Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Kansas Board of Workers Compensation concluding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) unambiguously requires a claimant to move for extension within three years of filing an application for hearing for the claim to survive a proper motion to dismiss, holding that the statute unambiguously prohibits an ALJ from granting an extension unless a motion for extension has been filed within three years of filing the application for hearing. Appellant filed an application for hearing with the Kansas Division of Workers Compensation asserting that he fell and injured himself while working for Employer. Approximately three years later, Employer filed an application for dismissal, arguing that the ALJ should dismiss Appellant's claim under section 44-523(f) because Appellant had failed to move the claim toward a hearing or settlement within three years of filing his application for hearing. The ALJ granted Employer's application to dismiss. The Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute was correct. View "Glaze v. J.K. Willliams, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Kansas Workers Compensation Board (Board) affirming an ALJ's denial of Helen Knoll's application for hearing with the Kansas Division of Workers Compensation (Division), holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) controlled Knoll's claim and required its dismissal. More than five years after Knoll filed her application with the Division, Employer moved to have Knoll's claim dismissed under section 44-523(f)(1) because the claim had not proceeded to a final hearing within three years of the filing of an application for hearing. The ALJ concluded that Knoll's motion for extension was timely and entered an award of compensation. The Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that dismissal was appropriate because Knoll did not file a motion for extension within three years of filing her application for hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a workers compensation claimant filed an application for hearing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-534 after Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) took effect in 2011, the 2011 statute governs the claim; and (2) because Knoll filed her application for hearing six months after the 2011 amendments became effective, section 44-523(f)(1) controlled her claim. View "Knoll v. Olathe School District No. 233" on Justia Law

by
In this appeal concerning the statutory definition of "idiopathic causes" contained in the statute excluding benefits for certain accidents or injuries the Supreme Court held that the Workers Compensation Appeals Board improperly denied benefits to Terrill Graber, who was injured when he fell down a workplace stairway, holding that there was not substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that the accident or injury arose directly or indirectly from an idiopathic cause under the statutory exclusion. There was no evidence presented in this case showing why Graber fell down the workplace stairway. The Board construed the term "idiopathic causes" in Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f)(3)(A)(iv) broadly to cover all unknown causes and denied compensation. The court of appeals reversed after defining the term more narrowly. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration consistent with this opinion, holding that the term "idiopathic causes" in this context means medical conditions or medical events of unknown origin that are peculiar to the injured individual. View "Estate of Graber v. Dillon Companies" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc. subject to the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) and compelling it to provide records requested by the State through the Kiowa County Commission but reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand the case for further proceedings. The district court held that an instrumentality of the county such as Great Plains is a public agency and not exempted from KORA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination as to whether the requested documents were relevant to evaluating Great Plains’ performance of its contract terms. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the Court of Appeals decision remanding the case to the district court for further determinations was erroneous because a request under KORA is not limited to performance of contractual terms. View "State v. Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Substantial evidence supported the Workers Compensation Board’s decision to deny workers compensation benefits to Appellant, who was severely injured when he was hit by a drunk driver while walking from a bar to his hotel. At the time of the accident, Appellant was a laborer working an out-of-town roofing job. The Board found that Defendant’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as defined by the Kansas Workers Compensation Act (KWCA). View "Atkins v. Webcon" on Justia Law

by
In an appeal of a Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) summary decision granting a compensating use tax refund to BHCMC, L.L.C., doing business as Boot Hill Casino & Resort, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed whether such a tax could be imposed on Boot Hill for electronic gaming machines it did not (and, under the law and its management agreement with Kansas Lottery, could not) own. Boot Hill challenged its payment of $801,588.95 in compensating use tax for the years 2009 through 2011. The amount assessed was based on the sale price for electronic gaming machines (EGMs) that Boot Hill purchased out of state for use at the casino it manages in Dodge City. The Court held that Boot Hill did not exercise a right or power incident to ownership of personal property in order to be subject to a compensating use tax for that property. Because Boot Hill has not exercised such a power or right, the Supreme Court affirmed BOTA's refund and the Court of Appeals panel decision that upheld it. View "In re Tax Appeal of BHCMC video" on Justia Law

by
A crane permanently attached to a truck chassis and associated tools do not qualify as cargo under 49 U.S.C. 31101(1), and therefore, the truck does not qualify as a commercial vehicle subject to registration and fee requirements under the federal Unified Carrier Registration Act (UCR). The Kansas Corporation Commission fined Appellant, whose truck was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, for failure to register and pay the fee required by the Act. Appellant requested a hearing to challenge the UCR violation. The Kansas Corporation Commission upheld the fine, concluding that Appellant’s truck was a commercial motor vehicle. The district court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and vacated the fine, holding that the Commission, district judge, and court of appeals erroneously affirmed the fine because Appellant’s crane and tools did not qualify as cargo, and therefore, the truck was not a commercial motor vehicle in Appellant’s fleet. View "Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

by
The Wabaunsee Board of County Commissioners appointed Robert Miller to serve a four-year term as Wabaunsee County Appraiser. Nearly two years into Miller’s appointment, the Board voted to terminate Miller and stop paying his salary and benefits. Miller exercised his statutory right under Kan. Stat. Ann. 19-431 to have his termination reviewed in an administrative hearing. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ordered the Board to reinstate Miller, but the district court vacated the decision. On remand, the ALJ gave deference to the Board’s decision and upheld Miller’s termination. Miller appealed, arguing that his termination was not in accordance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 19-431 because the Board did not have the authority to terminate a county appraiser. The district court affirmed the termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19-431 did not grant the Board the final authority to terminate Miller’s employment and thereby end his salary and benefits. Remanded with an order to determine the amount of back pay owed to Miller. View "Miller v. Board of Wabaunsee County Commissioners" on Justia Law

by
Mark Byers, who worked as a grinder at Acme Foundry, was injured in a workplace accident. After Byers was released from the hospital he agreed to do a drug test. Byers’ urine sample was thrown into the trash, however, when Acme’s in-house nurse determined that there was not enough urine in the collection cup. An administrative law judge concluded that Byers forfeited his benefits under the Workers Compensation Act by providing an inadequate urine sample for testing. The Workers Compensation Board upheld that ruling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Byers’ actions did not amount to a refusal. Remanded. View "Byers v. Acme Foundry" on Justia Law

by
Jeffrey Sperry, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility (LCF), filed a lawsuit seeking civil damages from the LCF Warden and the Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he had been exposed to lead paint and asbestos while incarcerated at LCF. The district court dismissed all claims except Sperry’s claims against the Warden and Secretary in their individual capacities. Approximately two years later, the district court dismissed all remaining claims when ruling on multiple motions to dismiss filed by the Warden and Secretary. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Sperry’s state law claims and reversed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. The Warden and Secretary petitioned for review, arguing that the district court and court of appeals erred in considering material outside the pleadings when ruling on motions to dismiss. Sperry cross-petitioned for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in ruling that his failure to attach proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies required dismissing his state law claims. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision that Sperry’s claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that the district court and court of appeals erred in not enforcing the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 141, and the error was not harmless. View "Sperry v. McKune" on Justia Law