liability different in kind than the strict liability doctrine applied under Kansas common law, and therefore, the three-year limitation period applied. The federal district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) section 65-6203 imposes liability for an accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the state that differs from the Kansas common-law strict liability standard; and (2) the three-year statute of limitations in section 60-512(2) applies to actions brought under section 65-6203. View "Eastman v. Coffeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg." on Justia Law

Tim Lilley leased pastureland adjacent to Mark and Janis Evanson's property. Lilley started a fire on the pastureland that spread to the Evensons' property, destroying the outbuildings on the property and around 200 trees. Lilley stipulated that he was at fault for the fire and the resulting damage. The district court held that the measure of damages was the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after the fire. The court awarded damages in the amount of $4,687 for the loss in value of the property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court and court of appeals incorrectly attempted to superimpose principles of temporary and permanent damages on the facts of this case; but (2) the lower courts' conclusions were nonetheless correct, and the district court did not err in relying on a diminished-value calculation of property loss. View "Evenson v. Lilley" on Justia Law