Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While driving a vehicle owned by her employer (Employer), Appellant was injured in an accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Appellant claimed underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under Employer’s commercial insurance package policy, which Appellant believed had been insured by Insurer, the same carrier that insured the tortfeasor. Insurer denied Appellant’s claim. A jury awarded Appellant damages, finding the tortfeasor at fault. The district court denied Insurer’s posttrial motion for judgment based upon its claim that it did not issue Employer’s insurance policy and granted Insurer’s motion for credit against the verdict in part, declining, however, to give Insurer credit for future medical expenses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s denial of Insurer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Insurer’s claim that Appellant named the wrong insurance company as the defendant; (2) reversed the district court’s decision on Insurer’s motion for partial summary judgment on future medical expenses and vacated the jury’s award of future medical expenses; and (3) reversed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for attorney fees. Remanded. View "Bussman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. " on Justia Law

City cited Defendant, which operated a grain elevator facility inside city limits, for violating municipal noise and nuisance ordinances. After a bench trial, the municipal court found Defendant guilty of violating both ordinances. The district court reversed, concluding that the ordinances were unconstitutionally vague because they did not warn potential violators of what conduct was prohibited and failed adequately to guar against the risk of arbitrary enforcement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the City's noise ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; but (2) the nuisance ordinance was constitutional as applied to Defendant. View "City of Lincoln Ctr. v. Farmway Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Appellant was seriously injured in a gasoline fire. Appellant filed a complaint against Employer for negligently failing to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the common-law assumption of risk doctrine barred recovery in this case because Appellant knew of the dangerous situation and voluntarily exposed himself to that danger. The court of appeals affirmed based on existing precedent. The Supreme Court (1) overruled prior caselaw adhering to the assumption of risk as an absolute bar to recovery, holding that the state's statutory comparative fault system, in which any alleged assumption of risk is considered as just one factor when determining proportionality of fault based on the circumstances, should control; and (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the district court erred when it granted Employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Appellant assumed the risk from which his injuries followed. Remanded for consideration of Appellant's negligence claims under the principles of comparative fault. View "Simmons v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Rineharts contracted with Morton Buildings for a preengineered building to serve as their personal residence and business location for their business, Midwest Slitting. Upon disputes regarding the structure's quality, the Rineharts and Midwest Slitting sued. A jury found for the Rineharts on several of their claims and for Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claim. The court of appeals affirmed and granted the Rineharts appellate attorney fees. Morton appealed, arguing that the economic loss doctrine, which originated with product liability litigation to prohibit tort claims when the only damages were to the product itself, should extend to bar the negligent misrepresentation claim in this case. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claims, holding that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation claims because the duty at issue arises by operation of law, and the doctrine's purposes would not be further by extending it to such claims; and (2) reversed the appellate attorney fee award because the Court could not determine from the record whether the court of appeals included time and expenses in the award not reimbursable under the applicable statute. Remanded. View "Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc." on Justia Law

Russell Graham shot himself and his son, Zeus, with a gun Russell purchased at Baxter Springs Gun & Pawn Shop. The pawn shop's owners, Joe and Patsy George, filled out the paperwork by listing Russell's mother as the purchaser of the gun because Russell had a prior felony conviction. Russell then paid for the gun and ammunition. Zeus's mother, Elizabeth Shirley, sued the pawn shop and the Georges for negligence in selling a firearm to a party while knowing it was intended for another and without performing a background check on the intended owner. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of Shirley's negligence per se claim but reversed the court's rejection of Shirley's negligent entrustment claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision allowing Shirley to proceed with a negligent entrustment claim; and (2) reversed the portion of the court's decision holding that Defendants were not held to the highest standard of reasonable care in exercising control over firearms. Remanded. View "Shirley v. Glass" on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law

After Employee was injured in a car accident with a police officer, Employer's workers compensation carrier (Claimant) sought to bring this tort action against City. Claimant gave notice to City that it was pursuing a negligence claim against it, claiming damages in the amount of $19,590. Claimant then brought a lawsuit in the district court, requesting $19,590 in damages. Several months later, Claimant sought leave to amend its petition to raise the amount of alleged damages to $228,088. City objected, arguing that Claimant's notice did not include "a statement of the amount of monetary damages that is being requested" as required under Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-105b(d)(5). The district court granted Claimant's petition, finding that Claimant's statutory notice substantially complied with 12-105b(d). A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the notice was in substantial compliance with the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Claimant's notice substantially complied with 12-105b(d), as the notice contained all the information required by the statute; and (2) when a notice conforms with section 12-105b(d), subsequent amendments to the pleadings are subject to an inquiry into a claimant's bad faith or misleading conduct. View "Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Shultz" on Justia Law

Defendant allowed Kim Driscoll to drive a car belonging to Defendant and others knowing Driscoll was incapable of safely driving the car because he drank alcohol on a daily basis and was a known reckless driver. Driscoll filed a negligent entrustment claim against Defendant and the other owners of the vehicle, claiming they owed him a duty not to give him control of the vehicle. The district court dismissed Driscoll's petition for failure to state a claim on the basis that state law does not recognize a first-party negligent entrustment claim. The district court then certified its decision as a final judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kansas law recognizes first-party negligent entrustment claims. Remanded. View "Martell v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in the course of providing aid to a calf that he was escorting onto a neighbor's property. Appellant sued to recover medical damages from the neighbor (Appellee), claiming that Appellees were negligent in creating a dangerous condition on their property that presented an unreasonable risk of harm by leaving their gate open and by leaving a clothesline wire running across the ground. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, holding that Appellant was a trespasser on Appellees' property and they had breached no duty toward him. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court applied the incorrect standard for the duty of care in this case. Remanded for the submission of new arguments predicated on the proper duty. View "Wrinkle v. Norman" on Justia Law

On the second anniversary of her husband Curley's death, Plaintiff, individually and as the representative of the estate of Curley, filed a lawsuit against defendants Doctor and Hospital, in which she raised wrongful death and survival claims based on alleged medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by a two-year limitation period. In so concluding, the court found that the causes of action accrued on the last date on which Defendants' negligence could have occurred and the date on which Curley's injuries were first ascertainable. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the basis for Plaintiff's lawsuit did not accrue until Curley's death. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as to the wrongful death action, holding that a claim for wrongful death accrues on the date of death unless information regarding the fact of death or the wrongful act that causes the death was concealed or misrepresented; and (2) reversed the court of appeals' holding regarding the statute of limitations applicable to the survival action, holding that the survival action in this case was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Martin v. Naik" on Justia Law